Route 1 conventions have multiplied since 1963 → terrorism has not receded → efficacy only partial

Route 2 a widening web of counter-terror law built → but the keystone, an agreed definition, is missing → efficacy capped

phased instruments (1963 aircraft treaty, first of its kind + five sectoral in the 1970s → aviation/shipping) → post-9/11 widening (bombings, financing, nuclear) → institutional support (FATF grey-listing, SCO’s RATS, UNSC 1267/1373/1624 → freezes, incitement) → instruments do curb finance and safe havens → definitional deadlock (no comprehensive convention, CCIT stalled, one state’s terrorist another’s freedom fighter → Heywood, “essentially contested concept”) → selective enforcement (China vs Hafiz Saeed listing under 1267 → “double standards,” BRICS/India protest) → persistence (Afghanistan, Syria)

conventions genuinely constrain terrorist finance, movement and safe havens → set against definitional deadlock + politicised, selective enforcement + terrorism still engulfing whole regions → net verdict is partial efficacy, not decisive result

Route 1 conventions manage terrorism, do not defeat it → finalise CCIT + end “good”/“bad” distinction + tie enforcement to rule of law

Route 2 Annan → a global scourge demands a global response → grounded in law and human rights, not selective convenience