Ethnicity, Insurgency and Nation-Building

Background

• Territorial, religious and ethnic disputes in South Asia are rooted in the years before and after the end of almost three centuries of British colonisation. At the end of the colonial period in 1947, the subcontinent was divided along religious lines into Hindu-majority India and Muslim-majority East and West Pakistan.
• Since the formation of nation-states, the religious and ethnic dynamics of the tragedies of 1947 and 1971 have been exploited by ultra-nationalistic politicians, some media outlets and extremist groups to undermine regional cooperation.
• South Asia has multi-ethnic, plural societies which have faced challenges of varying degree and intensity to their national integrity; legacies of colonial rule have made nation-building harder.
• Instances → the tribal problems of the Chakmas in Bangladesh, the Northeast in India, the Baloch in southwest Pakistan; the Kashmir issue; organisations such as the LTTE in Sri Lanka.

Basis of ethno-nationalism

• Attributable to the nature of pre-colonial societies and the impact of colonial rule upon them. The historical legacy and structure of pre-colonial South Asian societies shaped the demands and struggles of ethnic groups — the claim of pre-colonial Tamil separatists in northern Sri Lanka lends legitimacy to their claim for a Tamil Eelam in what they term their traditional homeland. Similar claims to a historical ethnic homeland appear among the Sikhs in India, the Baloch and Pashtuns in Pakistan, the Chakmas in Bangladesh.
• After independence the post-colonial state encroached on the traditional autonomy and privileges of groups which even the colonial powers had not disturbed, producing demands for autonomy or independence in northeastern India and in Balochistan.

“The post-colonial state is actually the colonial state with new rulers.”

Ross Mallick

The post-colonial state has centralised pre-colonial states into a political and administrative straitjacket regardless of ethnic and religious identity, mobilising separatist ambitions. Bangladesh, founded on a strong linguistic identity, tried to integrate the Buddhist, non-Bengali-speaking tribal minority into Muslim Bengali culture, leading to violent clashes between tribal guerrillas and the Bangladesh army in 1976.

“It all depends on how a state manages its developmental problems. Depending upon the state’s capability to accommodate the grievances of ethnic groups, these assertions fluctuate from dormancy to militancy.”

Ghoshal

Impact on nation-building

• Nation-building is complicated by the task of integrating heterogeneous ethnic groups into the mainstream of national politics; these states have had to establish political, social and economic institutions while forging a cohesive nationalism across diverse populations.
• The issue challenges the sovereignty of South Asian states — Tamil insurgency challenged Sri Lankan unity and integrity; in northeastern India the target of insurgency is the sovereignty of the state, its police, army and other institutions.
• Insurgency and autonomy movements often produce ethnic riots, especially between tribal and non-tribal groups or between tribes; all such developments get linked to state policy for the region.
• Afghanistan, among the most ethnically diverse countries in the world, has seen this diversity undermine nation-building — the Taliban takeover the latest instance. In Nepal, the Madhesi issue challenges the stability of the democratic transition.
• A major hurdle to socio-economic development: conflict-ridden regions cannot be accessed by governments for security reasons and trade is difficult, producing poor living standards which in turn create disaffection towards the state.
• Urmila Phadnis and Rajat Ganguly (Ethnicity and Nation-building in South Asia) → addressing ethnic movements across the subcontinent in a single volume requires dealing adequately with a diversity of groups, several national political systems, significant socio-political change, knotty issues of definition, conceptualisation and analytical scale, and an uneven literature.

Cross-border ethnic geography

• Tamils across the Palk Strait; Madhesis across the India–Nepal Terai; Bengalis across the India–Bangladesh border; Naga and Chin-Kuki communities across the India–Myanmar frontier — no ethnic conflict in the region stays domestic.
• Bilateralisation in practice — the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict drawing in the IPKF and shaping India’s UNHRC votes; the Madhesi question producing the 2015 blockade; illegal migration from Bangladesh entering Indian electoral politics; ULFA and NDFB camps in Bhutan and NSCN-K activity from Myanmar.

Terrorism and ceasefire violations

• David Scott — a constant refrain from India is its sense of Pakistan as a state sponsoring ‘terrorism’.
• Origins → support to Kashmiri and Sikh insurgents in the 1970s, part of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s search for forward strategic depth, a substitute for Pakistan’s lack of depth and early warning after 1971.
• After the loss of East Pakistan, Pakistan turned to asymmetric balancing. General Zia-ul-Haq began the ‘thousand cuts, zero-option war’ policy. Pakistan has also aided Khalistani separatists.
• Despite the Ceasefire Agreement of 2003, cross-border violations continue and have risen since 2009. Repeated attacks such as Pathankot and Uri rendered SAARC ineffective; after the surgical strikes relations reached a point of no return.
• The dual burden → terrorism denies India a decisive victory and simultaneously limits India’s ability to achieve regional hegemony.
• Ashley J. Tellis — jihadi terrorism is the perfect instrument for continuously coercing India. It gives the “deep state” plausible deniability, avoids conventional confrontations Pakistan is certain to lose, and converts Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent into a licence to needle New Delhi without exposing itself to heavy retaliation.

Why terrorism became policy — the logic chain. 1971 (East Pakistan lost; no depth, no early warning) → BHUTTO (Search for forward strategic depth) → ZIA (‘Thousand cuts, zero-option war’) → 1998 (Nuclear cover makes it low-cost) → INDIA (No decisive victory; no regional pre-eminence)

India’s earlier approach, and the choice since

• Three decades of policy centred on stopping infiltration across the LoC, negotiating a mutually acceptable political settlement, reducing violence within Jammu and Kashmir and reinvigorating the political process. A series of popular elections followed, with violence at its lowest point in 2012.
• Vivek Chadha — option one: “more of the same”. Continued talks despite occasional strikes, an offensive-defence posture along the LoC limiting infiltration and retaining moral ascendancy, sustained in the hope that domestic blowback and international aversion would eventually change Pakistan’s calculation.
• Vivek Chadha — option two: premised on the Pakistan Army’s vested interests being immovable. Unless India could impose costs on the Army itself, terrorism would continue with only tactical adjustment; India therefore needed pressure points against the Pakistan Army. Recent years reflect this second option.

Balochistan

• In the southwest of Pakistan, about half the country’s territory, rich in gas, gold, copper, oil and uranium, yet among its poorest regions. Gwadar port gives it strategic weight.
• Unresolved autonomy → the incorporation of Balochistan, including the formerly independent Kalat, has produced persistent grievances. Human rights abuses, economic exploitation without local benefit and ethnic nationalism against Punjabi dominance sustain the conflict.
• Pakistan accuses India of supporting Baloch nationalist activity; India generally maintains a non-interventionist stance but has occasionally highlighted the region’s plight.
• Suhasini Haidar → mentioning Balochistan puts pressure on both China and Pakistan, since CPEC depends on secure access through Gwadar.
• Sadanand Dhume → the reference reflects scepticism about productive dialogue with Pakistan in present circumstances.
• Kanwal Sibal → by raising Balochistan in his Independence Day speech, the Prime Minister put Pakistan on notice about its own internal vulnerabilities.

The 1987 Accord and the Thirteenth Amendment

Provisions of the Accord

• Merger of the northern and eastern provinces, where Tamils were in a majority, into a single province.
• Substantial devolution of power to the Northern Province.
• Dissolution of the LTTE and surrender of arms within a very short time.
• The Indian army to aid the Sri Lankan government if requested.
• The Thirteenth Amendment to create provincial councils, and to make Sinhalese and Tamil national languages while retaining English as the link language.

What the Thirteenth Amendment is

A new constitutional arrangement for power sharing between the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority, and between centre and provinces — a Provincial Council system, a constitutional structure providing the substance of federalism.

Consequences

• The Indian Peace Keeping Force played a role in controlling the insurgency, but Operation Pawan turned into a thankless venture.
• Hated by Sri Lankan Tamils and Sinhalese alike, the IPKF was characterised as an army of occupation by the Premadasa regime. India protected Sri Lanka’s national interest at heavy cost without acknowledgement, and the Premadasa administration used unconventional methods to force the IPKF out.
• Despite the failure, the enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment was a significant step towards devolution across the island.

Contestation — the fishermen and the ethnic question

Fishermen and Katchatheevu

• India recognised Sri Lankan sovereignty over Katchatheevu in 1974 without adequate safeguards for traditional fishing rights; Indian fishermen retained access for rest and drying of nets, not for fishing.
• Attacks on and arrests of Indian fishermen have increased, driven partly by depletion of marine resources on the Indian side; Sri Lanka protests the use of big trawlers and bottom trawling, which is illegal in its waters and damaging to marine ecosystems.
• The International Maritime Boundary Line is demarcated but fishermen on both sides cross it. Incidents have included the Sri Lankan navy firing on Indian fishermen, contrary to UNCLOS principles.
• Measures — a Joint Working Group on fisheries; a direct hotline between coast guards; release of detained fishermen and boats on humanitarian grounds; development of deep-sea fishing skills to reduce pressure on traditional grounds. The issue should be treated “as a purely humanitarian and livelihood concern”, with force never resorted to.
• A proposal for licensed fishing for southern Tamil Nadu fisherfolk in Sri Lankan waters met stiff resistance from Northern Province fishers, backed by MPs cutting across party lines. Possible approaches include a formal lease arrangement for the island or other cooperative resource management.

The ethnic question

• Jaffna Province has a large concentration of Tamils who began demanding a national homeland, a Republic of Eelam, over about 18,000 sq km.
• Two categories of Tamils — about a million Ceylon Tamils whose forefathers migrated in ancient times, and about a million who went during the nineteenth century, many without citizenship, whose status dominated early relations.
• The Sinhalese fear of Tamil domination is the principal reason behind the conflict; Tamil youth who lost faith in non-violence organised themselves into the Liberation Tigers, seeking a sovereign Eelam.
• The earliest attempt at settlement was the 1953 Nehru–Kotelawala agreement; Tamils alleged it was not implemented sincerely and many became ‘stateless persons’. The 1956 language disturbances aggravated tensions, and the 1983 violence was described as an ‘ethnic explosion‘.
• India continues to favour a peaceful solution within the framework of Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, through negotiation and without outside interference, and welcomes devolution to areas largely inhabited by the Tamil minority.

Regional Flashpoint: Myanmar

On 1 February 2021 the military — the Tatmadaw — launched a coup, declared the November 2020 election invalid and imposed a state of emergency.

• Nationwide protests met a brutal crackdown — arrests of elected leaders and journalists, live fire on demonstrators.
• Deep roots: Myanmar has been mired since independence (1948) in one of the world’s longest civil conflicts; resistance forces — ethnic organisations and the People’s Defence Force — control large parts of the territory; the economy has contracted.
• Regional spillover: refugee outflows, illegal gambling, drugs, human trafficking and scam operations; the Rohingya crisis strains Bangladesh (Cox’s Bazar) and others; statelessness raises the risk of radicalisation.
• The ASEAN test: a softer line than the West, mindful of China; consensus-based, non-interference diplomacy makes unanimous action hard. Indonesia and Malaysia are most willing to speak out, while Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam largely follow China’s lead — the crisis challenges ASEAN’s centrality and credibility.
• For India: Myanmar is a strategic land–maritime gateway to South-East Asia. The crisis has stalled connectivity projects and development assistance; tens of thousands of displaced people shelter across India’s north-eastern states, with pressure on border management (FMR, fencing).
• Way forward: humanitarian assistance, support for the displaced, regional stability, and quiet channels of dialogue with and between the junta and the opposition, including armed ethnic groups.