India and Pakistan have shared an unstable bilateral relationship over the years. From the partition in 1947, to the numerous military conflicts, the relations between the two countries have remained far from normal.
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Indo-Pak relations are, hence, supremely important from UPSC aspirant’s perspective.
Here you’ll find a consolidated list of all the newspaper articles related to the latest developments wrt Indo-Pak bilateral and global perspective.
Section updated on 16th Mar 22
Accidental launch of cruise missile by India – 16th Mar 22
News: There was an accidental launch of an IAF cruise missile that landed 124 km inside Pakistan. The missile did not carry any warhead. Thus, there was no loss of lives.
The incident highlights the sorry state of bilateral mechanisms for crisis management between two nuclear adversaries. Such accidents are known as “broken arrows” (accidents that involve nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons components, but do not create the risk of nuclear war).
What is the impact of the incident?
India’s global image and reputation of being a responsible nuclear power is challenged by the incident.
India and Pakistan do not have any robust risk-reduction protocols or mechanisms to deal with such mishaps. If Pakistan had air defence systems, it could have easily judged it as a hostile attack and retaliated. Also, the reaction time in the event of missile launches is only a matter of minutes.
It could have resulted into escalation between two nuclear-powered countries which are undergoing strains in their relations in recent years.
How was the potential crisis averted?
A potential crisis was averted by right diplomatic responses from both sides. Indian side admitted to a “technical malfunction” that led to the accidental firing of a missile.
A “high-level” enquiry has been ordered to investigate the incident and recommend appropriate action to prevent a repeat.
What is the stance taken by both sides?
Pakistan
BrahMos can’t be mistaken for nuclear tipped missile – Business Standard – 15th Mar 22
– Islamabad has criticised Indian “security protocols and technical safeguards against accidental or unauthorised launch of missiles in a nuclearized environment”. It wants India to explain its procedures to prevent accidental missile launches and the particular circumstances of this incident.
Inadequate explanation from Indian Side: The Indian government has not revealed either the nature of the missile, nor the location from which it was fired, nor which of the services fired it. It is Pakistan which claimed that an unarmed supersonic missile was fired from the Sirsa Air Force Base. It could have been the Brahmos cruise surface-to-air missile.
Pakistan has alleged that the incident “indicates many loopholes and technical lapses of a serious nature in the Indian handling of strategic weapons”.
– Enquiry into the incident: Pakistan has demanded for a joint probe to investigate into the incident. It has also requested that the international community be involved to promote “strategic stability in the region”.
India
BrahMos can’t be mistaken for nuclear tipped missile – Business Standard – 15th Mar 22
– India officially admitted that “in the course of a routine maintenance, a technical malfunction led to the accidental firing of a missile”.
– India has ordered a high-level Court of Enquiry (Inquiry). It said “While the incident is deeply regrettable, it is also a matter of relief that there has been no loss of life due to the accident.”
Pakistani demand for a joint probe has been rejected. Further, it has refuted the claims that it was a Brahmos missile. Indian side stated that all Brahmos trials take place in the eastern part of India or on the Andaman & Nicobar Islands of India.
Why were the responses from both countries not aggressive?
“A misfiring and its trail of poor strategic stability” – The Hindu – 16th Mar 22
Despite this lack of bilateral mechanism, both countries responded maturely to the accident. Pakistan did not allege that it was done intentionally by India and Indian sides owned up the mistake and ordered for inquiry.
This can be because in the subcontinent, unlike the Cold War, neither side keeps its nuclear forces on high alert. In case of India:
Warheads are separated from delivery vehicles
Nuclear weapons are de-alerted
No presence of tactical nuclear weapons
No pre-delegation of nuclear launch authority to local commanders, even during a crisis.
The situation in Pakistan is different i.e., there is presence of tactical weapons and reports of pre-delegation to forward commanders. However, like India, its nuclear forces are also not on high alert.
Why is Pakistan’s argument that India has launched a Strategic nuclear weapon is incorrect?
BrahMos can’t be mistaken for nuclear tipped missile – Business Standard – 15th Mar 22
First, as per India’s nuclear launch posture, the strategic weapons (commonly referred to as “nukes” or nuclear-tipped missiles) are invariably delivered via ballistic missiles, never via cruise missile. It was a cruise missile (named Brahmos). Therefore, it was not a strategic nuclear weapon.
Second, the cruise missile had been launched from near Sirsa, which is home to a major air force base, not from any Army Brahmos units, which are related to the strike corps.
Thirdly, launch of a strategic, nuclear-tipped ballistic missile require a two-person launch protocol, whereas, the Brahmos Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) was launched from a Sukhoi-30MKI fighter.
What is the present status of Missile Regime in India?
India became a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime in 2016. Thus, India is seen as a reliable defence partner that is capable of handling its strengths and contributing to global security. India is developing more missile systems, including a hypersonic variant.
Is South Asia prepared for dealing with such accidents?
“A misfiring and its trail of poor strategic stability” – The Hindu – 16th Mar 22
South Asia is hardly prepared for dealing with such crisis due to following reasons:
1) “Pre-Notification of Flight Testing of Ballistic Missile Agreement” is insufficient as it does not cover cruise missiles. In this incident also the missile that was misfired was a cruise missile (suspected to be BrahMos).
2) Confidence Building Measures (CBM) are weak: Two sides have not held structured meetings on nuclear and conventional CBMs for years now. There is a need to revive such dialogue mechanisms. Such as, started by Cold war adversaries after the 1962 Cuban Missile crisis.
3) Refusal of China to engage in strategic stability discussions with India and Pakistan – even though today China is involved in the Indo-Pak conflict even more.
What is the way forward?
“A misfiring and its trail of poor strategic stability” – The Hindu – 16th Mar 22
1) Setting up of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres: These can provide a faster mechanism to communicate sensitive information during a crisis. This should have the objective of timely communication and proper implementation of already agreed mechanisms. A case in point could be ‘Permanent Indus Commission’ (Resolving disputes under Indus Water Treaty).
2) Use of existing hotlines in case such an accident happens. In this case, the Indian Director General of Military Operations didn’t use the hotline to inform Pakistan about misfiring.
3) New Delhi and Islamabad must work out a risk-reduction protocol that can help diffuse the misunderstandings and prevent hostile responses to any kind of accident or false alarm.
- If it was due to human error: In this case the operational, command and control procedures must be reviewed.
- If it was due to a technical glitch: It cast doubts over the weapon system itself, especially at a time when India is looking to export BrahMos to countries like the Philippines. For example, in 1983, during the cold war, the nuclear early warning radar of the USSR reported the launch of intercontinental ballistic missiles from the US. But the Soviet officer Stanislav Petrov prevented the WWIII by rightly judging that the warning was false due to malfunctioning detection systems.
Further, New Delhi should devise ways to provide assurances to Pakistan and to improve strategic stability between two countries.
Also, the Indian side must give information on the incident as inadequate explanation leaves scope for Pakistan to shape the narrative on this incident if Indian inputs are not provided.
Pak’s National Security Policy document – last updated on 19th Jan 22
Pakistan’s National Security Policy and its Implications for India – Explained, pointwise [7PM – 19th Jan 22]
– The policy seeks peace with India without any hostility for the next 100 years. Pakistan had downgraded ties with India and stalled trade after India had revoked Jammu and Kashmir’s special status in 2019. They said that it would be impossible to normalize ties with India if it doesn’t reconsider its decision on Jammu and Kashmir special status.
But the NSP offers India the opportunity to engage with Pakistan outside the straitjacket of the J&K paradigm, especially since the ceasefire of February 2021 seems to have held. Moreover, there is no demand for the reversal of August 5, 2019, changes made by India in the status of Jammu & Kashmir.
– The policy leaves the door open for trade and business ties with India without a final settlement of the Kashmir dispute, provided there is progress in the talks. But the policy also states that India had “illegally occupied” J&K, and Hindutva-led politics as a threat to Pakistan’s security in terms of political exploitation.
– The NSP accords just one sentence to the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, though it has offered to host the next summit.
Keeping faith – On religious exchange b/w India & Pakistan – last updated on 27th Jan 22
“Keeping faith” – The Hindu – 27th Jan 22
Recently, Pakistan Hindu Council has sent a proposal to India to allow pilgrims of both countries to travel by air to avoid complicated procedures. The proposal is sent at a time when other India-Pakistan exchanges are suspended.
What is the scenario in religious exchanges?
First, the Kartarpur corridor came up in 2019 due to attempts made by both governments. This was the year when the two countries nearly went to war over the Pulwama attack.
Second, religious exchanges between both countries are governed by a protocol signed in 1974.
Third, the routes for Sikh pilgrims from Punjab to the Pakistani Punjab province are easy. But pilgrims who cross over at the Wagah/Atari border to travel to the Hinglaj Mata Mandir in Balochistan, the Paramhans Mandir in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the Ajmer Sharif dargah in Rajasthan, the Nizamuddin Aulia in Delhi faced difficulty due to complex routes.
What is the proposal?
The Pakistan Hindu Council has signed an MoU with Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) to facilitate faith-based tour groups. It has asked that PIA charters from Karachi and Lahore be allowed to fly direct to Indian cities.
It has proposed this with a view of reciprocal air charters from India. This is the first time ever that pilgrimages would be given this facility.
Why is the present state of India-Pakistan relations?
One, India-Pakistan ties are at worst currently even when there is peace. There is no political dialogue at a bilateral or multilateral level for over five years.
Two, due to many attacks, India has stopped normal communications and cultural exchanges. Pakistan also stopped all trade ties after the Government’s moves on Article 370 in Jammu and Kashmir. Both countries have also reduced their diplomatic missions.
Three, the COVID-19 pandemic has further resulted in the virtual sealing of borders. Now, only a few direct routes are operating.
What is the way forward?
First, there is a need for proper security checks to avoid any security threat.
Second, people-to-people initiatives can help build goodwill in an atmosphere of tension. For example, the LoC ceasefire announcement in February and the decision to reopen the Kartarpur corridor or the Government’s approval for cricket under the T20 World Cup. Hence, it is wiser to give the proposal some consideration.
Siachen issue – last updated on 15th Jan 22
“If Siachen is back on Indo-Pak agenda, it is good news” – Livemint – 15th Jan 22
Recently, the Indian Army Chief, General Naravane, in his press conference reportedly made a reference to the possibility of “demilitarisation of the glacial region” in Siachen.
He said that Pakistan would have to first authenticate respective troop positions along the 110-km long actual ground position line (AGPL) in the Siachen-Saltoro Ridge region for any talks on demilitarisation to take place.
The army chief’s remarks are significant because it is a departure from the uncompromising position that has been current in the recent past.
What is the historical background of the Siachen glacier issue?
Ceasefire Agreement: India and Pakistan signed a Ceasefire Agreement in 1949 after their first armed conflict over Jammu and Kashmir soon after their independence in 1947.
– The ceasefire line was drawn up to a point known as NJ 9842 on the map. Beyond this, the agreement stated, the line would run “north to the glaciers” leaving an un-demarcated zone right up to the border with China.
This formulation was repeated in the agreement on the Line of Control in 1972, which followed the Simla Agreement of 1971 in the aftermath of the Bangladesh War.
– This was an act of omission on India’s part. The line beyond NJ 9842 was not demarcated on maps in 1972.
Operation Meghdoot: In the later years of the 1970s, this issue came to the front, when official US maps began to show the LoC as extending right up to the Karakoram Pass on the India-China boundary.
– It implied that the Siachen glacier fell under the actual jurisdiction of Pakistan. The Chinese followed suit.
– As a result, roughly 2,300 sq km of territory in this glacier zone came to be shown as under Pakistani control.
– In response to this encroachment, the Indian Army launched what came to be known as Operation Meghdoot, in 1984, to occupy the Siachen-Saltoro ridge.
Pakistani attempts to dislodge the Indian troops from the heights did not succeed, though they did occupy and fortify the lower reaches on their side.
What were the steps taken to resolve the issues wrt AGL delineation?
Rajiv Gandhi – Benazir Bhutto Meeting: In December 1988, it was agreed that the two sides would hold talks to resolve the Siachen issue through mutual troop withdrawal.
However, there was no final outcome because Pakistan did not agree to map the actual ground positions of the two-armed forces from where they would withdraw.
Bilateral defence secretaries-level talks under the Narasimha Rao government: An agreement in principle was reached in 1992, when Pakistan reportedly agreed to the Indian proposal. However, later, PM Narasimha Rao took a decision to defer its actual signing to a later date, but then this did not happen.
Foreign secretary-level negotiations,2006: The following resolutions were agreed:
– There would be a formal agreement on mutual but phased withdrawal and joint monitoring of the demilitarised zone.
– There would be an annex which would record the current locations of the forces deployed by the two sides and the locations to which they would withdraw.
– There would be a schedule of withdrawals in different phases.
However, the proposed agreement was dropped again due to opposition from both sides.
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