Context
The “surgical operation” earlier this month killing the mastermind of the Sunjuwan Army camp attack (Jammu) was lauded as a major victory for Indian security forces, but for some observers, it is surprising that such a seemingly provocative episode closed with such a measured response
Author’s contention
Authors contend that both India and Pakistan exercise a degree of capacity in selecting into a crisis after a provocation meaning not every terrorist attack escalates into a severe reaction. For eg: Pathankot attack received a very different handling than the Uri attack although both were relatively similar
What is a crisis?
A crisis involves three properties —
- Acute threat
- Significant abnormality, and
- Temporal pressure
Factors that shape perceptions of these can increase or decrease the risk of crisis onset
What kind of provocations can lead to a crisis?
In the authors’ analysis, provocations correlated with crises exhibit intensified abnormality, like attacks involving complex assaults over an extended duration
Factors which increase the risk of a crisis?
High-volume media coverage and cumulative, successive attacks intensify perceived time constraint pressures on leaders’ decision making, increasing the risk of a crisis
Why the Sunjuwan didn’t lead to a crisis?
Sunjuwan involved an extended duration complex attack to draw attention and provoke Indian overreaction
- Nevertheless, the attack was missing some important attributes of a crisis. It did not follow after cumulating cross-border attacks and occurred amidst the backdrop of National Security Adviser dialogue. Moreover, the media coverage — a key indicator of crisis atmosphere — in the week following Sunjuwan was relatively subdued
Conclusion
Authors conclude by stating that these probabilistic indicators suggest that even under pressure, the government exercises some agency in “selecting into” a crisis. In this case, the government chose not to.
