Continuity — what has never changed

Permanent factors (geography, history, culture) impart continuity; dynamic factors (domestic and geopolitical change) cause change. Foreign policy evolves gradually, not in sharp breaks with the past.

Enduring interests, values and objectives → preservation of territorial integrity and independence, promotion of international peace and security, and economic development. The core continuing values:

• Non-alignment → independence from military blocs; abstentions from Cold-War-era votes and again on Russia–Ukraine.
• Multilateralism → active participation in the G20, BRICS and the SCO.
• Strategic autonomy → independent decision-making; refusal to join alliances like NATO; balanced relations with Russia and the US.
• Development cooperation → the ITEC programme and concessional lines of credit as soft power.
• Democratic principles and peaceful co-existence.

Change — the phases of India’s foreign policy

India’s foreign policy has evolved through distinct phases, following S. Jaishankar’s classification.

Six phases — from optimistic non-alignment to energetic diplomacy. 1 · Optimistic Non-Alignment (1946–62 — resisting dilution of sovereignty, rebuilding the economy, consolidating integrity; a leading role in founding NAM) → 2 · Realism & Recovery (1962–71 — pragmatic choices after the 1962 war; the Indo-Soviet Treaty (1971)) → 3 · Regional Assertion (1971–91 — liberation of Bangladesh through hard power; sanctions after Pokhran I (1974)) → 4 · Quest for Strategic Autonomy (1991–98/99 — in a unipolar world: nuclear capability, engaging the US, Israel and ASEAN; the Gujral Doctrine) → 5 · Balancing Power (1998/2000–2013 — the India–US nuclear deal (123 Agreement); BRICS; stronger ties with Russia; common causes with China such as climate change) → 6 · Energetic Diplomacy (2014–present — reassessing non-alignment; Neighbourhood First; a bid for a permanent UNSC seat; Act East and SAGAR)

Is ‘energetic diplomacy’ a justified label?

• Each earlier phase has a neat description; the current one is harder to categorise because India is still in the early phase of a major transition, with the near future not yet clear.
• Jaishankar rests the present phase on Indian aspirations and the goal of emerging as a leading power, recognising a world of convergences and issue-based arrangements.
• The India Way → treat the world as a ‘transactional bazaar’ and major powers as ‘frenemies’, basing partnerships on interests, not idealism.

“Engage America, manage China, cultivate Europe, reassure Russia, bring Japan into play, draw neighbours in, extend the neighbourhood and expand traditional constituencies of support.”

S. Jaishankar

• Markers of energetic diplomacy → leadership of the Global South, a refined Indo-Pacific strategy, and plurilateral activism (BRICS, G20, SCO); the goal of Viksit Bharat by 2047.
• Critical view → the label registers greater activism and risk-taking, but core objectives — autonomy, security, development — show strong continuity; the government has run ahead of Track-II (media, think-tanks, academia).
• Overall → the phases show adaptability and pragmatism; ‘energetic diplomacy’ is a justified description of intensity and ambition, though it is an evolving and still-contested category rather than a settled doctrine.

The Three Change Debates — qualitative shift, post-Cold War turnaround, Nehruvianism to Neoliberalism

A. Qualitative shift from previous regimes

• PM Modi has claimed to make India a leading power — a qualitative step beyond India’s earlier role as a balancing power.
• Institutional and strategic markers → the rise of the Quad, the JAI trilateral, Act East, foundational agreements with the US, and SAGAR in the Indian Ocean.
• Ronak Desai → India no longer sees the Palestine conflict in zero-sum terms. Harsh V. Pant → India’s West Asia engagement has jettisoned the traditional balancing approach, with deeper ties with the UAE and Saudi Arabia.
• A firmer posture → the Doklam stand-off, surgical strikes, and pre-emptive strikes in Pakistan.
• Continuities that qualify the shift → Gandhian idealism, the Gujral Doctrine with some neighbours, strategic autonomy, and South–South cooperation.
• C. Raja Mohan (Modi’s World) → Modi’s foreign policy heralds the “Third Republic” — after the Nehruvian era and the Manmohan era of economic reform.
• The change is one of pace, ambition and risk-appetite more than a wholesale break with core national interests; qualitative shifts are real, but they build on continuities of strategic autonomy and civilisational identity.

B. The post-Cold War turnaround

• The turnaround arose from systemic shocks, domestic economic stress, and a reframed doctrine that recast older ideals for a new order.

“The collapse of the Soviet Union and the concomitant end of the Cold War…forced India’s policymakers to make drastic changes” · “nonalignment ceased to have much meaning.”

Sumit Ganguly

• The 1991 fiscal crisis — oil prices after Kuwait’s invasion, mass repatriation from the Gulf, loss of remittances → abandoning import-substituting industrialisation and dismantling regulations.
• Nirupama Rao → the quest for strategic autonomy was driven by sustained economic growth, energy and maritime security, and access to technology, achieved by forging well-rounded relationships with all major powers.
• The post-Nehruvian discourse translates non-alignment into strategic autonomy and favours multi-alignment in a polycentric order.
• Shivshankar Menon → sovereignty and territorial integrity remain the foundation of the international system — revealing limits in adopting coercive norms like R2P.
• Outcome → the Indo-US civil nuclear agreement, a recognition of India’s emerging great-power potential.
• Critical view → crisis-driven liberalisation combined with strategic autonomy and identity-based continuities, even as tensions between sovereignty and universalist claims persist.

C. Nehruvianism to Neoliberalism

• Nehruvian foreign policy → non-alignment, anti-colonialism and peaceful co-existence; leadership of NAM; refusal to join NATO or the Warsaw Pact. Rajiv Sikri → Nehru sought sovereignty and strategic autonomy while supporting global peace and disarmament.
• Transition → the 1991 economic liberalisation marked the beginning of a shift where economic growth, globalisation and pragmatic engagement took centre stage.
• The US–India Civil Nuclear Deal (2008) → a symbol of the shift from a non-aligned posture to a pragmatic strategic partnership.
• C. Raja Mohan and Harsh V. Pant → India began to prioritise economic and strategic interests in an interconnected, multipolar world.
• Neoliberal markers → economic diplomacy, the WTO, multiple FTAs, and Act East deepening ties with ASEAN and Japan. Strategic partnerships → LEMOA with the US, the Rafale deal with France, and participation in the Quad.
• Continuities → caution about fully aligning with any power; strategic autonomy; South–South cooperation; egalitarian stands at climate and trade forums.
• Shyam Saran → strategic autonomy remains the guiding principle, but the means have changed. Ashley J. Tellis → India’s approach is flexible, forming partnerships without rigid ideological commitments.
• Conclusion → India is moving towards a neoliberal outlook, but realist factors defining its national interest will continue to dictate the pace; it is not a prisoner to any single stream.

D. Major features of the 21st-century policy

Overall → a shift from a non-aligned, reactive approach to a proactive, multi-vector one, combining traditional principles with contemporary priorities.

The Strategic Culture Debate

Jack Snyder coined ‘strategic culture’ in 1977 — the set of principles, conditioned emotional reactions and habitual behaviour a strategic community shares regarding strategy.

• George K. Tanham (Indian Strategic Thought, 1992) → India lacked a strategic culture, tracing this to four influences — geography, history, culture and the British Raj — plus the Hindu concept of ‘time’ discouraging planning, and Indians being kept out of strategic circles → foreign policy that is reactive rather than proactive.
• Rebuttal by Shivshankar Menon → India has always been an independent actor; it practises frugal diplomacy, economical in entanglements but not engagements; a pluralistic, secular, defensive security perspective.
• India’s contributions to strategic thought → the Arthashastra, non-alignment, Panchsheel, the Indo-Pacific vision; Nehru’s non-alignment drew on Kautilya’s mandala of concentric circles.
• Bharat Karnad → the Chinese Wei-qi model scores over India’s less-engaged, mandala-infused approach; strategic autonomy has led to strategic diminution.
• David Malone → the absence of a “grand strategy” has been advantageous — the ability to improvise fits a pragmatic international stance.
• The way ahead → multi-sum security (national, transnational, human, environmental, transcultural) replacing zero-sum games.
• Shivshankar Menon stresses the need for India’s diplomatic–strategic–academic community to develop its own perspectives (Raja Menon and Rajiv Kumar, The Long View from Delhi).

Does India have a strategic culture? — the fault line

Snyder coined the term in 1977 · the way ahead: multi-sum security over zero-sum games

Conclusion

• India’s foreign policy is the outcome of many determinants — geography, history, culture, social structure, economy, leadership, domestic milieu, defence and security, and the international situation — interacting at different levels of analysis.
• Permanent factors impart continuity; dynamic factors bring change → the movement from Nehruvian idealism to a pragmatic multi-alignment is best read as evolution, not rupture.
• Policy-making remains leadership-driven, working through the dominant power base of the PMO and the influence of the Prime Minister over institutions such as the MEA. At the same time the institutional base is undoubtedly broadening, as India’s expanding international interaction demands more disparate voices — Parliament and the states, the NSC, think-tanks and universities, business and the diaspora.
• Across every phase, strategic autonomy has remained the defining value, adapted to a vastly transformed international order.