Trump Drops a Bomb, on U.S. Nuclear Weapons Testing

UPSC Syllabus Topic: GS Paper 3 -security  And GS Paper 2- international relations

Introduction

Recently, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that the United States will resume nuclear weapons testing after a 33-year moratorium. The announcement followed Russia’s claim of a successful test of a nuclear-capable cruise missile and came the same day as Mr. Trump’s meeting with China’s President Xi Jinping. The details remain unclear, but the shift signals a major change in U.S. nuclear posture with wide global implications. Trump Drops a Bomb, on U.S. Nuclear Weapons Testing.

Consequence of Resuming Nuclear Weapons Testing by US

1. Arms-race risk and alliance strain: Speculation of a renewed arms race grows. U.S. allies may doubt extended deterrence and take extra precautions, including revising defence plans.
2. Erosion of 50 years of controls: The moratorium acted as restraint despite the CTBT not entering into force. Breaking it weakens non-proliferation habits built over decades, and others may cite the precedent to test.
3. NPT’s “grand bargain” undercut: Nuclear states promised disarmament; non-nuclear states promised restraint. Testing appears the opposite of disarmament and invites non-nuclear states to re-evaluate their choices.
4. Strain on existing and pending treaties

• New START cliff: The treaty capping U.S.–Russia strategic warheads expires in February 2026; testing would make a successor harder to negotiate and verify.
  • CTBT and broader norms: While not in force, CTBT commitments and the wider normative fabric are pressured as others cite U.S. actions to proceed.

5. Regional security ripple effects

Asia cascade: If China resumes testing, India may also consider testing. Pakistan would likely respond, raising instability in South Asia.
• Nuclear use as a ‘tactical’ option: Most leaders today did not see World War II or Hiroshima. This distance can make ‘tactical’ nuclear options seem more acceptable.

6. Environmental downsides: The U.S. already relies on simulations and non-explosive validation. Underground tests risk leakage and groundwater harm, and site readiness would take time.

International Treaties and Initiatives

1. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT): Signed in 1968 and in force since 1970, the NPT is the cornerstone of non-proliferation efforts.
   Three-part bargain:

• States without nuclear weapons agree not to acquire them.
• The five nuclear-weapon states (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States) agree to pursue disarmament.
• All states agree to cooperate on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

2. IAEA Safeguards: Non-nuclear weapon states that are NPT members have legally binding safeguards agreementswith the IAEA to verify that nuclear materials are not diverted for military purposes.
3. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT): This treaty bans all nuclear explosions, but has not yet entered into force because not all required states have ratified it.
4. Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW): This treaty, which entered into force in 2021, prohibits states from developing, testing, producing, acquiring, possessing, stockpiling, using, or threatening to use nuclear weapons.
5. Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU): The IPU promotes the role of parliaments in achieving a nuclear-weapons-free world by urging them to work with their governments to eliminate nuclear weapons from security doctrines.
6. Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI): A group of 12 countries, established by Australia and Japan, that promotes practical actions to advance NPT objectives. It focuses on transparency, strengthening the review process, and developing verification measures.
7. UN Security Council Resolution 1540: This resolution requires all states to take and enforce effective measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their materials to non-state actors.
8. New START: It is a U.S.–Russia treaty limiting strategic nuclear arms, called Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed in Prague on 8 April 2010 and entered into force on 5 February 2011.

Way forward

1. No-First-Use Pledge: At the NPT review, states should adopt a binding no-first-use commitment to lower alert levels and rebuild trust.
   2. Focused Great-Power Talks: The U.S., Russia, and China should open trilateral arms-control negotiations before New START expires, creating a template others can join.
   3. Reinforce Testing Restraint: All nuclear states should reaffirm the moratorium and expand transparency on subcritical experiments to prevent misinterpretation.
   4. Assurance and Crisis Channels: Strengthen consultations and hotlines to reduce fear, deter adjustments, and manage incidents.
   5. Verification and Public Accountability: Invest in monitoring tools and reporting to the UN, restoring confidence in the non-proliferation bargain.

Conclusion

Resuming U.S. nuclear testing risks eroding core norms, spurring competitive tests, and destabilising multiple regions. It weakens the NPT bargain, complicates New START follow-ons, and invites a costly arms race. The safer path is renewed dialogue, verifiable limits, and a collective No-First-Use pledge—rebuilding credibility before the window for prudent restraint closes.

Question for practice:

Examine the likely impacts of a U.S. resumption of nuclear weapons testing on the CTBT/NPT framework, New START negotiations, and security dynamics in Asia.

Source: The Hindu