The Concepts, and Why They Are Contested

“International politics is a struggle for power.”

Hans Morgenthau

• This unit supplies the vocabulary through which states read and act on the world — national interest, power, security, balance of power and deterrence, transnational actors, collective security, the world capitalist economy.
• Every concept is contested → realism, liberalism, constructivism, Marxism and the critical approaches read the same word differently; no single definition closes the debate.
• The thread running through the unit → how states pursue survival and advantage under anarchy, and how far that account survives globalisation, interdependence and non-state actors.

National Interest — Meaning, Nature, Components

• The foreign-policy equivalent of public interest; the material on which foreign policy is built.
• Two layers → a constant / permanent motivation (survival) and a variable content that shifts with systemic factors.
• Core interest → security, sovereignty, strategic autonomy. Variable interest → India’s non-alignment in the Cold War shifting to multi-alignment thereafter.
• Hans Morgenthau ties survival to three identities → physical (territory), political (the political-economic system), cultural (historical values).
• Broader components → economic, security, geopolitical, ideological / cultural interest.

Classification — Thomas W. Robinson’s Six Categories

Definitions, and the Four Readings

• Charles Lerche → “the fulfilment of general, long term and continuing purpose which the state, the nation, and the government all see themselves as serving.”
• Vernon Van Dyke → what states seek to protect or achieve in relation to each other.

An Essentially Contested Concept

• Joseph Frankel → the search for a theory of national interest is futile; the term is used so loosely it defies definition (he cites the Pakistani Army invoking “national interest” for self-interested ends).
• Raymond Aron → a pseudo-theory. K.J. Holsti → “as an object of inquiry [it] is a bottomless pit.”
• Furniss and Snyder → “national interest is what the nation decides it is.”
• Charles Beard → a deceptive term serving ruling elites. Scott Burchill → used for legitimation but lacking substance.
• Achin Vanaik → its power derives from being a principle of legitimation.
• Despite the vagueness, the concept is indispensable for describing, explaining and justifying state behaviour → Henry Kissinger: discerning national interest is essential to effective policy.
• Illustration → “national interest” has justified Russia’s action in Ukraine, US weapons programmes, and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

Instruments and Methods of Promotion

Realist toolkit → military build-up, balance of power, intelligence, strategic autonomy. Liberal toolkit → institutions, international law, economic interdependence, soft power, development assistance. Globalisation and technology keep adding to both.

The Dynamic Nature — and “Whose Interest?”

• Core interests stay constant; dynamic interests shift with systemic change (Morgenthau) → leadership, narrative and the balance of forces all move the content.
• China aligned with the USA for growth, then turned assertive as its power grew → interest is adaptive.
• US insistence on freedom of navigation in the South China Sea as a “core” interest; North Korea–US deterrence dynamics; diplomacy advancing dynamic interest (the JCPOA, 2015); propaganda reshaping interest-narratives (the Russia–Ukraine information war).
• Whose interest? → governments frame it as collective will, but elites, lobbies and ideology shape it — US–China rivalry benefiting defence and manufacturing; Brexit framed as sovereignty yet opposed by business and youth; Atmanirbhar Bharat and India’s Ukraine neutrality contested at home; fossil-fuel lobbies weakening climate commitments.

Power — Meaning, Definitions, Features

• A relational concept → the capacity to shape the behaviour of others.
• Hans Morgenthau → the ability to influence the thoughts and actions of others.
• Georg Schwarzenberger → the capacity to impose one’s will on others through effective sanctions.

“A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.”

Robert Dahl

• Dahl’s reading → power is relational, multidimensional and impermanent.
• Evolution → from the military-centric view of the classical realists (Thucydides, Machiavelli) to the economic and soft-power dimensions of modern theory.
• Features → both a means and an end; dynamic and relative (India’s standing fell after 1962, recovered after 1965 and 1971); actual vs potential (available strength vs latent capacity mobilised in crisis); unequal — no two nations hold equal power.

Elements and Dimensions

• Elements → geography and location (Napoleon’s emphasis; England’s naval rise), size, natural resources (US near-self-sufficiency), demography, military power, economic status, social cohesion (homogeneity strengthens, heterogeneity complicates), technology and R&D, intelligence (RAW, IB), leadership and personality.
• Elements skilfully used become determinants of power.
• Dimensions → military (a precondition for great-power recognition), economic (satisfies needs; controls others by granting or denying access to goods and services), psychological (opinion, image, propaganda, persuasive negotiation — amplified by mass media, NGOs and social movements). The three are inseparable.

Classification of States by Power

Types of Power — Hard · Soft · Smart · Sharp · Fast

The two poles — and the four newer coinages between them

SMART POWER — coined by Suzanne Nossel, popularised by Joseph Nye: the two, mutually reinforcing (carrot + stick). India at Doklam — rapid troop deployment alongside the Wuhan Summit.

Nye’s three sources of soft power: Culture — when attractive · Political values — democracy, human rights, rule of law, applied consistently · Foreign policies — when seen as legitimate and just

• Instruments → cultural diplomacy, education, media, public diplomacy — China’s broadcasting, the EU’s multilateralism, India’s yoga diplomacy.
• Relevance → complements hard power; central to reform of multilateral institutions, climate justice, peacekeeping and non-proliferation; its weight rises with interdependence and information technology.
• Limit → Dhruv Jaishankar: soft power not backed by hard power is pointless — hence Nye’s own call for smart power. Attraction supplements material capability; it does not replace it.

Scholarly Views, and the Constructivist Reading

• Kenneth Waltz → a bipolar order is the most stable; national interests align with bloc interests.
• Robert Gilpin (War and Change in International Politics) → states alter the system as their interests evolve, using military, economic and technological capabilities.
• John Mearsheimer (offensive neorealism) → a hegemon strengthens itself and weakens rivals to dominate its region.
• Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane (Power and Interdependence) → asymmetrical interdependence is itself a power resource.

Constructivist view

• Power is rooted in shared meanings, identities and norms, not fixed material facts → we never see the world through naked eyes.
• Nicholas Onuf and Alexander Wendt → ideas shape how states define interests and threats — and ideas can change.
• Giambattista Vico and Immanuel Kant → the social world is human-made and filtered through consciousness; intersubjective meanings produce outcomes.
• Anthony Giddens (structuration) → by thinking differently, actors can transform structures — including anarchy itself.
• Challenge to realism → anarchy and the security dilemma are intersubjective, not given. Challenge to liberalism → it goes past institutions, democracy and trade to ask how an issue becomes “security” at all.

“Anarchy is what states make of it.”

Alexander Wendt

Polarity of Power

• The structure of the international system read off the distribution of great-power capability → unipolar, bipolar, multipolar.
• A vague concept → Morgenthau noted four connotations of “balance,” Ernst Haas eight.
• Unipolar → one preponderant power, no comparable rival. Monteiro’s features → an anarchic system, no balance of power, mutual relations without overarching control; proponent William Wohlforth. Risk → an overstretched hyperpower turning megalomaniac.
• Bipolar → two blocs; alignment, competition, zero-sum dynamics (the Cold War).
• Multipolar → several centres competing to fill vacuums (the Concert of Europe, the interwar period).

The stability debate — how structural realism ranks the three. Bipolar — most stable (Kenneth Waltz: the two powers manage rapid mutual adjustment, preventing escalation) → Unipolar — next (No counter-coalition forms, but the preponderant power overstretches) → Multipolar — least stable (John Mearsheimer: unbalanced multipolarity — a potential hegemon among small states — is the most dangerous of all). Mearsheimer → polarity is the chief cause of war; balanced multipolarity is the less feared variant.

Hegemonic Stability, and the Relevance of the Polarity Thesis

• Hegemonic Stability Theory (George Modelski, Robert Gilpin, Stephen Krasner) → a dominant hegemon with capacity and will sustains order; Krasner’s hegemons → the British Empire, then the USA.
• A hegemon must hold three attributes together → capacity to enforce rules, willpower, and commitment to a mutually beneficial system. Hegemons supply collective goods and counter the free-rider problem.
• Limits → it struggles to stabilise order, may generate conflict among hegemons, and cannot absorb uneven growth.
• Is polarity still useful? Questioned → America’s post-Soviet unipolar rise produced no counter-coalition; Nehru’s “nervous peace” critique. Criticised for oversimplification (it sets aside ideology, culture, economics), unclear measurement of power, and the dynamism of the system.
• Revival → China’s rise and counter-coalitions like the Quad reinforce the thesis; iterations such as the balance of terror and the nuclear balance extend it. David Hume → so long as common sense holds, the idea stays relevant.
• Verdict → limited, but indispensable for mapping the distribution of power.

Contemporary Centres of Power

• Global power → worldwide influence, hard and soft capabilities. Paul Kennedy → a great power’s strength varies historically and with the political environment. Martin Wight → a dominant power can create, define and monopolise international conflicts.
• Kenneth Waltz’s five requirements of a great power → population and territory; resource mobilisation; economic output; political stability; military strength and outreach.
• Regional power → a major share of regional GDP and trade, dominant military, political and cultural influence (India, Brazil). Sub-regional power → influence over neighbours on a smaller scale, aspiring to regional status.
• Post-Cold War emergence → decline of bipolarity, rise of globalisation, emergence of non-state actors, redistribution of power. Robert J. Guttman → a 21st-century superpower needs economic and military strength, a strong market and technological prowess, a young educated workforce, and global vision.

Security — the Security Dilemma and the Insecurity Dilemma

• The core concept of the discipline, which is often called Security Studies. Hobbes → security of life is the fundamental value. For realists, security is national security defined by military power.
• Security dilemma → a defensive build-up by one state is read as aggressive by others, triggering retaliatory build-ups. Developed by John Herz from the Hobbesian state of nature; Robert Jervis’s offence–defence theory explains its severity. Booth and Wheeler → “the quintessential dilemma of international politics.”
• Insecurity dilemma → Brian Job (The Insecurity Dilemma): in the Third World, people are at risk from their own state; national security defined as regime security is pitted against ethnic, social and religious demands. Georg Sorensen → 21st-century states suffer internal threats from ethnic movements, non-state actors, failed states and civil wars.

Two dilemmas, one loop — and each feeds the other. SECURITY DILEMMA (External · inter-state — John Herz: my defence is read as your threat) ↔ MUTUAL REINFORCEMENT (Each dilemma deepens the other) ↔ INSECURITY DILEMMA (Internal · state vs society — Brian Job: the regime is the threat). External threats justify internal repression · internal weakness invites external aggression — the Cold War arms race, the Arab Spring.

• Liberal response → collective security shifts the focus from national to international security; security communities and interdependence dampen the dilemma. Amitav Acharya → the security dilemma may not fit Third World states at all.
• Overcoming it → trust-building, transparency in military activity, international institutions, strong and stable societies. Contemporary backdrop → Russia–Ukraine, Israel–Gaza, US–China.

Theoretical Perspectives on Security

The cut examiners like → instrumentalist theories (realist, liberal, Marxist) against reflectivist theories (feminist, constructivist, critical, Copenhagen).

Human Security

• Shifts the referent from the state to the individual → freedom from fear, want and indignity.

Economic · Food · Health · Environmental · Personal · Community · Political

• T.D. Truong → states may be economically secure while their people face violence, patriarchy and environmental harm; the focus must move from freedom from fear to freedom from want.
• Economic security is not human security → a working woman may earn well and still face harassment; income guarantees neither dignity nor safety. Feminist critique → traditional national security is masculine-biased and creates a “security paradox” (Ann Tickner).
• Barry Buzan (People, States and Fear) → five sectors of security — military, political, economic, societal, environmental — interconnected, so that a threat in one affects the others.
• Illustrations → COVID-19 (health security), the Syrian refugee crisis (societal security), the Rohingya crisis (political security), climate-driven displacement.
• Realist caution → so deepened as to be nearly meaningless; states’ resources are finite and the concept raises false expectations. Human security complements economic security; it does not replace it.

Securitization and Security Communities

• Securitization (Copenhagen School) → the process by which actors transform an issue into a matter of existential security through speech acts — declaring something a security issue makes it one. Scholars → Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde. Examples → the Arctic framed as an existential threat; migration in Europe.
• Security communities → Karl Deutsch (1957): a region where war becomes improbable or unimaginable and problems are solved by peaceful change.
• Two kinds → amalgamated (merger under one authority — the USA and its thirteen colonies) and pluralistic (sovereignty retained — USA–Canada).
• Conditions → compatible core values and the capacity to respond predictably and non-violently; Carole Weaver adds balanced multipolarity.
• Redefined after the Cold War by the constructivists Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett around shared values and identities → ASEAN, MERCOSUR, the Pacific Islands Forum, SAARC. The lesson → anarchy can be transcended through shared norms.

Third World Security, and the Amorphous-Concept Debate

• Mohammed Ayoob (The Third World Security Predicament) → traditional security studies lack the tools to analyse the weak, post-colonial states of Asia, Africa and Latin America; their core problem is internal, not external.
• Amitav Acharya (“The Periphery as the Core”) → the dominant understanding of security wrongly fixes on the inter-state level, excludes non-military threats and trusts the global balance of power; Cold War hegemony armed the Third World without democratic filters.
• Caroline Thomas → arbitrary colonial boundaries ignored ethnicity and geography, breeding conflict.
• Sources of insecurity → weak nationalism, weak institutions, poverty, legitimacy deficits, dependence on great powers; Homer-Dixon’s scarcity conflicts (simple-scarcity, relative-deprivation, group-identity).
• Peripheral realism → the major threat to the Third World comes from within; developed states are mere facilitators.

Has “national security” been widened out of meaning?

• The concept has widened from military defence to economic instability, cyberattacks, pandemics and climate change.
• Concern → an over-broad concept becomes vague and is misused to justify surveillance, curbs on liberty and intervention — the securitization of non-military issues.
• Defence of the widening → military and non-military threats now blur; a narrow definition leaves cyber, economic and environmental vulnerabilities unaddressed. Buzan’s five sectors give a structured way to widen without dissolving the concept.
• The balance → transparency and public discourse; strong oversight; prioritisation and graduated response. Widening is necessary, but bounded — so that security enables rather than inhibits human flourishing.