Route 1 realism leaves every state to secure itself → collective security makes security of one the concern of all → liberals read it as an institutionalised balance of power

Route 2 the defining shift → competitive balancing replaced by a universal guarantee → every conceptual dimension follows from that shift

universality as the defining mark → Hartmann’s “mutual insurance plan… anywhere and everywhere” → no enemy named in advance, neutrality precluded → three conditions (treaty procedure / renunciation of war except self-defence / pledge to defend the victim) → Schwarzenberger’s machinery for joint action → institutional dimension → League: Article 10, each member judged aggression → Manchuria, Ethiopia → Charter centralises the judgement in the Security Council → Articles 39, 41, 42

the same universality strains → sovereignty indivisible, escape hatch retained → aggressor pleads self-defence, aggression left undefined → Morgenthau: freezing a status quo vs politics as struggle for power → Mannheim: “relative utopia” → the dilemma of waging war to prevent war

Route 1 premise is overwhelming power, not equilibrium

Route 2 Korea shows it can work, Ukraine how seldom it does → noble in principle, constrained in practice