The Two Houses & Their Powers

Composition — Article 79

Parliament = President + Lok Sabha + Rajya Sabha. It is the supreme Union legislature, the national forum of opinion, the institution of executive accountability, a symbol of unity and a forum of transformation.

Unlike the British Parliament, the Indian Parliament is not legally sovereign — it is limited by the written Constitution, Fundamental Rights, the federal division of powers, judicial review and the basic structure doctrine.

Lok Sabha — House of the People

Directly elected on universal adult franchise; five-year tenure unless dissolved; representation roughly proportionate to population; controls the executive through confidence/no-confidence; primacy in finance. Special position: Money Bills can originate only here; the Council of Ministers is collectively responsible to it; a no-confidence motion can remove the government only through it.

Rajya Sabha — Council of States

Purpose: federal representation, continuity in legislation, a forum for “second thought”, a check on hasty legislation, space for experienced and nominated members. Composition: indirectly elected by state assemblies; 12 nominated members (art, literature, science, social service); a permanent House, not subject to dissolution. Special powers: Article 249 (legislate on the State List in national interest), Article 312 (initiate All-India Services), participation in amendments, and functioning during emergency when the Lok Sabha may be dissolved.

The Upper House’s justification has often been more about “second thought” than firm “state rights”.

W.H. Morris-Jones

N. Gopalaswamy Ayyangar supported it as a chamber of sober reflection.

For Rajya Sabha

• Protects federal balance · improves deliberation · represents expertise · a revising chamber · continuity · supports pluralism. Theory: Mill‘s chamber of revision · Bhargava‘s principled disagreement · Chandhoke‘s minority rights · Bhatia‘s institutional protection of constitutional values.

Against Rajya Sabha

• Weak on Money Bills · cannot remove government · may delay · used to rehabilitate politicians · unequal state weight · nominees as loyalists · bypassed via ordinances / Money-Bill route. P.B. Mehta: misuse of ordinances and Money Bills to bypass scrutiny. Subhash Kashyap: deadlocks weaken law-making. M.V. Rajeev Gowda: party politics hits efficiency.

Law-Making, Money Bills, Finance & Privileges

How a law is made — the ordinary route. Bill introduced (Minister / Private Member) → Readings & debate → Select / Joint Committee (optional) → Passed by both Houses → Joint sitting if deadlock → President’s assent → ACT. Money Bill side-rail: originates only in Lok Sabha → Speaker certifies → Rajya Sabha may only recommend → must return within 14 days → Lok Sabha may accept or reject.

Financial control

No tax without parliamentary sanction; no withdrawal from the Consolidated Fund without approval; budget debate and grants; committee scrutiny through the Public Accounts Committee, Estimates Committee and Committee on Public Undertakings.

Parliamentary privileges — Articles 105 & 194

Purpose: protect free speech in the House, ensure legislative independence, shield members from external pressure, enable scrutiny of the executive, maintain the dignity of the legislature. Articles 122 & 212 bar judicial scrutiny on procedural grounds; courts may intervene where constitutional rights are substantively violated.

• P.V. Narasimha Rao (1998) → earlier protection for bribery-linked speech/vote inside the House.
• State of Kerala v. K. Ajith (2021) → privilege is not a gateway to escape ordinary law.
• Sita Soren v. Union of India (2024) → parliamentary immunity does not protect bribery.

Codification debate — for: clarity of scope, natural justice, judicial review, accountability, protection against misuse; against: erosion of autonomy, excess judicial interference, reduced flexibility, need for wide consensus. Upendra Baxi: privilege must not block transparency. Rajeev Bhargava: the tension between privilege and individual rights. M.P. Singh: privilege with safeguards against abuse.

The Speaker & Presiding Officers

The Speaker represents the authority, dignity and freedom of the House — the whole House, not a party or constituency.

Constitutional basis: Article 93 (Speaker & Deputy Speaker), 94 (vacation/resignation), 95 (Deputy Speaker’s powers), 96 (not to preside during own removal). Salary charged on the Consolidated Fund → institutional independence; presides over joint sittings under Article 108.

Core functions: presides and maintains order; interprets rules; allocates time; admits questions and motions; certifies Money Bills; refers Bills to committees; decides disqualification under the Tenth Schedule; protects privileges; continues in office after dissolution until a successor is chosen.

“The Speaker represents the House. He/She represents the dignity of the House, the freedom of the House … the Speaker becomes a symbol of nation’s freedom and liberty. Therefore that should be an honoured position … occupied always by persons of outstanding ability and impartiality.”

Jawaharlal Nehru

“The chief characteristics attaching to the office of Speaker … are authority and impartiality.”

Thomas Erskine May

The Vice-President chairs the Rajya Sabha and is expected to remain non-partisan.

Problems & controversies

Elected on a party ticket and often retaining party association; bias risk in anti-defection decisions; controversial Money-Bill certification (e.g. the Aadhaar Bill); declining referral of Bills to committees; large-scale suspension of opposition members; no strong neutrality convention like the British Speaker.

• Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992) → the Speaker’s Tenth-Schedule decision is subject to judicial review.
• Raja Ram Pal (2007) → proceedings are not immune from review where substantive illegality exists.
• Nabam Rebia (2016) → a Speaker facing a removal motion cannot decide disqualification.
• Keisham Meghachandra (2020) → disqualification should normally be decided within three months.

“Speakers … hold a pivotal position in the scheme of parliamentary democracy and are guardians of the rights and privileges of the House.”

Supreme Court, Kihoto Hollohan

Reforms: consult the Leader of Opposition; build a neutrality convention; adopt “once a Speaker, always a Speaker”; no party post in office; bar immediate post-tenure executive office; transfer anti-defection adjudication to the Election Commission or an independent tribunal; committee-based scrutiny of Money-Bill certification; timely disqualification. Jürgen Habermas stresses free, fair deliberation; John Stuart Mill, procedural neutrality.

Anti-Defection Law & the Speaker’s Dilemma

Inserted by the 52nd Amendment, 1985 (Tenth Schedule); strengthened by the 91st Amendment, 2003. Purpose: end “Aaya Ram, Gaya Ram” politics; stability; party discipline; respect for the mandate; less horse-trading.

Grounds of disqualification: voluntarily giving up party membership; voting/abstaining against the whip without permission; an independent joining a party; a nominee joining a party after the permitted period.

The adjudication problem — and the reform direction. Speaker decides (Tenth Schedule) → Dual identity: party leader + quasi-judge → Neutrality & delay concerns. REFORM → President / Governor on EC advice (Art 103 model) · OR independent tribunal of retired judges · 3-month limit · confine to survival votes. Maxims engaged: nemo judex in causa sua (no one judges their own cause) · audi alteram partem (hear the other side).

Judicial review: Paragraph 7 tried to bar review; in Kihoto Hollohan (1992) the Court upheld the Schedule but struck down the exclusion — judicial review is part of basic structure; courts may review the Speaker’s decision after it is made. Related: P.M. Kaliappan v. P.M. Sayeed (1999), A.K. Kraipak (1969), U.O.I. v. Tulshiram Patel (1985), Jagjit Singh v. Haryana (2006).

Reform proposals: the Dinesh Goswami Committee and 170th Law Commission Report favour shifting adjudication to the President/Governor on Election Commission advice (Article 103 model); independent tribunals; a three-month period; and limiting the law to votes affecting the government’s survival.

Scholarly assessment: K.R. Venugopal and Subhash Kashyap support it for stability/discipline; Fali S. Nariman criticises it for reducing legislators to “voting machines”; M.P. Singh for stifling dissent; Justice J.S. Verma warned against misuse; Rajiv Dhavan seeks balance with conscience; N.R. Madhava Menon would limit it on conscience issues.

Parliamentary Committees

“Congress in session is Congress on public exhibition, whilst Congress in its committee-rooms is Congress at work.”

Woodrow Wilson

Smaller bodies of members from one or both Houses that examine Bills, budgets, departmental performance, public expenditure, policy documents and executive action. Authority: Article 105 (privileges/powers) and Article 118 (rules of procedure).

Types: Standing — PAC · Estimates · CoPU · DRSCs · Ad hoc — JPC on 2G · Select Cttee, Surrogacy Bill 2016

Financial committees: Estimates Committee (Lok Sabha only; suggests economy — Asok Chanda on rationalising expenditure); Public Accounts Committee (audits sanctioned spend; “twin sister” of the Estimates Committee; W.H. Morris-Jones saw it as a deterrent against waste); Committee on Public Undertakings (state enterprises; Indrajit Gupta criticised weak implementation). DRSCs (after 1989) bring continuous oversight, technical scrutiny, non-partisan review and cross-pollination between Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha.

Committees “identify pressing and prospective issues, suggest solutions, and highlight gaps in implementation.”

Chakshu Roy

High-impact measures such as the farm laws and the Delhi (Government of NCT) Amendment Act, 2021 were passed without full committee scrutiny.

Issues: weak political will, executive dominance, partisan use, short one-year tenure, poor attendance, thin research support, non-binding recommendations, delayed Action Taken Reports, jurisdictional overlap, weak transparency. P.B. Mehta links weak committees with executive centralisation; Rajeev Bhargava and Zoya Hasan warn against partisan functioning; Upendra Baxi notes non-binding reports reduce control; Faizan Mustafa stresses expertise; Gautam Bhatia warns excess consensus dilutes dissent; Neera Chandhoke cautions against avoidable judicial intervention.

Kalpana Mehta v. Union of India → committee reports may be used as a persuasive external aid in statutory interpretation.

“All Bills should be referred to DRSCs … [which may] finalise the second-reading stage in the committee.”

NCRWC

Opposition, Decline & Changing Profile

The Opposition

Central to responsible government — it scrutinises policy, questions ministers, offers alternatives, voices minorities, mobilises debate and prevents concentration of power. Instruments: Question Hour, debates, adjournment and privilege motions, no-confidence, committee scrutiny, amendments, public mobilisation (e.g. the GST/GSTN debate, Land Acquisition Bill 2015, CAA, Triple Talaq). Neera Chandhoke wants coherent alternatives; Gautam Bhatia links it with public-interest scrutiny; Faizan Mustafa and M.P. Singh note fragmentation weakens it; Bhargava and Mehta regret the loss of ideological depth.

Decline of Parliament — the Shankar & Rodrigues arc

Three phases — effectiveness to “federation of anarchy”. Phase 1 — to 1960s: Congress dominance, deliberative culture, ~120 sitting days/yr (1952–72) → Phase 2 — 1970s+: Disillusionment, Emergency, regional & social movements → Phase 3 — 1990s+: Coalitions, disruptions, criminalisation, 17th LS ~58 days/yr. Budget Session 2023: Lok Sabha functioned for 33% and Rajya Sabha for 24% of scheduled time; only 16% of Bills in the 17th Lok Sabha went to committees.

Parliament as a “federation of anarchy”.

Hamid Ansari

World Bank parameters for assessing legislatures: financial accountability, compliance, efficiency, effectiveness, relevance, sustainability.

Decline thesis

• P.B. Mehta (executive dominance) · Zoya Hasan (marginalised lose voice) · Subhash Kashyap (archaic procedure, weak discipline, poor party system) · Devesh Kapur & Mehta (criminalisation, weak committee experience).

Against decline

• Arvind Virmani (Parliament still functional through Bills, questions, output) · Shashi Tharoor (democratic vibrancy) · Shankar & Rodrigues (it has broadened and deepened democracy despite stress).

“Good governance needs good legislatures to oversee the performance of the executive.”

Venkaiah Naidu

Changing profile of parliamentarians — three phases

• Phase 1 (to 1960s): upper-caste, urban, foreign-educated, movement-derived authority, part-time politicians; OBCs, women and minorities under-represented.
• Phase 2 (1970s–90s): the “Twilight Zone” — the Green Revolution strengthened landowning OBCs, regional parties rose, Indian-educated and full-time politicians increased.
• Phase 3 (1990s+): plebianisation — stronger OBC representation; caste, religion and ethnicity become central; education improves; the rural–urban divide weakens; women’s representation long remained low.

M.N. Srinivas links low female representation to a patriarchal mindset; Bhargava and Austin see early Parliament as elite constitutionalism; Chandhoke sees democratisation producing identity politics; Robert Michels‘ Iron Law of Oligarchy helps explain the rising wealth of MPs; Faizan Mustafa links wealth with elite capture; Mehta warns performance may replace substance; Zoya Hasan and Carl Schmitt frame the tension between identity mobilisation and deliberative institutions.