India & the Wider UN Agenda

Beyond peacekeeping — development, poverty, climate, terrorism, piracy, disarmament, human rights and peacebuilding.

• Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (2023–2027) — a joint UN–India framework across health, education, growth, environment and community empowerment.
• Forests — India’s Green Credit Program presented at the UN Forum on Forests. Disarmament & AI — the UN’s disarmament chief discussed AI’s implications for security ahead of the Conference on Disarmament.
• Global agenda — the MDGs, the SDGs, climate summits, and the CCIT framework against terrorism.

India’s Demand for a Permanent Seat

17.1 Basis of the demand

The Council’s structure is largely unchanged since 1945, when five victors — China, France, the UK, the US and the then USSR — took permanent seats. India’s case rests on representation and equity, Global South representation, economic and demographic weight, its peacekeeping record, nuclear-power status and regional stability. Article 23 of the Charter itself directs that elected members be chosen with regard to their contribution to international peace and security — a criterion India meets on the Charter’s own terms.

Three reasons — Harsh V. Pant (“The Challenge of Reforming UN”) (1) acknowledgement that India is a great power; (2) assurance the UNSC is not used against India, as happened in 1948 on Kashmir; (3) capacity to stop sanctions against smaller countries.

17.2 Grounds of the claim

• Bridging divides — between the P2 and P3, India presents itself as a neutral state able to build consensus. World view — Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam and a constitutional commitment to international peace.
• Extensive association — founding member; eight non-permanent terms, most recently 2021–22. In July 2026 India launched its bid for the 2028–29 term under the vision SHANTI (Securing Holistic Advancement through Norms, Trust and Integrity), naming counter-terrorism, maritime security and the governance of artificial intelligence among its priorities.
• Intrinsic strength — the most populous country, the fifth-largest economy and second-largest by PPP, a responsible nuclear power, and the world’s largest democracy. Leader of the Third World — NAM and the G-77.
• Global issues & expertise — the MDGs, SDGs, climate summits, the CCIT, and long counter-terrorism experience; a pluralistic society; active in the G20 and BRICS.
• Global support — the US, Russia, the UK and France, and well over 120 states across the L.69 and African Union blocs.

17.3 Views of scholars

Peacekeeping as a Ground for the Seat

Over seven decades, peacekeeping is the strongest single ground India advances — readiness to shoulder exactly the global responsibility expected of permanent members.

• C. Raja Mohan — peacekeeping shows moral authority and strategic capacity. Ramesh Thakur (From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect) — emerging powers’ contributions strengthen their case in global governance.
• Shashi Tharoor (Pax Indica) — involvement reflects readiness for greater responsibility. Arundhati Ghose (India’s Role in the United Nations) — peacekeeping has bolstered India’s diplomatic standing.
• The counter-argument — contribution has not brought a greater say; funding, not troops, determines influence. Anit Mukherjee — “not commensurate to results”; Thierry Tardy — the 1996 election loss to Japan.

The tension that drives the reform push: Heavy contributor (Largest cumulative peacekeeper) → Light representation (No proportionate say in mandates) → Reform campaign (Those who implement should shape)

The G4 Proposal

Members — Brazil, Germany, India and Japan: significant economic and regional powers offering mutual support for permanent seats reflecting twenty-first-century realities.

The model — a 25-member Council

→ Six new permanent and four non-renewable non-permanent seats — directly addressing the long-noted deficits of Africa and Asia.

• Inis Claude Jr. — the veto was a deliberate design to prevent enforcement against any of the Big Five: structural paralysis by choice.
• The P5 treat veto reform as non-negotiable; the G4 has accepted, as a transitional compromise, that the veto be limited to existing permanent members “for at least 15 years”.
• Restraint, not removal, is the realistic path. The UNGA veto initiative (resolution 76/262, 2022) forces a vetoing state to explain itself before the Assembly within 10 working days; the ACT Code of Conduct and the France–Mexico initiative pledge against the veto in the face of atrocity crimes — though of the P5 only France and the UK have signed the former, and only France the latter.
• Bharat H. Desai — these shifts “open the doors for the… permanent membership without veto”, a “pragmatic way out” for India and the G4.

Uniting for Consensus (Coffee Club)

Members — formed in the mid-1990s under Italy; core members include Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Italy, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, the Republic of Korea, San Marino, Spain and Türkiye, speaking for roughly 50–55 states. Preference — expand non-permanent seats only (longer-term, re-electable) with curbs on the veto; its March 2024 proposal took this line.

Objections — new permanent seats would “freeze privilege” and widen the divide between large and small states; reform must respect Article 108 (two-thirds of the UNGA plus ratification by all five veto-holders). Motivation — regional rivalries, with Pakistan opposing India and Italy opposing Germany.

→ India’s position: it has rejected the UfC plan and called for a credible “UN 2.0” at the Inter-Governmental Negotiations (2024), describing the slow pace as a “wasted opportunity”. The Chair’s “Convergences and Divergences” paper of 17 June 2025 confirms deep splits and no agreed negotiating text.

China & India’s Claim

• China is the main opponent of India’s permanent membership — a position tied to their history of border conflict — and has repeatedly declined to welcome India into the permanent category.
• India has explicit backing from four of the five permanent members — the US, the UK, France and Russia. China remains non-committal and could veto any Charter amendment.
• China uses peacekeeping to build defence diplomacy with African nations; C. Raja Mohan notes this has given it a political advantage over India. In Delhi, the seat is seen as a way to balance Chinese power in Asia, and in South Asia.

Impediments in India’s Path

• Charter rigidity — a two-thirds UNGA majority plus ratification by every permanent member, so a single veto stops enlargement. Opposition — the UfC group, plus competing claims from Africa and Latin America that dilute support.
• Great-power calculation — the P5 are reluctant to admit members who would dilute their influence; divide-and-rule preserves the status quo; Russia and the US weigh their support against wider bargains with Beijing.
• Procedural deadlock — fifteen years of IGN without a single negotiating text, and no agreed criteria for permanent membership.
• India-specific — non-signature of the NPT (despite “No First Use”) and a modest UN-budget contribution.

Three further constraints — Mukherjee and Malone (1) Resource constraints — limited means hinder consistent lobbying; (2) Normative engagement — India needs deeper engagement with the normative side of Council issues; (3) Entitlement vs realpolitik

entitlement is insufficient; strategic alliances are necessary.

→ The larger question — Neelam Deo, C. Raja Mohan and Shyam Saran warn a “Cold War 2.0” could sideline the UN, making the seat less consequential than pragmatic partnerships; Ramesh Thakur cautions that threats of “non-co-operation” carry reputational cost; Teresita Schaffer notes India’s growing “multilateral personality”.

The Veto Question

Should India accept a permanent seat without the veto, or insist on full parity with the P5?

• Insist on the veto — Natwar Singh and Ambassador Nirupam Sen: new permanent members must have veto rights, or the Council runs on two tiers. Commodore Uday Bhaskar: refuse seats without the veto, since acceptance would entrench the original five.
• Flexibility — India has agreed to delay veto discussions and the G4 accepts a fifteen-year moratorium. Bharat H. Desai reads veto-restraint norms as a “pragmatic way out”; Chinmaya R. Gharekhan urges realism and practical arrangements such as semi-peripheral membership.
• The obstacle to parity — Ashley Tellis: reluctance to grant the veto reflects concern about India’s independent foreign policy. Rajesh Rajagopalan takes the opposite route — abolish or limit the veto altogether.

→ India’s settled position: true reform needs equal rights for new permanent members; a seat without the veto is an inadequate compromise.

India’s Diplomatic Strategy

• Maximize support in the UNGA — leadership in the G-77 and NAM to build a two-thirds majority; the L.69 Group (India services its secretariat), which presses for an “accountable, representative, transparent” Council; and the G4.
• Minimize resistance in the UNSC — bilateral outreach and strategic partnerships; demonstrating credibility (democratic record, responsible nuclear posture, peacekeeping); and presenting itself as necessary on terrorism, climate and development.

What scholars advise Ramachandra Guha — prioritize internal development over superstar status. C. Raja Mohan — guard against being bargained by the West. Ramesh Thakur — non-cooperation is a possible but risky lever. Shyam Saran

build concrete power instead of chasing illusory goals.

India & the UN’s Ineffectiveness in Recent Crises

The UN’s failure on Russia–Ukraine and the West Asian conflicts has sharpened scrutiny of its structural limits. India’s response is shaped by strategic autonomy and the non-alignment tradition.

25.1 The Russia–Ukraine crisis

• India has consistently abstained on resolutions condemning Russia in the UNSC, the HRC and the UNGA.
• Historical ties & defence dependence — S. Jaishankar treats India–Russia as a consistent fixture; C. Raja Mohan and Harsh V. Pant point to reliance on Russian hardware and diplomatic backing on Kashmir.
• Strategic autonomy — abstention preserves autonomy amid polarization; Narendra Modi’s line to Putin, “now is not an era of war”, expresses a preference for dialogue. It also helps avoid a Russia–China–Pakistan axis.

25.2 West Asia

• Israel–Palestine — India supports a two-state solution, direct negotiations and Palestinian rights while deepening ties with Israel; Happymon Jacob calls this dual engagement “pragmatic idealism”.
• Iran — cautious engagement on the nuclear question and sanctions; India presses for international law and peaceful settlement while pursuing energy interests, particularly through Chabahar Port.

25.3 Scholarly assessments

Shyam Saran and Suhasini Haidar criticise the paralysis of the UN and the Council’s inability to act because of veto politics. Think tanks such as ORF and IDSA note India’s advocacy for multilateralism alongside its readiness to act independently. → The posture combines realist strategy, multilateral advocacy and pragmatic idealism.

Theoretical Perspectives

→ Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye supply the corrective: institutions can redistribute control toward those already at the centre of networks — precisely India’s complaint about the Council.

Important Scholarly Assessments

Conclusion

India’s engagement runs on two tracks that reinforce each other — a leading troop and police contributor supporting day-to-day operations, and a reform advocate pressing for a Council that reflects contemporary power. Contributor in the field, reformer in diplomacy, stakeholder in the organization’s future.

• Credibility earned in the field supplies both the moral standing and the policy content of the reform case — representation for implementers, credible mandates, safety of peacekeepers, technology-enabled operations.
• The gap between contribution and Council outcomes sustains the campaign and will not close through merit alone — Charter rigidity, competing regional claims, veto politics and great-power competition all work against a quick result.
• Institutions built for the twentieth century will not serve the twenty-first: the Council risks irrelevance, and the world risks turbulence with no one able to address it. A UN unwilling to reform will erode its own legitimacy and meet the fate of the League of Nations.

India and the UN — the Approach

• Harsh V. Pant → Indian leadership holds that working in and through bodies like the UN serves both India and the wider international community. India saw the UN as the central instrument for peace during the Cold War; since then its engagement has shifted, and it now spearheads reforms to make the body more representative, credible and effective.
• Among these reforms, UNSC reform is of special interest. From the early 21st century India has pursued permanent membership, building collective positions through the G4 (from late 2004) and the L69 group (from 2007), and cultivating individual country pledges.
• April 2023 → EAM S. Jaishankar said India would soon become a permanent member, arguing that the West cannot keep its door closed to a rising economic power for long.
• Harsh V. Pant is cautious: reform is highly unlikely soon, yet India keeps spending precious diplomatic capital on the seat, treating it as an almost indispensable foreign-policy priority.
• Why the Council must change → the UN was formed after the Second World War and still mirrors that order, not today’s distribution of power. It failed to prevent the genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia, the interventions in Iraq and Libya, and the enforcement of law in the Nicaragua and South China Sea disputes; failure was visible in Syria and Yemen, and is visible now in the Russia–Ukraine war. Whenever a veto-wielding P5 interest is engaged, the Council fails.

The process of reform — the real barrier — Charter amendment needs two-thirds of the General Assembly, and two-thirds of the Security Council including all permanent members. The second threshold is the barrier: most P5 members (apart from the UK and France) oppose significant change and can veto it.

The five reform issues: Categories of membership · The veto · Regional representation · Size and working of an enlarged Council · Council–Assembly relationship

India’s Case for a Permanent Seat

A permanent seat has been on India’s agenda since the Cold War’s end; the collapse of the Soviet Union left India without its primary ally and forced a reorientation.

• C. Raja Mohan → India first saw veto power as essential to its national interest, if only to keep others out of its affairs.
• Manu Bhagavan → economic reforms turned India into the new “Asian Tiger”; the Pokhran detonation announced its entry into the elite nuclear club. With this status, India embraced a narrative of exceptionalism and demanded a permanent seat in recognition of its significance.
• Securing its rightful place in the “comity of nations” has been a goal since Nehru. As the Council reflects the archaic post-1945 order, it must be restructured to reflect India’s current standing.
• The objective basis → population, size, GDP and economic potential, civilizational legacy, cultural diversity, and a working democratic system.
• Contributions → the most consistent and third-largest contributor of troops to UN peacekeeping; a demonstrated ability, as a non-permanent member, to work the machinery of global governance.
• Harsh V. Pant and Chirayu Thakkar → India is expanding its footprint in multilateral bodies and preparing to become a global rule-maker; a revisionist China’s rise has pushed the US to seek India’s role in upholding the rules-based order — but India cannot play that role without a permanent seat.
• Aarshi Tirkey → the Council’s decision-making is archaic and has obstructed action: China’s obstruction meant the 1267 Sanctions Committee took nearly a decade to designate Masood Azhar as a global terrorist. Reform is urgent to make the process representative, legitimate, efficient and transparent.

“Only reformed multilateralism with a reformed United Nations at its centre can meet the aspirations of humanity.”

PM Narendra Modi, ECOSOC speech

Points in Favour of India

• Russia, the US, France and the UK have consistently supported India’s cause; more than 50 other countries have openly done so.
• At the 2023 G20 Summit, US President Joe Biden reaffirmed support for India’s permanent membership.
• The only permanent member opposing India’s entry is China; it supports reform in principle but has never explicitly backed India’s expansion call.
• India has served eight times as a non-permanent member; in 2021 it won its eighth term with 184 of 192 votes.
• India is part of the G4, working to expand both permanent and non-permanent seats; in 2021 the G4 reiterated the need to enlarge the Council to meet complex threats.
• Harsh V. Pant and Chirayu Thakkar → India has no militarised disputes and shows no revanchist policy beyond standing issues with China and Pakistan, so the risk of abuse of power is low and it could take a relatively impartial global role.
• India has good relations with both the developing and the developed worlds — part of the G77 and (partially) the G7, and a member of the G20 — positioning it as an ideal candidate.

Challenges to India’s Demand

• Opposition to the G4 → regional rivals formed Uniting for Consensus (the “Coffee Club” — Italy, Pakistan, Spain, Argentina, Canada, Mexico, South Korea), which opposes new permanent seats but supports enlarging the non-permanent category.
• The African Group wants two permanent seats for Africa, citing historical injustice and the continent’s weight on the Council’s agenda, to rotate among African states.
• The rigid amendment process (two-thirds plus all P5) makes expansion look like a pipe dream.
• The US, UK, France and Russia express support, but the US has offered no formal written backing.
• Given India’s frequent alignment with Russia and China (BRICS, SCO, AIIB), the US and the West suspect it of belonging to a counter-hegemonic bloc, so American support is of questionable seriousness.
• The China factor → the primary obstacle; China presses for a “package solution” acceptable to all, through the widest possible consultation.
• Rivalries run deep: many Europeans oppose Germany, Argentina questions Brazil, Pakistan opposes India. Reform is like a Rubik’s Cube — it will languish while divisions are so sharp.
• Aarshi Tirkey → experts question India’s readiness to share the financial, material and political burden. India contributes about $23.4 million to the UN’s roughly $3-billion operational budget; the question is whether New Delhi will carry a larger share.

Evaluation and Policy Suggestions

Conclusion

The United Nations cannot and should not be expected to answer every problem facing the world. As Jussi M. Hanhimäki notes in The United Nations: A Very Short Introduction, it often offers ways to reduce tension and resolve problems, performs a great deal of useful humanitarian work, and makes it possible for the poor to improve their situation. It is far from flawless and, like individual states, it constantly needs to improve in behaviour and effectiveness. Yet it remains an organisation the world cannot do without — and the forum it provides, for communication and cooperation among states, has a legitimacy no other body can supply.

Proposed Models for Council Reform

“Africa is of the view that so long as it exists, and as a matter of common justice, it should be made available to all permanent members of the Security Council, even though it is opposed in principle to the veto.”

Ezulwini Consensus, 2005