Meaning & Nature of Justice

Justice belongs to moral philosophy but is finally realised through political order, law and institutions. John Rawls: “justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought.” It performs three functions — gives individuals their due; arranges rights, duties, rewards and punishments; balances liberty, equality, welfare, merit and need.

Etymology & binding function

Latin Jungere (to tie or bind together) and Jus (bond or tie). Justice is a bonding idea — it organises people into a fair order and distributes rights and duties, rewards and punishments, benefits and burdens, honours, opportunities and obligations.

Justice as ideal & dynamic truth

Justice is an ideal — the pursuit of absolute truth — with two dimensions: a static dimension (comprehension of ideal truth) and a dynamic dimension (its evolving realisation through reason and social consciousness). Social consciousness is spatial and temporal: slavery, the subjugation of women and caste discrimination were once rationalised as just and are now seen as deep injustice. Julius Stone too treats law and justice as contextual — law develops with social conditions, making justice dynamic, not frozen.

Justice as a balancing idea

Justice balances conflicting values — liberty and equality, rights and welfare, merit and need, individual claims and social good, procedure and outcome. Theories differ because they pick different ultimate values:

Liberalism: liberty · Socialism: equality · Utilitarianism: utility · Rawls: liberty + egalitarian correction · Sen: capability · Communitarianism: community & the good

Justice remains the harmonising principle of political morality.

Classical Principles — Rome, Plato, Aristotle

Roman principles

Emperor Justinian gave two classical legal principles: Alterum non laedere (do not harm others) and Suum Quique Tribuere (allocate to each what is due). These became the base for justice as non-injury and due allocation.

Plato — justice as harmony

For Plato, justice is harmony: each person performs the function suited to their nature, each class keeps its proper place, non-interference is central. Justice in the individual is harmony among parts of the soul; justice in the state is harmony among classes, with wisdom, courage and temperance arranged under reason.

Justice is “minding one’s own business and not being a busy-body.”

Plato, Republic

Features: teleological, duty-oriented, hierarchical, linked to the ideal state, not based on modern individual rights.

Aristotle — the central virtue

“justice is the bond of men in states, and the administration of justice … is the principle of order in political society.”

Aristotle

General justice aims at the complete goodness of society. Particular justice splits into distributive justice (honours, wealth, offices and goods by merit) and corrective / rectificatory justice (correction of wrongs). His principle: treat equals equally, treat unequals unequally in proportion to relevant differences — justice is proportional, not arithmetical.

Greek Perspective & the Rawlsian Concept

Both treat justice as the organising principle of political life, but the moral frame differs sharply.

Greek justice is teleological, duty-centred and hierarchical, accepting inherent inequality; law is believed to carry higher moral or natural authority and the state applies it rather than freely creating it. John Rawls begins from moral equality, uses the original position and veil of ignorance, protects liberty first, and allows inequality only when it benefits the least advantaged. Norman Barry highlights Rawls’ concern for the neediest through the chain principle. The movement from Greek justice to Rawls is the movement from polis ethics to constitutional pluralism.

Procedural · Substantive · Distributive Justice

Procedural justice — fairness of the method

Justice of rules, procedure and process — impartial courts, due process, formal equality before law, fairness in decision-making. Close to liberalism: liberty is the ultimate value, equality of opportunity is preferred over equality of outcome. In Rawlsian terms a just procedure runs through entering the contract, unanimous agreement, basic conditions (e.g. freedom of speech), protection of the most disadvantaged and stability.

“It doesn’t matter who wins if the rules and the procedures followed in a race are just.”

Norman Barry

Critique: it rejects discrimination on caste, creed, sex and religion and accepts equal dignity, but may overstretch competition. Crawford Brough Macpherson argues a strictly procedural capitalist model can destroy creative freedom; John H. Sachar notes talents may not be rewarded by intrinsic worth because social hierarchies distort competition. In India, procedural justice dominated until the Maneka Gandhi judgment, after which adjudication moved towards a mix of procedure and due process.

Substantive justice — fairness of the outcome

Fairness of the content of laws, policies and decisions — actual distribution of rights, duties and opportunities, reduction of inequality, correction of historical and structural injustice. Close to socialism: equality is the ultimate value, substantive equality over formal equality, needs-based justice a stronger form. Key elements: equity, fair distribution, redressing injustice, rights and entitlements, social welfare.

“Justice requires us to respond to structural injustice, not only by individual actions, but by changing the structures themselves.”

Iris Marion Young

The fault line of justice — method versus outcome

• PROCEDURAL — fairness of method; liberty; formal equality; liberalism · rules · due process · equal opportunity · Norman Barry
• SUBSTANTIVE — fairness of outcome; equality; needs-based; socialism · equity · redistribution · equal outcome · Iris Marion Young

Distributive justice sits between — “who gets what, on what basis?” Rawls’ equality & Difference Principle place a substantive concern inside a procedural theory.

Distributive justice — who gets what, on what basis?

Aristotle gave the classical formulation: the benefits and burdens of life — honour, wealth, assets, offices — must be shared by a just principle, and wrong distribution is met by corrective justice. Modern debate identifies three criteria: equality, merit / desert, need. David Miller, in Social Justice (1976), maps three forms:

David Miller: merit and welfare must be combined — markets help efficiency and tackle scarcity, welfare secures minimum needs, merit must be rewarded but redistribution is needed to prevent impoverishment. Egalitarian theories begin from equal share; Marxist theories place need above desert (“From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs”); utilitarian (Jeremy Bentham) seeks the greatest good of the greatest number. John Rawls distributes primary social goods — liberties, opportunities, income, wealth, powers, bases of self-respect — in lexical order. Ian Campbell calls justice an architectonic value of normative political philosophy.

Equality, Merit, Need & Economic Justice

Equality-based justice — human rights and human equality make equality a central basis; everyone must receive equal political, social and economic rights. Merit / desert-based justice — a non-egalitarian basis stressing innate worth, achievement and contribution; Aristotle distributes by merit and virtue, liberal justice uses merit through equality of opportunity; Herbert Spencer and Edmund Barker are linked with a conservative, social-Darwinian defence of free-market capitalism. Need-based justice — every person has minimum needs that must be met for personality and worth; Karl Marx: “From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.”

Liberal vs Marxist economic justice

Liberal: modern liberalism keeps private property but accepts state action — John W. Chapman, Arthur Okun and John Rawls support a moderated market order (efficiency and consumer choice, progressive taxation, social security, inequality legitimate only if it improves the worst-off). Arthur Okun: “the market needs a place, and the market needs to be kept in its place.” Marxist: justice read through production relations — law and rights reflect class ownership, private ownership creates exploitation, real equality needs collectivisation. Socialist stage: “From each according to his ability, to each according to his work”; communist stage: need-based allocation after the state withers away.

Liberalism, Utilitarianism & Rawls’ Intervention

Liberalism & procedural justice. Liberty is the central value, individual rights are protected, formal equality is emphasised, the state must not impose a single good life. Classical liberal justice tends towards procedural fairness; the neoliberal link — Friedrich August von Hayek, Robert Nozick, Milton Friedman — treats the market as a model of freedom and growth, the state preventing fraud and coercion, not redesigning outcomes.

Utilitarianism & its limits. Utility replaces liberty — the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Jeremy Bentham links justice with pleasure and pain; John Stuart Mill: “The greatest happiness of the greatest number is the foundation of morals and legislation.” John Rawls accepts utilitarianism as a progressive departure from narrow rights-talk but considers it flawed: it supports majoritarianism over egalitarianism and can make minorities a means to majority ends.

Rawls’ Kantian maxim

Influenced by Immanuel Kant: no person may be used merely as a means to the ends of others. Each person has an inviolability founded on justice; the welfare of society as a whole cannot override the loss of freedom of some for the greater good of many.

Rawls as a liberal egalitarian. He stands between absolute liberty and absolute equality — against utilitarianism (individual inviolability cannot be sacrificed), against libertarianism (market outcomes judged by fairness), against socialism (equal liberty remains prior). Liberty is lexically prior, equal basic liberty applies to all, social-economic inequality is allowed only when it benefits the least advantaged, fair equality of opportunity is required. This makes liberalism more humane; Will Kymlicka treats his work as a major factor in the revival of normative theory.

Robert Nozick’s Entitlement Theory

Developed in Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Where Rawls is influenced by Immanuel Kant, Robert Nozick is influenced by John Locke. His maxim: “From everyone as they choose, to everyone as they are chosen” — against the communist “From everyone according to his ability, to everyone according to his need.” He rejects patterned distribution: what a person earns through work and legal rules is their entitlement, and the state cannot seize holdings for public interest if acquisition and transfer are just.

Three principles of entitlement

• Justice in acquisition — how holdings are first acquired; must not violate others’ rights; akin to Locke’s proviso, “as long as enough and as good is left for others.”
• Justice in transfer — voluntary transfer by gift, exchange, sale, labour or enterprise; no force or fraud; contracts must respect individuals as ends.
• Rectification of injustice — unjust acquisition or transfer must be corrected; the state or international community may intervene to restore justice.

Nozick accepts that history contains involuntary transfers, but as long as present disparities arise from voluntary transfers he is untroubled by inequality. He reduces the state to a nightwatchman / dominant protective agency — protect against force, theft and fraud, enforce contracts, protect rights; any state beyond minimal protection violates rights.

Criticism: entitlement may ignore unequal social starting points; justice cannot focus only on giving and receiving holdings; historical injustice makes present entitlement hard to verify; first acquisition can create scarcity; market transfer may be formally voluntary but socially unequal; the minimal state cannot address structural deprivation.

Ronald Dworkin’s Theory of Justice

Ronald Dworkin — American philosopher, jurist and constitutional scholar. Central claim: equality is a sovereign virtue; every individual has a right to equal concern and respect. Two dimensions: equal treatment (similar cases treated similarly unless there is good reason otherwise) and equal assets (a just society must equalise starting assets). He criticises utilitarianism for sacrificing individual rights to collective welfare and failing to give individuals inherent value.

Welfare vs assets. Dworkin rejects equality of welfare — trying to make everyone equally satisfied rewards expensive tastes and blurs personal responsibility. He supports equality of assets: distribution must distinguish choice from circumstance — individuals are responsible for choices, while society compensates for unchosen disadvantage.

The auction & the envy test

Individuals receive equal purchasing power and bid for goods by preference. Distribution is just if it passes the envy test — if no one prefers another’s bundle to their own, it is envy-free and just.

Two sensitivities: ambition sensitivity (outcomes reflect personal choices, plans and ambition) and endowment sensitivity (inequalities from natural talent, disability or brute luck are addressed through hypothetical insurance). He distinguishes brute luck (uncontrollable circumstance — should be mitigated) from option luck (outcome of deliberate choice — not automatically compensated), and criticises Rawls for not adequately separating the worst-off due to choice from the worst-off due to circumstance. Community determines the value of goods, so market value and social valuation affect distribution.

Amartya Sen’s Conception of Justice

Capability & freedom. Amartya Sen treats freedom as central — justice should enlarge real freedom. He shifts attention from utility, primary goods and formal equality to capability (real freedoms or opportunities to achieve valued beings and doings) and functionings (achieved states and activities — being healthy, educated, employed, participating). His question, “Equality of what?”, is answered by equality of basic capabilities — capability defined through “a person being able to do certain basic things.”

Critique of Rawls. Rawls fails to take sufficient account of human diversity: people differ in health, longevity, climate, location, work conditions, disability, gender, body size and social disadvantage, so equal primary goods may not produce equal capability — a severely disabled person may need more goods to reach similar functioning. Primary goods are an inadequate metric and may produce “unjustified inequality and unfairness.”

Comparative assessment & public reasoning. Sen rejects the search for perfectly just arrangements in favour of comparative assessment, removal of clear injustice, public reasoning and democratic participation. The flute example (The Idea of Justice): Ann can play it (utilitarian), Bob has no other toy (egalitarian), Carla made it (libertarian) — there may be a plurality of right answers, so justice must allow reasoned comparison, not one perfect blueprint.

Niti & Nyaya

Niti = correct procedures, formal rules, institutions, organisational propriety. Nyaya = actual social realisation, the lives people are able to lead, the world that emerges from institutions. Nyaya is broader — justice must examine outcomes, not only design. Matsyanyaya (big fish devouring small fish) is the injustice justice must prevent; abolitionists did not claim ending slavery would make the world perfectly just, only that slavery was totally unjust.

In the Krishna–Arjuna debate of the Bhagavad Gita, Krishna represents deontological duty and Arjuna sensitivity to consequences — a theory of justice must account for both impartial principles and consequences for human lives. Pratap Bhanu Mehta criticises Sen: by avoiding transcendental principles his justice emerges only from available choices, which may weaken a firm standard of justice.

Feminist Conception of Justice

Feminist scholars argue that traditional theories exclude women and expose how patriarchy shapes law, family, social roles, rights, labour, morality and political theory. The traditional canon focuses on the public sphere, neglects the household, treats the family as natural rather than political, and overlooks care, dependency and gendered labour. Julius Stone reinforces a dynamic, contextual view — law evolves with social conditions — opening space for feminist critique.

Susan Moller Okin on gender & family

Susan Moller Okin brings gender and family into justice theory through the “gender system” — the institutionalisation of sex differences. Tradition, socialisation and role-fixation are gendered; legal systems perpetuate inequality by ignoring gender differences; women have been relegated to the household, whose concerns were excluded from justice since Aristotle; the gendered family is the root of gender inequality. She calls for reconstruction of roles, reconceptualisation of opportunities and women’s participation in shaping a “human moral theory,” and criticises Michael Walzer’s cultural relativism even while acknowledging his attention to gender.

Feminist critique of Rawls

Rawls uses generic male terms (“he,” “his,” “man,” “mankind”); the veil of ignorance does not explicitly mention sex; he recognises the monogamous family as a basic institution but does not examine justice inside it, assuming a fairly traditional gender system. Martha Nussbaum criticises the absence of women at the original position; Carole Gilligan (In a Different Voice) stresses an ethics of care against masculinist moral theory. Feminist conclusion: the family is not outside justice — care work, gender hierarchy and household power must be central to justice.

Dr. B. R. Ambedkar & John Rawls

Dr. Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar roots justice in caste oppression and social humiliation. His justice is not merely formal — it demands caste abolition, liberty, equality, fraternity, dignity, the equal worth of men and women, the abolition of untouchability, constitutional safeguards, and social and economic equality.

“we are entering an era of political equality. But economically remain a deeply unequal society. Unless we resolve this contradiction, inequality will destroy our democracy.”

Dr. Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar

For Ambedkar, justice was “simply another name for liberty, equality and fraternity”; “equality may be a fiction but nonetheless one must accept it as a governing principle”; democracy is “a way of associated living” and an ideal society “should be mobile.” Gail Omvedt: Ambedkar’s vision of a new social order is summed up in the greatest slogan of the French Revolution — “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity.” John Rawls’ justice as fairness begins instead with a fair procedure — original position, veil of ignorance, identity-blind contractors — and treats whatever principles are chosen as just (pure procedural justice), tolerating limited inequality only when it benefits the least advantaged.

Indian constitutional commitments to justice, equality, liberty and fraternity resonate strongly with Ambedkar’s egalitarian justice.

Global Justice

In the twenty-first century justice is no longer confined to the state. Drivers: economic interdependence (movement of capital, labour, goods and technology; a rising rich–poor gap between countries), human rights (Thomas Pogge: “every human being has a global stature as the ultimate unit of moral concern”), global poverty, and transnational politics (domestic problems shaped by bodies such as the World Bank). Key works: Charles Beitz (Political Theory and International Relations), Henry Shue (Basic Rights), Brian Barry (“Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective”), Steven Luper-Foy, Thomas Pogge (World Poverty and Human Rights).

Rawls on international justice. Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge extend the Difference Principle globally (affluent countries should aid the global South; global institutions perpetuate poverty). Rawls responds that domestic principles are not simply applied between societies: international justice needs principles among liberal and decent peoples — peaceful, securing basic human rights, under law guided by the common good, with a social hierarchy that exists with decency. His rules: mutual recognition of freedom and independence; observance of treaties; equity in agreements; non-intervention; a right of self-defence but not of war; honouring human rights; restrictions on the conduct of war; and assistance to peoples in unfavourable conditions.

Where does the duty of justice end — the border or the species?

• STATIST — duty territory-bound; poverty from domestic factors; aid = assistance to burdened societies · Rawls (Law of Peoples) · decent peoples
• COSMOPOLITAN — duty not territorially restricted; poverty from the international order; global egalitarian justice · Beitz · Pogge · Brian Barry · Caney · Steiner · Shue

each individual a “citizen of the world” vs special obligations to fellow citizens

Charles Beitz classifies views into political realism, the morality of states, and cosmopolitanism, and writes that cosmopolitanism “stands opposed to any view that limits the scope of justification to the members of particular types of groups.” Forms of cosmopolitanism: extreme/moderate (Samuel Scheffler), strong/weak (David Miller), radical/mild (Simon Caney) — radical denies any nation-wide distributive principle; mild allows special obligations to fellow citizens alongside global ones.

Pogge’s theory is normative and empirical — concerned with poverty, avoidable suffering, global inequality and institutional responsibility. He stresses “the huge impact of the global economic order on the incidence of poverty worldwide,” insists “Severe poverty is avoidable,” and distinguishes a negative duty (not to harm), an intermediate duty (to avoid harm) and a positive duty (to help) — treating negative duties as more stringent than the positive duties discussed by Peter Singer, Henry Shue and Peter Unger. Responsibility for radical inequality lies mainly with affluent citizens of rich countries, the elites of poor countries, and present institutional arrangements.

Social Justice & Contemporary Importance

Social justice means organising society so that every person receives legal rights, dignity, fair opportunity, protection from exploitation and social-economic security. It is dynamic — it expands as society recognises new forms of deprivation, and earlier charity-based concerns (work, unemployment assistance, housing, education, welfare) become obligations of the state.

Core elements & objections

Primacy of community interest (individual claims may be limited when they harm vulnerable groups); interconnected political equality, social dignity and economic equity; a reformative thrust; operational safeguards — Roscoe Pound’s six social interests (security, institutions, morals, material goods, progress, individual rights) and eight jural postulates that translate justice into ordinary law; affirmative action; the welfare state. Objections: expanded state power, bureaucratic patronage, threat to liberty, difficulty of measuring deprivation, new permanent inequalities, reduced incentive. Friedrich August von Hayek warns enforced equality may produce servitude; John Rawls defends institutional change when institutions are unjust; Amartya Sen adds that policy must be judged by actual freedoms.

Why Rawls still matters

Justice as fairness informs debates on income inequality and welfare; basic liberties protect civil liberties, privacy and political rights; Political Liberalism and overlapping consensus help with cultural-religious pluralism; his ideas shape global justice, intergenerational justice (the veil asks what present generations owe future ones), ethical decision-making and democratic values. The Difference Principle connects with progressive taxation and welfare; climate justice can use the veil to protect vulnerable countries and future generations. His concern for the least advantaged resonates with Mahatma Gandhi’s talisman and Deendayal Upadhyaya’s Antyodaya. Ongoing debates run through multicultural justice (Will Kymlicka), global justice (Thomas Nagel) and extensions of the theory (Philip Pettit).

Key texts beyond Rawls

Kelly Brown Douglas, Stand Your Ground (2015) · Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (2009) · Laura Valentini, Justice in a Globalized World (2011) · Lea Ypi, Global Justice and Avant-Garde Political Agency (2012).