PYQ Vault · Paper 2 · Recent Developments in Foreign Policy — Part 2

Do you think that India’s capacity building role in Afghanistan has shrunk the strategic space for Pakistan there? Discuss.

How the answer moves

The flow snapshot — the routes in, the body, the counter-view and the routes out.

Flow snapshot — how the answer moves
Intro routes

Route 1 strategic depth = Pakistan’s doctrine of a pliant Kabul as leverage vs India India replied with capacity building, not arms space narrowed but conditional

Route 2 can soft/development power deny a rival strategic space? yes, partly, but bounded by hard power

Body flow

$3 bn footprint (Parliament, Salma Dam, 433 HICDP/34 provinces, ICCR students) Pant: investment ties India to Afghan stability, goodwill Pakistan can’t match connectivity (Chabahar, Delaram–Zaranj, air corridors) bypasses Pakistan, cuts transit chokehold Sikri’s Kautilyan Mandal logic (friend of neighbour’s neighbour) = structural check [counter enters] post-2021 reset resolves it: Pakistan’s depth never arrived — Taliban reject Durand Line / shelter TTP / lean Iran–China Islamabad fears encirclement, Kabul drifts to India India’s capacity-building capital Muttaqi Oct-2025 visit + Kabul embassy upgrade Pant: pragmatism not endorsement

Counter-view

soft/development power vs hard power — can goodwill deny strategic space when the rival holds ISI–Taliban links, the Haqqani nexus and geography? (Jacob: no Plan B; the 2021 fall shrank India’s own space too)

Conclusion routes

Route 1 capacity building did shrink Pakistan’s space, by denying it a monopoly and building goodwill that outlived regime change — not by displacing proxies

Route 2 the decisive collapse of “strategic depth” came from the Taliban’s own nationalism; India’s development legacy is what let it profit

Model answer

Handwritten, in the form it would be written in the examination hall.

Handwritten model answer — UPSC PSIR 2018, Recent Developments in Foreign Policy — Part 2