Contents
Introduction
While judicial independence is a cornerstone of constitutional democracy, the opaque ‘in-house procedure’ for judicial oversight in India raises critical concerns about transparency, public accountability, and institutional credibility.
The ‘In-house Procedure’: Background
- The ‘in-house procedure’, formulated in 1997 by the judiciary, governs the internal mechanism for handling complaints of misconduct against judges of High Courts and the Supreme Court.
- It mandates that only judges examine complaints, with no statutory backing or scope for public scrutiny. This process was intended to preserve judicial independence by insulating the judiciary from executive or legislative interference.
- However, recent cases—such as the incident involving Justice Yashwant Varma, where sacks of unaccounted cash were discovered, or the 2019 sexual harassment allegations against former CJI Ranjan Gogoi—highlight significant shortcomings of this internal mechanism.
- These include lack of transparency, absence of procedural fairness, and no public disclosure of findings or standards of inquiry.
Implications for Judicial Credibility and the Rule of Law
- Erosion of Public Trust: Secrecy surrounding judicial inquiries weakens public confidence in the impartiality and accountability of the judiciary. Justice must not only be done but seen to be done.
- Inconsistent Application of Standards: Unlike disciplinary mechanisms for civil servants or MPs (e.g., CVC, Lokpal, or Ethics Committees), the judiciary lacks a statutory framework to ensure consistent and fair outcomes.
- Threat to Rule of Law: Rule of law mandates that no one is above scrutiny, including judges. Shielding judicial officers from transparency undermines this foundational principle.
- Lack of Procedural Fairness: In the case of the complainant in Justice Gogoi’s matter, denial of legal representation, lack of access to the report, and subsequent reinstatement without explanation point to procedural arbitrariness.
Balancing Autonomy with Transparency
India’s Constitution under Article 124(4) and Article 217 provides for impeachment of judges through a Parliamentary process, but this is rare and politically cumbersome. Only one judge (Justice V. Ramaswami, 1993) faced an impeachment motion, which failed due to abstentions.
Therefore, a balanced framework is needed:
- Institutional Independence with External Oversight: Establish an independent Judicial Complaints Commission with retired judges, legal experts, and civil society representation to ensure impartial inquiry while safeguarding independence.
- Statutory Backing for Inquiries: Codify the ‘in-house procedure’ through a Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill (pending since 2010), incorporating due process and public reporting.
- Mandatory Disclosure of Findings: Make non-classified portions of inquiry reports public to ensure transparency and reduce misinformation.
- Citizen’s Right to Know: As per RTI Act and Article 19(1)(a), citizens are entitled to information on the conduct of public officials, including judges.
- Global Best Practices: In the UK, the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office (JCIO) handles complaints independently and publishes outcomes. Canada’s Canadian Judicial Council operates similarly.
Conclusion
Institutional autonomy must not come at the cost of public accountability. A transparent and fair oversight mechanism is essential to uphold the rule of law and preserve the judiciary’s moral legitimacy.


