Route 1 Korean denuclearisation sits at intersection of security model + deterrence + nuclear norms → summit must be judged against these logics

Route 2 NK nuclear-armed, outside NPT → Singapore opens a channel → delivery hinges on why Pyongyang holds its arsenal

security model (Morgenthau/Waltz): weapons = survival, so no denuclearisation via one meeting → deterrence (Schelling/Brodie): credible retaliation lowers incentive to relinquish → identity/status (Wendt): arsenal signals standing + regime security, more than a bargaining chip → verification = central obstacle + peaceful-use loophole (civilian → military route) → diplomacy (Keohane/Nye): dialogue valuable but needs enforceable mutual guarantees

liberal engagement case (dialogue + confidence-building can move behaviour) vs realist-structural case (survival, deterrence, unverifiable commitments make summitry alone insufficient)

Route 1 summit a beginning, not a settlement → durable denuclearisation needs verification + enforceable guarantees

Route 2 Tannenwald: sustained stigma beats one-off deals → Sagan: coercive diplomacy + arms control + norm-building together → summitry can start, not complete