The turning point in 1932

The turning point in 1932

Context

What separate electorate for Dalits would have done to the Hindu-Muslim equation, and therefore the prospect of Partition?

Conclusion: It might have kept India united

How?

Deep Insecurity among the Muslims

• The politics of the Muslim elite was driven primarily by a sense of deep insecurity due to the domination of India’s political and economic landscapes by the upper caste Hindu elite
• Lack of progress in English education
• The shift of the centre of gravity of Indian politics from the heartland of northern and central India, where much of the Muslim elite were concentrated, to Calcutta, Madras and Bombay and their hinterlands dominated by the new English-educated, predominantly Hindu elite
• Aggressive forms of Hindu nationalism advocated by the likes of V.D. Savarkar, K.B. Hedgewar and M.S. Golwalkar contributed to it
• The soft Hindutva of many stalwarts within the Congress, including Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Lala Lajpat Rai and Vallabhbhai Patel, added to Muslim concerns, as did Jawaharlal Nehru’s disdain for what he termed the Muslim League’s “communal politics”.

Main goal of the Muslim league: Political parity

Political parity between caste Hindus and Muslims, remained the primary goal of the Muslim League through much of its existence as a political party

Hindu Domination

• Elections in British India were held under a very restricted franchise based primarily on property, income and educational qualifications
• Only about 13% of the population had the right to vote.
• The Dalits lagged far behind caste Hindus in all the three qualifications that determined the right to vote and, therefore, were not only under-represented but also represented by members of those castes that were opposed to according equality to them

Ambedkar’s demand for separate electorate accepted: The communal Award

• This demand to have separate representation in the central and provincial legislatures in order to protect their interests which ran counter to the interests of the dominant Hindu castes who also hogged most of the seats in the legislatures was accepted by British Prime Minister Ramsay Macdonald in 1932

Muslim league saw an opportunity

• As this award had the potential to weaken the caste Hindu leadership’s hold on the entirety of the Hindu population, the league readily accepted the award.

Gandhi’s fast against this decision

• To everyone’s dismay Mahatma Gandhi, who was seen as a leading advocate for Dalit rights, went on a fast unto death to persuade the British to repeal the award
• To him, the award was a ploy to divide Hindu society that he found unacceptable

Ambedkar had to give in

• Initially, Ambedkar refused to bend to Gandhi’s coercive fast
• However, when it became clear that Gandhi’s life depended on Ambedkar’s decision, Ambedkar was forced to give up his demand in return for reserved seats for Dalits but on the basis of a single Hindu electorate.

Gandhi’s extreme reaction was the final nail in the coffin

It convinced Muslim league that Gandhi and the Congress were bent on not giving Muslims their due share in the future political arrangement in India.

Reasoning:

• If implemented, the Communal Award, would have led to parity between caste Hindu and Muslim representatives in the legislatures, and the Dalits, who the Muslim elite did not find threatening and who they saw as potential allies against caste Hindus because of the common fear of upper caste domination, would have held the balance
• This would have precluded the need for demanding Partition and in all probability kept India united.

Failure of the Cabinet Mission Plan

Nehru didn’t accept it whereas Jinnah had accepted the cabinet mission plan 1946 which might have kept India united as a loose federation

So the major reason for division of India: Gandhi’s stance on communal award

• Mahatma Gandhi’s stance on the Communal Award — even more than Nehru’s refusal to enter into a coalition with the Muslim League in the United Provinces in 1937, which is widely seen as the turning point in Muslim politics in favour of separatism — was responsible for increasing the Muslim leaders’ distrust of the Congress that made Pakistan an attractive option for them
• One could plausibly argue that Gandhi’s rejection of the Communal Award sent the message to the Muslim leadership that he and the Congress were more interested in promoting a monolithic Hindu bloc than in nurturing Hindu-Muslim unity or providing justice for the Dalits in the form demanded by Ambedkar
• This increased their sense of insecurity and finally led to the demand for a separate state comprising the Muslim majority provinces of British India