Why is India’s no first use policy under so much strain

Why is India’s no first use policy under so much strain

News:

India’s no first use policy has diluted due to India’s access to better technology and Pakistan’s clever use of terrorist.

Important Facts:

• India’s new political discourse on revisiting its nuclear doctrine has once again attracted transnational debate on the efficacy of no first use policies, despite the fact that India has repeatedly recapitulated that it is amenable to negotiate no first use treaties.

The main features of India’s nuclear doctrine

• Establishing and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent
• A “No First Use” policy, i.e. nuclear weapons to be used only “in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere”
• Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be “massive” and designed to inflict “unacceptable damage” and such a nuclear retaliatory attack can be authorized only by civilian political leadership through the Nuclear Command Authority
• No use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states
• India to retain recourse of retaliating with nuclear weapons in the event of a major attack against it with biological or chemical weapons
• Continuance of strict restrictions on the export of nuclear and missile-related materials and technologies, participation in FMCT negotiations, continued moratorium on testing
• Take measures for establishing a nuclear weapon free world, through global, verifiable and non-discriminatory disarmament.

What is “No first use policy”

• The fundamental purpose of Indian nuclear weapons is to deter the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons by any State or entity against India and its forces. India will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail.
• India will not resort to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States which do not possess nuclear weapons, or are not aligned with nuclear weapon powers.
• States with such pledges would be technically able to still use nuclear weapons first in a conflict.

Debate over utility of NFU

• There is a widespread debate whether Government should revise and update” India’s nuclear doctrine and consider revoking India’s pledge of no first use (NFU) of nuclear weapons.
• According to Government, the policy is “India’s nuclear-strategic culture” which holds the relevance of in the present context.
• However, there are raising voices over the utility of “No First Use Policy of Nuclear weapons” considering the structural factors which has diluted its relevance such as.

Structural factors which has diluted the NFU consensus:

• Modernized Weapons:
  • NFU policy suits a power which wants to deter just nuclear wars. In other words, if a nuclear weapons state is comfortably placed on a conventional (or, more broadly, non-nuclear) front with respect to its adversaries, it does not need to threaten first use of its nuclear bombs.
  • China on the other hand conventionally stronger than India and China’s impressive infrastructure and massive military modernization have effectively eroded the notion that Himalaya border will protect India.
• Sub-conventional assets.
  • Pakistan through a clever use of sub-conventional assets (such as terrorists attact) and threat of using tactical nuclear weapons against any Indian conventional response to a 26/11 type of an attack has raised obvious question on NFU utility.
  • In this case, India’s nuclear doctrine, that professes massive retaliation even against use of midget nukes, will not help in case of terrorist attack.
• Better Technology:
  • India today has access to much better technology than it had in 2003 when it released its nuclear doctrine.
  • Presently India have more robust surveillance platform, missiles and remote sensing technologies which can help India to execute successful counterforce (CF)strikes
  • India’s solid fuel missiles have enabled it to move towards canisterised systems for storing its land-based ballistic missiles. Such systems can reduce turnaround times to strike in case the rival is shown to be readying its nuclear assets for use
  • With INS Arihant, Canisterisation has further enabled India’s nuclear deterrent to move to the seas
  • Both Canisterisation and sea-based deterrence thus increase the strain on NFU policy

Way Forward:

• The Indian nuclear doctrine was articulated in 1999 and looking at the current geopolitical developments across the world especially the growing friendship of our neighbors, it is high time to review it.
• India must frame amend its Foreign policy and strategic affairs on the basis of a country’s long-term national interests and soft-power and take into consideration both internal diaspora and external factors.
• Due to India’s tempestuous relationship with its neighbors, changing paradigm of Indian Ocean diplomacy and its desire to be a global power, it is the right time for India to revisit the existing framework and articulate and advocate for an international consensus to draft a new policy taking into account the geopolitical changes in South Asia