The Setting — India’s Western Arc

India’s western neighbourhood — the Gulf, the wider West Asia and Afghanistan — carries the country’s energy lifeline, its largest diaspora, and its most active theatre of great-power contestation.

West Asia holds 47.7% of the world’s oil and 42.7% of natural gas; more than 60% of the world’s oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz (Chinnaya R Gharekhian).

“…to shed a drop of blood for every drop of oil.”

Winston Churchill

“An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America and will be repelled by any means necessary including military force.”

Jimmy Carter, January 1980 (the Carter Doctrine)

India’s engagement has moved from an ideologically-driven Non-Aligned posture to one built on pragmatism and strategic autonomy. Two phrases mark the shift: S. Jaishankar’s “Think West and Act East,” and the “Look West” / “Link and Act West” turn under Narendra Modi.

Organising principle today

Independent, issue-based partnerships with each country — Arab Gulf, Israel and Iran — without being trapped by their rivalries or by the prism of Pakistan.

Why West Asia Matters — Five Stakes

Expert readings

• Shivshankar Menon — a more active forward policy to pursue India’s geo-strategic interests.
• Manoj Joshi — careful handling for maximum gain while avoiding political minefields.
• Rajiv Bhatia — pragmatism as the guiding principle of the transformation.

People-first strand

Protecting nationals in conflict zones is a first-order priority: during the 2025 Israel–Iran crisis, Operation Sindhu evacuated Indian citizens from both Iran and Israel — humanitarian outreach as statecraft, without formally aligning against any party.

Evolution of India’s West Asia Policy

The Nehruvian phase

• Non-aligned values — sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference.
• Nehru organised the first Asian Relations Conference (New Delhi, March 1947); Oman signed a defence pact with India in 1972.
• The Nehru–Nasser alliance — India backed the Arabs against Western interference over Palestine and the 1956 Suez Crisis.

The 1990 Gulf Crisis — a turning point

• Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait (2 August 1990) confronted the V.P. Singh government with a dilemma — Iraq was an ideological ally that backed India on Kashmir, but new economic openings pointed the other way.
• India did not formally condemn Iraq, stressing the safety of 185,000 stranded Indian expatriates; it later supported UNSC Resolution 678 (November 1990).
• January 1991: India allowed American planes to refuel at Indian facilities — a signal of alignment. Muchkund Dubey called the crisis a US “test of friendship.”

The pragmatic turn

• Post-1991 unipolarity narrowed options and pushed a shift from geopolitics to geo-economics.
• Modi’s “Link and Act West” policy — cooperative bilateralism and multi-alignment.
• Instruments: CEPA (India–UAE), Rupee–Dirham / Local Currency Settlement, e-Migrate linked with Saudi e-Thawtheeq, and minilaterals like I2U2.

“…from the ideologically-driven Non-Aligned Movement to a policy based on greater pragmatism.”

Meher Wadhawan

Three phases of India’s West Asia policy. Nehruvian (Non-alignment · Nehru–Nasser · Palestine, Suez 1956) → 1990 Gulf Crisis (V.P. Singh dilemma · 185,000 evacuees · Res 678) → Pragmatic turn (Geo-economics · Link & Act West) → Today (Issue-based ties · CEPA, I2U2, IMEC)

Reading the Region — Three Lenses

Assessment

The Hobbesian reading of international politics as a “struggle for power” without a common authority still holds. Realism dominates, but liberal and constructivist currents grow stronger; the region’s course turns on how these paradigms interact under multipolarity.

Security Architecture — Which Way Does It Order?

The recent Israel–Iran war was aerial — the most advanced air force against the most advanced ballistic-missile capability — sharpening one question: bipolar, multipolar, or hybrid order?

Israeli primacy set against a multipolar diplomatic web

Net: hard-power balance almost bipolar · diplomatic-economic web multipolar → a hybrid order

Key Developments in the Region

The deeper churn — the ‘Arab Street’ reading

• Roots in nineteenth-century European imperialism and imposed liberal-secular institutions displacing Sharia — culminating in Kemal Ataturk’s abolition of Sharia in Turkey (1924).
• Rapid top-down Westernisation left people “stranded both materially and spiritually” (Pankaj Mishra).
• Talmiz Ahmad: the twentieth-century Islamic discourse “was an oppositional concept that functioned outside the prevailing state order.”
• Outcomes uneven — resilient authoritarianism persisted; the long-run effect ran through political economy (Vision 2030, geo-economics, new partners like China).

Implications of Instability for India

• Energy shock is first-order — India imports ~85% of its crude; Iraq has been among its top-three suppliers, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
• Oil spikes widen fiscal and current-account deficits, raise fertiliser and freight costs, and inflate the subsidy bill.
• Supply-chain disruption — threats to shipping raise freight rates and consumer prices.
• Maritime security — Houthi drone strikes and hijackings in the Red Sea threaten freedom of navigation at Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb.
• Risks to expatriates and remittances; a standing evacuation imperative.
• Spillover of extremism (ISIS-type) into internal security.
• Delay to connectivity — the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) and Chabahar exposed to disruption.

India–Iran

Overview

A deep historical and cultural bond; Modi calls it “a friendship as old as history.” India’s ~25 million Shias and ~70,000 Parsis add a civilisational dimension.

“Few people have been closely related in origin and throughout history than the people of India and Iran.”

Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India

Why Iran matters

• Geography and energy — a major oil supplier bordering Pakistan and Afghanistan; a key alternative route when transit through Pakistan is blocked; a junction of South Asia, the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus, opening onto the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman.
• Strategic and cultural mutualities — India’s Shia population and NAM leadership align with Iran’s diplomatic goals; India’s balance offsets a Pakistan aligned with the US and Saudi Arabia.

The US factor & sanctions history

• Post-1979 revolution and the hostage crisis reordered Iran’s ties with the world.
• US pressure repeatedly constrained India — Reliance pressured over a ~US$900 million US Exim Bank loan (S Samuel C Rajiv); India’s 2006 IAEA vote against Iran; discontinuation of the Asian Clearing Union swap (December 2010); oil-import cuts of 11% (2012) and ~15% annually thereafter.
• The IPI “peace pipeline” — a 2,775-km Iran–Pakistan–India gas project — could never be realised under US pressure; India instead signed the India–US Civil Nuclear Agreement.

Under Modi and after

• Modi’s May 2016 visit (first by an Indian PM in fifteen years — Ankit Panda) produced ~12 agreements, chiefly on Chabahar and a Trilateral Transport and Transit Corridor with Iran and Afghanistan; a US$150 million Exim credit line; IRCON on the ~500-km Chabahar–Zahedan railway.
• Chabahar bypasses Pakistan and counters China’s Gwadar; goods reach Afghanistan via the Delaram–Zaranj highway.
• Trump’s May 2018 JCPOA withdrawal and renewed sanctions forced India to cut Iranian oil imports (Ravi Joshi, ORF).
• Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale reframed strategic autonomy as “issue-based” alignment; India secured written US assurance for ~US$85 million of Chabahar equipment.
• Frictions — Article 370; India’s Israel–UAE–US coalition role; Iran’s limited Taliban support (Samuel Ramani); the Farzad-B gas field.

India has been, and will likely “remain on the tightrope.”

Anita Inder Singh

2020 & 2025 flashpoints

• 2020 — the US killing of Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani near Baghdad raised fears of full-blown Iran–US conflict, threatening energy security for India, China, Japan and South Korea.
• 2025 — India welcomed the June Israel–Iran ceasefire, praised US and Qatari mediation (“there is no alternative to dialogue and diplomacy”), distanced itself from the SCO’s condemnation of Israel, and launched Operation Sindhu. P.R. Kumaraswamy called the stance “calculated, nuanced, and matured”; Shanthie Mariet D’Souza warned that strategic ambiguity works only while conflicts stay within India’s core interests.

Abraham Accords — effect on India–Iran

Positive: validate strategic autonomy; a calmer Israel–Gulf equation gives India more room. Negative: closer Israel–Gulf ties may strain India–Iran, sharpen sectarian tension, and pressure India to keep Israel ties from overshadowing Iran.

India–Iran: four decades on the tightrope. 1979 (Revolution & hostage crisis) → 2006 (India’s IAEA vote) → 2012 (Oil cuts under sanctions) → 2016 (Chabahar · 12 pacts) → 2018 (US exits JCPOA) → 2025 (Ceasefire · Op Sindhu)

India–United Arab Emirates

Ties run back centuries through Indian Ocean trade and migration; formal relations from 1972. Modi’s 2015 visit established the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.

Challenges

CEPA trade still concentrated in gems, petroleum and electronics rather than technology and green energy; the Kafala system and slow labour reforms. Talmiz Ahmad reads engagement as shaped by economic realities and shifting Gulf security; the Atlantic Council cautions on the institutional capacity to deliver.

“This is not just a transactional relationship — it’s a meeting of visions, backed by determined leadership.”

Dr. Muneer Ahmed, IPCS

India–Afghanistan

History & setting

• The “graveyard of empires” — from Alexander to the USSR and the US; ties trace to the Indus Valley (a Seleucid successor state passed to the Maurya Empire, 305 BCE).
• The nineteenth-century Great Game cast Afghanistan as a buffer state; British India and the Afghan Amir signed the MoU on the Durand Line.
• India recognised the Republic of Afghanistan on 19 July 1973; both were founding NAM members; the Strategic Partnership Agreement (October 2011) deepened ties; the fall of Kabul (August 2021) forced a rethink.

Scholars: Brahma Chellaney (use Iran for alternate access beyond Pakistan); Rajiv Sikri invokes Kautilya’s Mandala — a friend is the neighbour’s neighbour; Happymon Jacob (soft power alone is not enough, and India lacks a Plan B); Rajeshwari Pillai Rajagopalan (the Afghan-led / Afghan-owned line isolated India); Vivek Chadha (a stable Afghanistan curbs terrorism).

India’s footprint — two decades of capacity-building

Why Afghanistan matters

Internal security (radical ideology, drug trafficking, ISI-proxy safe havens); geo-economic (a transit hub; minerals — copper, iron, lithium); geo-strategic (a buffer against north-western threats); regional balance versus China and Pakistan; connectivity to Central Asia via Chabahar and the Delaram–Zaranj highway. Harsh V. Pant — development investment ties India to Afghan stability.

Why the US left

• Withdrawal finalised 30 August 2021 — Operation Enduring Freedom (post-9/11) had targeted the Taliban for aiding Al-Qaeda.
• Re-prioritisation from Central Asia to the Asia-Pacific (Quad); over US$3 trillion spent on the “War Against Terror”; a Democratic 2020 priority — Biden clarified the US was not there for nation-building.
• M. K. Narayanan — the US left Afghanistan worse than it found it after spending more than US$1 trillion, the government collapsing and the Taliban taking control quickly and bloodlessly.

Transforming Afghanistan into a modern democracy was “an unrealistic and overly ambitious objective.”

Henry Kissinger

From 9/11 to the fall of Kabul. 9/11 (Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan) → Enduring Freedom (Taliban toppled) → Bonn 2001 (Top-down state-building) → 20-yr war (> US$3 trillion) → 30 Aug 2021 (US withdrawal) → Kabul falls (Taliban 2.0)

Taliban 1.0 vs 2.0

India’s stakes under Taliban rule

More elusive than China, Russia and Iran — a product of competing realpolitik and principle; its emphasis on morality now “tempered by a more pragmatic discourse.” Dhruva Jaishankar — focused humanitarian aid and global-opinion pressure can shape Taliban conduct on rights; Gautam Mukhopadhaya — letting old developmental projects continue keeps India’s foothold and goodwill; Phunchok Stobdan and Manjeet Pardesi — a dual-track strategy that engages the Taliban while guarding against premature legitimisation.

India’s engagement since 2021

• Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri met Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi — the highest-level meeting since 2021, ending the phase of “cautious engagement” that Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla had earlier called “limited.”
• 1.6 tonnes of medicines (December 2021); an official team in Kabul (June 2022); concern over women’s exclusion from universities, citing UNSC Resolution 2593; the Afghan embassy in New Delhi closed (October 2023).
• In May 2025 S. Jaishankar held a landmark call with Muttaqi after the Taliban condemned the Pahalgam attack; visa relaxation followed; bilateral trade surpassed US$1 billion (2024–25) with zero-tariff access for Afghan agricultural exports.

India works through regional platforms — the Moscow Format, the Delhi Regional Security Dialogue (November 2021), the India–Central Asia Summit (2022), and SCO-RATS. Its stance is read through Keohane and Nye’s complex interdependence, combined with realist pragmatism and constructivist solidarity.

Way forward — scholarly compass

• Vinash Paliwal — “A pragmatic understanding of the geopolitical reality is what motivates India’s engagement with Afghanistan under Taliban leadership.”
• Vivek Katju — discreet contacts keep India informed but risk legitimising the Taliban; Rakesh Sood — a “no boots on the ground” policy.
• Harsh V. Pant — shift focus from Kashmir to Afghanistan, and seek an understanding among Washington, Moscow and Delhi.

“India should not try to fish in troubled waters.”

M.K. Bhadra Kumar

Operation Sindoor & the Deterrence Turn (2025)

The Pahalgam attack (22 April 2025; 26 civilians killed — The Resistance Front, a Lashkar-e-Taiba front) triggered Operation Sindoor on the night of 6–7 May; four days of the sharpest India–Pakistan crisis in decades ended in a 10 May ceasefire.

What was new

• Strikes on nine terror sites in Pakistan and PoK — the Muridke and Bahawalpur headquarters of LeT and JeM; the deepest into Pakistani Punjab since 1971.
• First Indian use of BrahMos and SCALP-EG cruise missiles against Pakistan; the first India–Pakistan clash where both sides used drones.
• The 1960 Indus Waters Treaty held “in abeyance” until Pakistan “credibly and irrevocably abjures” cross-border terrorism.
• Ceasefire (10 May) via DGMO channels; the US role is disputed — Washington claimed mediation, India insists the pause was bilateral.

The “new normal” — Modi’s three pillars (12 May)

Retaliation for any terror attack, on India’s terms · no tolerance of “nuclear blackmail” · no distinction between terrorists and the governments that sponsor them.

“Terror and talks cannot go together… Terror and trade cannot go together… Water and blood cannot flow together.” — Narendra Modi, Address to the Nation, 12 May 2025

The debate — what actually changed

India · Saudi Arabia

Overview

• Diplomatic ties formalised in 1947; a Strategic Partnership from 2010.
• Milestones: the Delhi Declaration (2006), the Riyadh Declaration (2010) and the India–Saudi Arabia Strategic Partnership Council (SPC, 2019) → a move from routine exchanges to structured cooperation.

“The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is one of India’s most valued partners — a maritime neighbour, a trusted friend, and a strategic ally… In a world full of uncertainties, our bond stands strong, as a pillar of stability.”

Narendra Modi

Areas of cooperation

Frictions

• Conflicting foreign policies — the Saudi role in Yemen and growing ties with China.
• Delayed investment — cancellation of Aramco’s planned 20% stake in Reliance; a stalled Ratnagiri/West Coast refinery.
• Energy pricing — the “Asian Premium” charged by Saudi Arabia and other OPEC producers.
• Labour — “Saudization” and a “Family Tax” strain the Indian workforce; the contested Kafala system.
• Trade imbalance — India’s deficit ~US$31.3 billion (2022–23); a stalled India–GCC FTA.

Md. Muddassir Quamar reads Saudi Arabia as central to India’s Middle East security and economic integration; Dr. Yogender Singh notes expansion across energy, defence, infrastructure, technology and education, driven by leadership-level trust.

“The institutionalization of the SPC has transformed ties from ad hoc engagement to a more strategic relationship with strong economic, political, and security components.”

Kinda Bakr

India · Iran

Overview

• A deep historical and cultural bond. Jawaharlal Nehru, in Discovery of India, wrote that few peoples have been so closely related in origin and through history as those of India and Iran; Modi calls it “a friendship as old as history.”
• India’s ~25 million Shias and ~70,000 Parsis add a civilisational dimension.

Why Iran matters

• Geography and energy — a major oil supplier bordering Pakistan and Afghanistan; an alternative route when transit through Pakistan is blocked; a junction of South Asia, the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus, opening onto the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.
• Strategic and cultural mutualities — India’s Shia population and NAM leadership align with Iran’s diplomatic goals.
• Economic and diplomatic — India a major buyer of Iranian oil; India’s NAM platform aids Iran’s outreach; India’s balance offsets a Pakistan aligned with the US and Saudi Arabia.

The US factor and the sanctions history

• The 1979 revolution and hostage crisis reordered Iran’s ties with the world.
• US pressure repeatedly constrained India — Reliance pressured over a ~US$900 million US Exim Bank loan (S Samuel C Rajiv); the 2006 IAEA vote against Iran, soon after the India–US civil nuclear understanding; discontinuation of the Asian Clearing Union swap (December 2010); oil-import cuts of 11% (2012) and ~15% annually thereafter.
• The IPI (“peace pipeline”) — a 2,775-km Iran–Pakistan–India gas project — could never be realised under US pressure; India instead signed the India–US Civil Nuclear Agreement.

Under Modi and after

• Modi’s May 2016 visit (the first by an Indian PM in fifteen years, per Ankit Panda) produced ~12 agreements, chiefly on Chabahar and a Trilateral Transport and Transit Corridor with Iran and Afghanistan; a US$150 million Exim credit line; and IRCON’s role in the ~500-km Chabahar–Zahedan railway.
• Chabahar bypasses Pakistan and counters China’s Gwadar; goods reach Afghanistan via the Delaram–Zaranj highway.
• Trump’s May 2018 withdrawal from the JCPOA and renewed sanctions (August and November 2018) forced India to cut Iranian oil imports (Ravi Joshi, ORF).
• Vijay Gokhale reframed strategic autonomy as issue-based alignment rather than ideological non-alignment; India secured written US assurance for banks to facilitate ~US$85 million of Chabahar equipment.
• Frictions: Article 370 and India’s place in the Israel–UAE–US coalition; Iran’s limited support for the Taliban (Samuel Ramani); the Farzad-B gas-field dispute. Anita Inder Singh: India will “remain on the tightrope.”

2020 and 2025 flashpoints

• 2020 — the US killing of Quds Force commander General Qasem Soleimani near Baghdad International Airport raised fears of full-blown Iran–US conflict, threatening energy security for India, China, Japan and South Korea.
• 2025 — India welcomed the June 2025 Israel–Iran ceasefire and praised US and Qatari mediation, holding that “there is no alternative to dialogue and diplomacy”; it distanced itself from the SCO’s condemnation of Israel, launched Operation Sindhu to evacuate nationals, and read the crisis through the same lens as the Ukraine war. P.R. Kumaraswamy called the stance “calculated, nuanced, and matured”; Shanthie Mariet D’Souza flagged that strategic ambiguity works only while conflicts stay within India’s core interests; Meena Singh Roy ties the relationship’s potential to resolving Farzad-B; Sumitha Narayanan Kutty sees India expanding energy, connectivity and trade to secure its interests and balance rival powers.

Current — the Twelve-Day War, the 2026 escalation & the Iran hedge

• The Twelve-Day War (13–24 June 2025) — Israel’s Operation Rising Lion struck Natanz, Fordow, Isfahan and Arak and killed the IRGC head and nine nuclear scientists; Iran’s Operation True Promise 3 fired over 550 missiles and 1,000+ drones (Israel claimed 80–90% intercepted). On 22 June the US bombed Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan (Operation Midnight Hammer) and Iran struck the US Al-Udeid base in Qatar; a ceasefire followed on 24 June with US and Qatari involvement. Prasanta Kumar Pradhan (MP-IDSA) reads the war as reaffirming American primacy — Russia, tied down in Ukraine and weakened by Assad’s fall, could not help Iran, and China condemned the strikes but sent no material support.
• The 2026 escalation — from 28 February 2026, US–Israel strikes (Epic Fury / Roaring Lion) killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei; Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz on 4 March 2026; a memorandum to end the war was signed on 17 June 2026. India did not condemn the killing and sent only its foreign secretary to sign the condolence book; with the strait shut, it used Chabahar as an evacuation route.
• The hedge under American pressure — Nirupama Subramanian traces India’s caution to the 2005 IAEA vote against Iran and recalls that Iran had shielded India at the UN over Kashmir in 1994; she reads the refusal to condemn the strikes as autonomy narrowed into dependence, while Kabir Taneja reads the same silence as deliberate hedging that protects a pending trade agenda. India kept roughly five per cent of its energy basket from Iran despite sanctions (Harsh V. Pant), and Iran sits under the foreign ministry’s PAI (Pakistan–Afghanistan–Iran) desk.

India–Iran: four decades on the tightrope. 1979 (Revolution and hostage crisis reorder ties) → 2006 (IAEA vote against Iran, after the India–US nuclear understanding) → 2010–12 (ACU swap ends; oil-import cuts begin) → 2016 (Chabahar and the trilateral corridor) → 2018 (Trump exits the JCPOA; sanctions return) → 2025 (Israel–Iran ceasefire; Operation Sindhu)

Abraham Accords — read-across for India–Iran

“Once we make up our mind, the distance between Kashi and Kashan is just half a step.”

Narendra Modi

India · Israel

Overview

• A deep, expanding partnership built on shared democracy and pluralism and two knowledge-based economies.
• Michael Walzer, in The Paradox of Liberation (2015), observes that both India and Israel underwent similar transitions — beginning with secular nationalist movements that later gave way to religiously influenced ideologies.
• The 30th anniversary of full ties (from 1992) was marked with a commemorative logo pairing the Star of David and the Ashoka Chakra.

Evolution of India’s approach

• India recognised Israel in 1950 and allowed a Mumbai consulate, but withheld full ties until 1992 (established under P.V. Narasimha Rao), given anti-colonial alignment and Arab ties.
• Shift markers: President Pranab Mukherjee’s 2015 visit; Modi’s 2017 visit (the first by an Indian PM); Netanyahu’s reciprocal 2018 visit → widening the relationship beyond military cooperation into economy and technology.

Cooperation and divergence

Sectors of cooperation

• Energy — Israel’s Mediterranean gas reserves.
• Space — India has launched Israeli spy satellites; the alignment of Israel’s Beresheet and India’s Chandrayaan-2 programmes.
• Defence — Spyder missile, Barak-8, AWACS.
• Intelligence — RAW–Mossad counter-terrorism cooperation.
• Agriculture — dryland-farming and drip-irrigation know-how; 27 Centres of Excellence across 21 Indian states.

Points of divergence

• The Palestinian issue — support for self-determination and a two-state solution; UN votes critical of Israeli settlements (2016, 2018).
• Continued dealings with Iran and resistance to US-backed sanctions.
• Posture — India’s stress on peaceful coexistence and non-interference vs a more aggressive security posture (India sought a ceasefire in the 2014 Gaza conflict).
• Domestic politics — since the 1920s Khilafat movement, some nationalist opinion has read Palestine through an Islamic prism.

On Barak-8, its success has “emboldened the hopes … of both these countries in the field of defense research.”

Deeksha Singh

Current — the Special Strategic Partnership & Sudarshan Chakra

• Ties were elevated to a Special Strategic Partnership on 26 February 2026. India’s planned air-defence shield, Mission Sudarshan Chakra (announced 15 August 2025, with a 2035 target), draws on Israeli systems — MRSAM, SPYDER, Harop, Rampage and the Phalcon AWACS (Sukhbir Kaur Minhas, MP-IDSA); Kabir Taneja likens Israel to a one-stop shop for advanced military technology.
• The Gaza ceiling — the convergence still has limits. Taneja reports that even Israel’s admirers in India recoiled at the scale of destruction in Gaza and that New Delhi has privately conveyed concern; India declined Israeli requests to ban Hamas, citing legal grounds and a large domestic Muslim population.
• The Israel–Lebanon front — a November 2024 ceasefire followed the killing of Hassan Nasrallah and Hezbollah’s retreat north of the Litani; a US-brokered Framework Agreement in June 2026 opened the first direct Israel–Lebanon talks since 1983.

Beyond defence — connectivity and geo-economics

• IMEC links India to Europe via the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel — rail, road, port, energy and data — bypassing Suez as an alternative to the Belt and Road.
• I2U2 (India, Israel, UAE, US) broadens cooperation to water, energy, transport, space, health and food security. Sameena Hameed reads I2U2 and IMEC together as India’s shift from bilateral dealings to minilateral connectivity.
• India’s acquisition of Haifa Port gives a logistics foothold on IMEC’s Mediterranean end; Indian firms now run the Haifa container terminal once managed by China.
• Trade climbed from US$200 million (1992) to US$4.82 billion — India Israel’s seventh-largest trading partner and third-largest in Asia.

Assessment

Israel is “in many ways as perhaps our most trusted and innovative partner.”

S. Jaishankar (2021)

A “marriage made in heaven being implemented here on Earth.”

Benjamin Netanyahu

The idea of I2T2 — India’s talent and Israel’s technology — points to its future orientation; Vasudhaiv Kutumbakam in India mirrors ‘Tikun Olam’ (“heal the world”) in Israel. Kanchi Gupta cautions that India will not abandon its traditional support for Palestinian statehood — domestic politics and ideology still shape the policy.

India · Palestine

Overview

• Rooted in India’s anti-colonial ethos and a focus on West Asian stability; the Palestinian issue is often called the “mother of all crises.”
• India opposed Israel’s creation (1948), supported Palestine’s UN inclusion (1949), recognised the PLO (1974) and formally recognised the State of Palestine (1988) — among the first non-Arab nations to do so.
• India backs a sovereign Palestinian state on pre-1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital, reflected in UN voting and alignment with the G77 and BRICS.

“Palestine belongs to Arabs in the same way England belongs to the English.”

Mahatma Gandhi (1938)

De-hyphenation

Engaging Israel and Palestine on independent tracks rather than as a single package — the frame that lets India deepen ties with one without abandoning the other.

Areas of cooperation

• Budgetary aid totalling ~US$30 million since 1995; the Jawaharlal Nehru Library at Al-Azhar University; the “TURATHI” Women Empowerment Centre; the India-Palestine Super Specialty Hospital.
• US$1.25 million pledged to UNRWA; scholarships (150 under ITEC, 100 through ICCR); cultural ties through Indian martial arts and Kathak.
• Modi’s 2018 visit — the first by an Indian leader — reaffirmed support for a sovereign Palestine, alongside a de-hyphenation policy toward Israel.

Continuity and change

• The 1992 opening to Israel and the 1994 post-Oslo trajectory shifted priorities; support for Palestine became “more symbolic than substantive.”
• Core continuities persist — a two-state solution, strategic autonomy, and developmental-needs-driven engagement.
• India endorsed a UN resolution (2017) criticising the move to declare Jerusalem Israel’s capital, advocates a two-state solution, and endorses UNSC Resolution 242’s “land for peace.”
• During the October 2023 Gaza conflict, India condemned terrorism while voicing concern over civilian casualties; it abstained on the June 2025 UN ceasefire resolution — keeping ties with both Israel and the Global South.

Current — the Gaza ICJ case & India’s UN voting

• South Africa v. Israel at the ICJ — filed 29 December 2023, with provisional measures ordered on 26 January 2024 (and further measures on aid access and the Rafah offensive later that year). Judge Dalveer Bhandari sat with the ICJ majority that found some Palestinian rights plausible, while India as a state has stayed out of the interventions filed under the Genocide Convention.
• India’s UN voting on Gaza — India voted for the December 2024 ceasefire resolution but abstained on the Spain-led resolution of 12 June 2025 (149–12), becoming an outlier in Asia; Ambassador Parvathaneni Harish defended the abstention by citing India’s earlier votes and its preference for dialogue and diplomacy (Devirupa Mitra, The Wire).
• The gap between the Indian judge’s vote and the government’s silence captures New Delhi’s caution: India supports the ICJ as an institution while keeping its own hands free.

Reading the recalibration

Harsh V. Pant reads it as a response to regional change; Suhasini Haidar and others warn that abstentionism can look ambiguous or passive, while Brookings/ORF analysts see a hedged approach that maximises flexibility. Theoretically it is a hybrid of principle and pragmatism, drawing on complex interdependence (Keohane and Nye) and constructivism; Amrita Narlikar frames India’s foreign policy as coalitional diplomacy and issue-based pragmatism.

On the conflict itself: Jessica Stern stresses the psychological toll and the case for nonviolent resistance, urging pressure to protect civilians; Noura Erakat critiques the application of international law and points to legal actions to halt arms sales to Israel; Nishank Motwani notes the strengthening of India–Israel ties under Modi after 7 October; R. Ravindra, India’s Deputy Permanent Representative at the UN, has highlighted the war’s direct impact on India’s economic, energy and maritime interests, stressing de-escalation and continued humanitarian aid.

India · United Arab Emirates

Overview

• Ties go back centuries through Indian Ocean trade and migration; formal relations from 1972. Modi’s 2015 visit gave new momentum and established the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.

“India and the UAE have always found common ground because their economic and geopolitical interests align. The past decade has only deepened that trust and cooperation.”

Dr. Muneer Ahmed (IPCS)

Areas of convergence

Challenges

• CEPA trade still concentrated in gems, petroleum and electronics rather than technology and green energy; the Kafala system and slow labour reforms.

Talmiz Ahmad reads engagement as shaped by both economic realities and the shifting security dynamics of the Gulf; the Atlantic Council cautions on institutional capacity to deliver on ambitious cooperation. Muneer Ahmed calls it “not just a transactional relationship — a meeting of visions, backed by determined leadership”; Modi’s framing: the partnership “isn’t just economic — it’s a global signal.”

Debate — vindicated or strained? India’s multi-alignment across the West Asia crises

Vindicated. Harsh V. Pant holds that balance is now the source of Indian influence and that flexible diplomacy has softened each shock; the former diplomat T. S. Tirumurti agrees that India’s space contracts only when it abandons multi-alignment for one camp. Pant names the approach calibrated multi-alignment, and Patrizia Cogo Morales treats multi-alignment as the current form of strategic autonomy.

Strained. Amitabh Mattoo treats strategic autonomy as a test under acute strain, warning that neutrality is becoming a luxury as rival camps demand loyalty at once; Nirupama Subramanian goes further, reading India’s silence as strategic dependence. Shanthie Mariet D’Souza takes the middle view — the doctrine still holds, but the ability to balance conflicting partners nears its limit if war drags on.

India, the United States and Afghanistan

• Devin T. Hagerty → the withdrawal of US and NATO forces was the most important regional security issue preoccupying Indian strategic elites, with potential follow-on effects on the north-western subcontinent. India feared that, as after the 1989 Soviet withdrawal, the vacuum would produce the Taliban and terrorism — fears borne out in 2021.
• M. K. Narayanan → Biden’s decision to fix a withdrawal date regardless of conditions inside Afghanistan facilitated the Taliban takeover. The “horses for courses” mantra in US foreign policy significantly affects India’s strategic and security interests; the hasty withdrawal raised doubts about American credibility.
• Brahma Chellaney → the exit told American allies that they count on US support when they most need it at their peril; the withdrawal compromised India’s security.
• The Af-Pak framing re-hyphenated the subcontinent at a time when India valued de-hyphenation, and rested on American dependence on Pakistan for Operation Enduring Freedom. India’s response was to invest heavily in Afghan reconstruction and to seek land access to Central Asia through Iran and Afghanistan. India and Russia had earlier converged in supporting the Northern Alliance, which became the core of the US-backed resistance forces.
• Consequences for India — a strategic setback and a near-term triumph for the Taliban’s chief backer, Pakistan; damage to India’s heavy investments; and jeopardy to the long-standing goal of land access to Central Asia through a port and railway line via Iran and Afghanistan.

After the takeover

• The Taliban takeover has made the regional security situation more fragile; Pakistan-based organisations such as Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba now have a regime that may look the other way or provide safe haven.
• M.K. Narayanan refers to Pakistan as the ‘patron saint’ of the new regime. Islamabad publicly condemns these organisations while quietly permitting or supporting their operations, seeking indirect control or strategic influence to reduce space for India.
• India’s counter should be to mend ties with the regime realistically, innovatively countering Pakistan’s search for strategic depth by building security cooperation, while bracing for a heightened threat.
• There is still no consensus in South Asia on recognising the Taliban as the legitimate government, which makes holding a SAARC summit difficult, since barring Pakistan no member would be comfortable sharing the table with its representatives.

The New Great Game

• Since 2001 China’s policy has moved from a non-engagement “observer” policy (2002–2010) to an economics-centred agenda (2011–2017) to a security-dominated agenda (post-2018), which has remained dominant since August 2021.
• Beijing’s primary concerns are curbing regional instability and preventing Afghanistan from becoming a haven for groups it brands terrorist, especially Uyghur militants.
• China’s economic interests centre on mining — the Mes Aynak copper mine and oil extraction in Faryab and Sar-e-Pol — both long on hold. BRI projects circumvent Afghan territory; Chinese policymakers worry about the effect of instability on their interests in Pakistan and Central Asia.
• C. Raja Mohan → closer collaboration between China and Pakistan could be a “serious challenge for India”, given India’s border dispute with China and the treatment of CPEC as a threat to Indian trade and security.
• China and Russia share strong mutual interests, both focused on security and violent extremism; Russia is concerned that violence could spill into Central Asia, which it treats as its near abroad and exclusive sphere of influence. Neither has recognised the Taliban government, and both have criticised the American and European focus on human rights and democracy while scaling down expectations of an inclusive government.
• Post-August 2021 China’s main assistance has been humanitarian aid and COVID-19 vaccines; diplomatically it has rallied support for rebuilding, calling for sanctions relief and unfreezing of Afghan assets, with Pakistan urging Western powers to engage.
• Dr. Sanjeev Kumar notes that a serious study by Peking University in 2018 appreciated the Indian model of delivering major projects in Afghanistan — India’s aid is more comprehensive and wider in coverage than China’s, and Afghans valued that India had contributed more than the UN and NATO.
• India must therefore ensure involvement in Afghanistan’s settlement to protect national interests, check China-Pakistan ambitions and engage Russia without affecting relations with the West.

Views of scholars — and the 2023 question

• Sushant Sareen → engage, isolate, or oppose — Indian policy should incorporate all three. While engaging the Taliban, India must reach out to its old friends, most of them in exile, to push for reconciliation; it must simultaneously isolate the Taliban without breaking ranks with the international community; and it must oppose the Taliban, not only diplomatically and politically but by covertly supporting anti-Taliban forces — a carrot-and-stick approach. There are never any full stops in Afghanistan, and no reason for India to put full stops in its own policy; pragmatism combined with hard-nosed moves is the way to get back in the game.
• Vivek Katju → the Taliban is here to stay, and India has no alternative but to deal with it even while repeating, if it wishes, the mantra of inclusive government. Maintaining contacts with leaders of the ousted Republic would be unobjectionable, especially as the Taliban itself wants them to return. The sooner India establishes a permanent presence in Kabul the better; this is not evangelism but the cold pursuit of interests, which often requires supping with the devil, with a long spoon.
• Rudra Chaudhuri → the approach will mean taking risks, assessing costs and expecting failures, and also doing everything possible to address real challenges. Facts must be taken for what they are: that Afghanistan is changing is a fact, and that the United States is leaving is a fact. As Kissinger argues, it is not easy to change facts; what is possible is for facts to be used. A state’s decision to recognise a government is a matter of pure discretion premised on larger political gains, and India’s approach should be determined by its geo-strategic interests.