Liberalism, Utilitarianism & Rawls’ Intervention

Liberalism & procedural justice. Liberty is the central value, individual rights are protected, formal equality is emphasised, the state must not impose a single good life. Classical liberal justice tends towards procedural fairness; the neoliberal link — Friedrich August von Hayek, Robert Nozick, Milton Friedman — treats the market as a model of freedom and growth, the state preventing fraud and coercion, not redesigning outcomes.

Utilitarianism & its limits. Utility replaces liberty — the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Jeremy Bentham links justice with pleasure and pain; John Stuart Mill: “The greatest happiness of the greatest number is the foundation of morals and legislation.” John Rawls accepts utilitarianism as a progressive departure from narrow rights-talk but considers it flawed: it supports majoritarianism over egalitarianism and can make minorities a means to majority ends.

Rawls’ Kantian maxim

Influenced by Immanuel Kant: no person may be used merely as a means to the ends of others. Each person has an inviolability founded on justice; the welfare of society as a whole cannot override the loss of freedom of some for the greater good of many.

Rawls as a liberal egalitarian. He stands between absolute liberty and absolute equality — against utilitarianism (individual inviolability cannot be sacrificed), against libertarianism (market outcomes judged by fairness), against socialism (equal liberty remains prior). Liberty is lexically prior, equal basic liberty applies to all, social-economic inequality is allowed only when it benefits the least advantaged, fair equality of opportunity is required. This makes liberalism more humane; Will Kymlicka treats his work as a major factor in the revival of normative theory.

John Rawls — Works, Society & Primary Goods

An American political philosopher in the liberal tradition. Major works: Justice as Fairness (1958 article; 1985 essay), A Theory of Justice (1971), Political Liberalism (1993), The Law of Peoples (1998). Key ideas — original position, veil of ignorance, justice as fairness, primary goods, maximin rule, Difference Principle, lexical order, reflective equilibrium, overlapping consensus, political liberalism.

Society — conflict and cooperation

Society is marked by both conflict (different interests and claims) and cooperation (a venture for mutual advantage). For Rawls society is a natural construct (individuals do not choose it), institutions must fairly balance competing claims, and justice is the first virtue of social institutions. Norman Barry’s chain principle: society is like a chain — the weakest link matters as much as the strongest, so the condition of the least advantaged decides the justice of the whole. Samuel Gorovitz calls Rawls clearly redistributionist — government must not merely keep order but achieve distributive justice by valuing the needs of the poor.

Primary goods & two moral powers

Justice is the fair distribution of primary goods — rights, liberties, opportunities, income, wealth, powers, bases of self-respect. Rawls distinguishes social goods (wages, wealth, rights, freedom) from natural goods (health, intelligence, natural ability). Parties in the original position are free and equal persons with two moral powers: a sense of justice (willingness to cooperate on fair terms — making them reasonable, unlike purely Hobbesian actors) and a conception of the good (each has an idea of a good life).

Justice as Fairness — the Derivation

Original position. Rawls revives social contract theory: free and equal persons, placed behind the veil of ignorance, choose principles to govern the basic structure of society. It works like an Archimedean point — an impartial standpoint that removes morally arbitrary advantage and makes principles fair to all. He follows the contract method of John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant, but his contract is hypothetical, not historical. Conditions: moderate scarcity, parties neither altruistic nor purely egoistic, mutual indifference, rational concern for primary goods, fair equality among parties.

Veil of ignorance. It removes knowledge of class, caste, gender, race, religion, social status, natural talents, wealth, conception of the good and fortune in the natural lottery.

“no one[’s] place in society, … fortune in the distribution of natural assets … [or] conceptions of the good. … The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance.”

John Rawls

It creates moral insulation from social contingency, prevents bargaining from privilege and forces impartial public reasoning. Critics: Amartya Sen (a transcendental approach cannot, on its own, advance justice or compare alternatives), Susan Moller Okin (Rawls “almost completely ignores women”), Michael Sandel (the veil detaches persons from the identities that make moral reasoning possible). Defence: it is a heuristic device, not a sociological description — and can be extended to gender, disability, ecological risk and future generations.

Maximin rule. Maximise the minimum — choose the best worst-case outcome. Rational persons will not risk the worst position under unjust rules; they secure basic liberty, fair opportunity and protection for the least advantaged. Maximin justifies the Difference Principle.

From the original position to the two principles. Original Position (free, equal, rational parties choose the basic structure) → Veil of Ignorance (no knowledge of class, caste, gender, talents, fortune) → Maximin (risk-averse: secure the best worst-case) → Two Principles (1 · Equal Liberty → 2 · Fair Equality of Opportunity → Difference Principle (lexical order)).

The Two Principles, Lexical Priority & Reflective Equilibrium

First Principle — Liberty Principle

Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with the same scheme for all — freedom of speech and conscience, political liberty, the right to vote, liberty of the person, rule-of-law protections. Rawls gives liberty priority.

Second Principle — Equality Principle

Social and economic inequalities must satisfy two conditions: Fair Equality of Opportunity (offices and positions open to all; birth, class, wealth, caste or gender must not block access) and the Difference Principle.

“social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged.”

John Rawls

Lexical priority

Principles apply in lexical order: the First Principle must be satisfied before the Second; equal basic liberty cannot be traded for economic gain; fair equality of opportunity precedes the Difference Principle. Liberty has priority over equality, and equality regulates distribution once liberty is secured. Rawls later softens the liberty principle from “the most extensive total system” (A Theory of Justice) to “a fully adequate scheme” (Political Liberalism), answering H. L. A. Hart’s point that liberty cannot always be mechanically ranked by rational preference.

Reflective equilibrium

A method of moral justification — a balance between general principles and considered judgments, adjusted until they form a coherent system. Narrow reflective equilibrium aligns beliefs with a particular set of principles; wide reflective equilibrium adjusts beliefs in light of all relevant moral considerations. It gives moral justification to principles and avoids both pure intuition and rigid deduction.

Contractual & Distributive; Justified Discrimination; Liberal Egalitarianism

Contractual and distributive character. The theory is contractual — principles are chosen in the original position, parties agree unanimously under fair conditions, the contract is hypothetical not historical. It is distributive — principles regulate the allocation of primary social goods and the Difference Principle protects the least advantaged. Tom Campbell calls justice the central and commanding concept of normative political philosophy; Crawford Brough Macpherson calls the theory an elegant defence of a liberal democratic welfare state while arguing it rationalises liberal beliefs rather than giving a universal theory; Robert Nozick attacks it as an “end-state” theory that reconstructs society to a preferred final pattern. Yet Rawls’ work inaugurated “a golden age in theorising about justice.”

Democratic equality & justified discrimination

Rawls calls the Difference Principle a form of democratic equality: unequal rewards are not rejected automatically, but inequality must improve the condition of the least advantaged, since natural endowments and social starting points are morally arbitrary and institutions must correct the unfair effects of luck. Limited discrimination is justified when it raises the position of the least advantaged and preserves equal liberty — through progressive taxation, affirmative action, property-owning democracy, a social minimum, India’s reservations, the U.S. Civil Rights Act. This is not charity; it is institutional reciprocity. Critics: collectivists see trickle-down capitalism, Marxists say the veil hides private property and exploitation, libertarians say redistribution forces the meritorious to part with holdings, Amartya Sen says the deprived need capabilities beyond primary goods, socialists call it a “vulgar defence of inequality,” Brian Barry doubts liberty’s lexical priority follows from rational choice.

How Rawls enriches liberalism

Four enrichments: liberty stays central (equal basic liberty has lexical priority); equality enters liberalism (social-economic inequality must be morally justified); the welfare state gets a philosophical defence (redistribution becomes a requirement of justice, not compassion); liberalism becomes anti-utilitarian (minority rights cannot be sacrificed for aggregate welfare). He rejects Soviet-style communism (violates basic liberties, fails fair opportunity) and laissez-faire capitalism (unequal life chances, weak fair competition). His preferred form: a property-owning democracy — wide distribution of productive assets, social minimum, fair value of political liberties, economic independence. David Hume’s circumstances of justice and Immanuel Kant’s moral autonomy influence him; his distributive justice compensates for morally arbitrary misfortune in the social and natural lotteries.

Rawls’ Political Liberalism

In Political Liberalism, Rawls answers communitarian and pluralist criticism by distinguishing a political conception of justice from a comprehensive doctrine. The political conception applies only to basic political and economic institutions, does not govern the whole of personal life, is free-standing, and does not depend on one religion, morality or philosophy — it arises from the public political culture of a democratic society.

Comprehensive doctrines cover all of life — utilitarianism, Kantianism, Judaism, religious worldviews, moral philosophies. Rawls does not ask citizens to abandon them; he asks them to accept a shared political conception for the basic structure.

Overlapping consensus

How can citizens holding different comprehensive doctrines accept the same principles of justice? They support one political conception for different moral, religious or philosophical reasons. This differs from mere compromise — compromise is strategic and temporary; overlapping consensus is moral and stable within democratic culture.

Reasonable pluralism is a normal feature of democratic culture: citizens disagree because they reason from different experiences and values. The burden of judgment — complex evidence, different weights on values, diverse experiences, the limits of reason — sets limits on what can be reasonably justified to others, and supports toleration and public reason.

Greek Perspective & the Rawlsian Concept

Both treat justice as the organising principle of political life, but the moral frame differs sharply.

Greek justice is teleological, duty-centred and hierarchical, accepting inherent inequality; law is believed to carry higher moral or natural authority and the state applies it rather than freely creating it. John Rawls begins from moral equality, uses the original position and veil of ignorance, protects liberty first, and allows inequality only when it benefits the least advantaged. Norman Barry highlights Rawls’ concern for the neediest through the chain principle. The movement from Greek justice to Rawls is the movement from polis ethics to constitutional pluralism.

Criticism of John Rawls

Attacked from every side — the critics around Rawls

• Nozick — too redistributive; talents are not common assets
• Marxists — too capitalist; veil hides class & property
• Communitarians — too individualistic; abstract self
• Feminists — gender-blind; family left unexamined
• JOHN RAWLS — justice as fairness
• Amartya Sen — too institutional; capability over goods
• Isaiah Berlin — lexical ordering denies value pluralism
• Brian Barry — liberty priority not forced by rational choice
• Schaefer — Difference Principle may breach Kantian equality

Criticism refines Rawls more than it displaces him — he stays the central reference point.

Functional & logical

Jean Hampton: the theory may not be truly contractarian — the veil, not bargaining, produces the Two Principles, and since all parties behind the veil are identical, real bargaining is unnecessary. Also, the defence of maximin is problematic: if parties care little for gains above the minimum, this conflicts with the assumption that each wants as much primary social goods as possible.

Libertarian & Marxist

Robert Nozick (Lockean): treating talents as common assets reduces dignity and self-respect; a person may be entitled to talents even if undeserved; using the better-off for the worst-off violates the Kantian no-means principle; redistribution violates just holdings. Friedrich August von Hayek too gives primacy to liberty and accepts market inequalities. Marxist: the veil ignores class relations — deliberation without knowledge of property is meaningless. Crawford Brough Macpherson: the system defends private capitalist enterprise and the Difference Principle resembles trickle-down. Bhabatosh Dutta: maximin can justify enriching the rich if some benefit trickles down; raising the minimum need not reduce inequality; filtration theory is empirically disproved. (Buchanan: Marxism rests on class struggle and historical development, not abstract moral philosophy.)

Feminist & capability

Feminists say the theory neglects gender, family, unpaid care and intra-household power. Susan Moller Okin: Rawls does not examine justice inside the family, the veil omits sex, generic male language hides women, the monogamous family is treated as basic but its internal inequality is unexamined. Martha Nussbaum notes the absence of women in the original position; Carole Gilligan (In a Different Voice) offers an ethics of care; Catherine MacKinnon is also placed among feminist critics. Amartya Sen: equal primary goods do not create equal real freedom — people differ in health, disability, gender and circumstance — so the primary-goods metric is inadequate and may yield “unjustified inequality and unfairness.”

Social Justice & Contemporary Importance

Social justice means organising society so that every person receives legal rights, dignity, fair opportunity, protection from exploitation and social-economic security. It is dynamic — it expands as society recognises new forms of deprivation, and earlier charity-based concerns (work, unemployment assistance, housing, education, welfare) become obligations of the state.

Core elements & objections

Primacy of community interest (individual claims may be limited when they harm vulnerable groups); interconnected political equality, social dignity and economic equity; a reformative thrust; operational safeguards — Roscoe Pound’s six social interests (security, institutions, morals, material goods, progress, individual rights) and eight jural postulates that translate justice into ordinary law; affirmative action; the welfare state. Objections: expanded state power, bureaucratic patronage, threat to liberty, difficulty of measuring deprivation, new permanent inequalities, reduced incentive. Friedrich August von Hayek warns enforced equality may produce servitude; John Rawls defends institutional change when institutions are unjust; Amartya Sen adds that policy must be judged by actual freedoms.

Why Rawls still matters

Justice as fairness informs debates on income inequality and welfare; basic liberties protect civil liberties, privacy and political rights; Political Liberalism and overlapping consensus help with cultural-religious pluralism; his ideas shape global justice, intergenerational justice (the veil asks what present generations owe future ones), ethical decision-making and democratic values. The Difference Principle connects with progressive taxation and welfare; climate justice can use the veil to protect vulnerable countries and future generations. His concern for the least advantaged resonates with Mahatma Gandhi’s talisman and Deendayal Upadhyaya’s Antyodaya. Ongoing debates run through multicultural justice (Will Kymlicka), global justice (Thomas Nagel) and extensions of the theory (Philip Pettit).

Key texts beyond Rawls

Kelly Brown Douglas, Stand Your Ground (2015) · Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (2009) · Laura Valentini, Justice in a Globalized World (2011) · Lea Ypi, Global Justice and Avant-Garde Political Agency (2012).