Discuss the efficacy of India’s ‘no first use’ policy (nuclear weapons) in the context of the evolving strategic challenges from its neighbours.
How the answer moves
The flow snapshot — the routes in, the body, the counter-view and the routes out.
Route 1 NFU’s efficacy ≠ the pledge itself → rests on a survivable, assured second strike → 1998 → 1999 draft → 2003 doctrine (CBW caveat)
Route 2 retaliation-only pledge (shared with China) → real question = does it still deter evolving neighbour threats?
case for NFU (Sethi: no costly first-use infra / hair-trigger → de-mated posture; Koithara: eases command-and-control) → escalation burden shifted to the adversary → evolving threats test it → Pakistan TNW/Nasr + sub-conventional blunt the conventional edge → Karnad: massive retaliation vs a small tactical strike not credible → China’s fast growth (~600 warheads/SIPRI; Pentagon >1,000 by 2030) → eroded Himalayan buffer → Narang: neither credible toward China nor minimal toward Pakistan → India’s reply = capability, not reversal (triad, Agni-V MIRV 2024, Operation Sindoor calibrated strikes; ORF urges flexibility)
expansionist strain: NFU forces India to absorb the first strike, “massive” threat empty against tactical use, counterforce temptation → vs moderate case: economy, de-mated stability, no decapitation capability, first use invites an arms race
Route 1 NFU still efficacious for a dominant power facing no existential threat → task = survivability + clearer signalling, not abandonment
Route 2 discarding NFU changes little in deployment but costs the responsible-power image → strengthen triad / early warning / second strike, retain the pledge
Model answer
Handwritten, in the form it would be written in the examination hall.
