Beyond big game hunting: 

Beyond big game hunting: 

Context

• India by accepting the invitation to join the Quadrilateral grouping to provide alternative debt financing for countries in the Indo-Pacific, has taken a significant turn in its policy for the subcontinent.

The Quad pivot

• The Japan-proposed, U.S.-endorsed plan, including Australia, it is necessary that India analyze the impact of this admission on all its relations.
• As a growing economy with ambitious domestic targets, India’s own needs often clash with those of its neighbours.
• More connectivity will eventually mean more competition, whether it is for trade, water resources, or energy.

Major concerns of Bhutan

• In April, the International Monetary Fund’s world economic outlook had already put Bhutan at the top of South Asia in terms of the highest debt per capita, second only to Japan in all of Asia for indebtedness.
• The budget figures attracted much criticism for the Bhutanese government, and opposition taunts that Bhutan could become the “Greece of South Asia” forced Prime Minister Tshering Tobgay to appoint a three-member committee.
• Among the committee’s findings were that Bhutan’s external hydropower debt financed by India at 9-10% rates were piling up, with the first interest and principal payments expected in 2018, and construction delays, mainly due to Indian construction issues, were taking the debt up higher.
• Several pleas to the Ministries of External Affairs and Power, the Cross Border Trade of Electricity (CBTE) guidelines issued by India had not been revised, putting severe restrictions on Bhutanese companies selling power, and on allowing them access to the power exchange with Bangladesh.
• Given falling prices for energy all around, India could not sustain the Bhutanese demand that power tariffs be revised upwards.

The confusing state

• India has also been ambivalent on tackling political issues in its region, often trapped between the more interventionist approach of the U.S., which has openly championed concerns over ‘democratic values’ and human rights in Sri Lanka, Maldives and Bangladesh, and the approach of China, which is to turn a blind eye to all but business and strategic interests.
• In Nepal, India lost out to China when it allowed a five-month-long blockade at the border, calling for a more inclusive constitution to be implemented by Kathmandu — but in the case of Myanmar, it lost precious ground in Bangladesh when Mr. Modi refused to mention the Rohingya refugee situation during a visit to Nay Pyi Taw. In both cases, India reversed its stand, adding to the sense that it is unsure of its next steps when dealing with neighbours on political issues.

Will it of any benefit for India?

• It is important to note that while Indian government’s new plan is to involve the U.S. and Japan in development projects in South Asia will yield the necessary finances, it will come at the cost of India’s leverage in its own backyard.
• India’s counter to China’s persistent demand for a diplomatic mission in Thimphu.
• In Sri Lanka, the U.S. and Japan will now partner in India’s efforts to counter China’s influence, but whereas India objected to Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean, it will not be able to object to an increase in U.S. naval warships and Japanese presence there.