The new normal in the Indo-Pacific contestation

Source– The post is based on the article “The new normal in the Indo-Pacific contestation” published in The Hindu on 21st December 2022.

Syllabus: GS2- International relations

Relevance– Indo-pacific

News– The article explains the changes in the strategic scenario of the Indo-pacific. It also explains the future of geopolitics in this region.

What are the steps taken by China to increase its outreach in the Indo-Pacific region?

The contest for South Asia and the Indian Ocean is not new. China has long tried to mark its influence in these regions and enhance its strategic ambitions. It is trying to limit Indian influence and sustain its energy supply and economic growth.

Beijing’s outreach in South Asia increased manifold in the early 2000s with its economic boom. It began to further its strategic ends in the region through loans, financial incentives, and mega-infrastructure projects. This became more institutionalised with the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013.

These investments enabled Beijing to access the Indian Ocean, promote political and security ties in the region. It has harboured military vessels and submarines, and taken certain islands and ports on lease in the Indian ocean.

What are the actions taken by India and other Quad members to counter Chinese influence?

After Galwan, New Delhi has re-energised diplomatic efforts in its backyard. In the Maldives, New Delhi is reciprocating President Ibrahim Solih’s ‘India First’ policy with massive economic assistance, grants, and infrastructure projects. It is also cooperating on maritime security.

In Nepal, Prime Minister Cuba’s government has attempted to improve Nepal’s overall bilateral relations with India.

In Sri Lanka, India, this year alone, has provided economic and humanitarian assistance and investments worth $4 billion.

India’s leading efforts in South Asia and the Indian Ocean have also attracted other Quad members. They are offering genuine alternatives to the BRI.

They have also assisted Sri Lanka throughout the crisis. Japan is also finalising its talks with Sri Lanka on debt restructuring.

In the Maldives, Australia and the U.S. have committed to opening their embassies and new areas of cooperation. In 2020, the U.S. signed a defence and security framework with the Maldives. Nepal has also ratified the U.S.’s Millennium Challenge Corporation.

How are these actions perceived by India and China?

It is only with the Galwan clashes in 2020 that the Indian strategic thinking is deeming Beijing as a bigger threat than that of Islamabad.

The possibility of a two-front war persists. But Pakistan’s strategic isolation, economic and political fallout, and border and terror challenges emanating from Afghanistan have minimised the likelihood of its aggression.

The recent success of India and its partners is unlikely to deter China from furthering its presence in the region. Recently, the Chinese surveillance vessel Yuan Wang-5 re-entered the Indian Ocean.

Beijing also hosted its first-ever China-Indian Ocean Region Forum, to institutionalise its presence in the region and challenge new initiatives such as the Quad and the Colombo Security Conclave.

What will be the strategic implication of these acts for the future of this region?

Beijing will continue to leverage its economic and political influence in South Asia.

South Asian countries would also hesitate to completely move away from China as they want balancing with China and India. It will essentially make this competition a ‘new normal’.

Such a balancing outcome is very likely. Most South Asian countries are now facing economic and political turmoil. The COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have continued to haunt the region.

Nepal, the Maldives and Bhutan are struggling with depleting forex reserves. Energy shortages, inflation, and negative or slow economic growth are also disrupting day-to-day activities in these countries. Ongoing protests in Bangladesh are a mere indication of such upcoming challenges.