Contents
Introduction
A 2025 Constitution Bench clarified Governor–State legislative relations under Articles 200–201, ruling Governors cannot indefinitely delay Bills. The judgment rebalances India’s federal structure, safeguarding democratic accountability against procedural paralysis in law-making.
Key Clarifications by the Supreme Court
| Issue | SC’s Clarification | Constitutional Citation | Implication |
| Governor’s options on Bills | Assent, return for reconsideration, or reserve for President | Article 200 | Eliminates “withhold assent simpliciter” misuse |
| Governor bound by Cabinet advice? | Discretion exists only in assent decisions | Article 163 | Prevents mechanical assent but preserves constitutional harmony |
| Judicial review allowed? | Merits non-justiciable, but indefinite inaction reviewable | Articles 200, 361 | Ends delay-based veto |
| Timelines by judiciary? | Courts cannot prescribe rigid deadlines | “As soon as possible” | Separation of powers respected |
| Use of Article 142? | No “deemed assent”; judiciary cannot substitute executive action | Article 142 | Upholds constitutional design |
| Unassented Bill becomes law? | Clear No | Article 200–201 | Assent indispensable for enforceability |
Critical Analysis: Strengthening Federalism & Legislative Certainty
Strengths of the Judgment
- Reinforces cooperative federalism (SC: S.R. Bommai v. Union of India).
- Prevents executive obstructionism – earlier incidents include:
•Kerala (2023-24): Bills pending for 2+ years.
- Punjab: Governor refused session summoning
- Clarifies constitutional silence, reducing constitutional deadlocks.
- Respectful to State autonomy and democratic mandate
- Greater transparency in discretion → constitutional morality (Justice D.Y. Chandrachud doctrine)
Weaknesses / Grey Areas
- Still no mandatory time limit, allowing continued delays.
- Discretion not bound by advice → potential politicization.
- Presidential decision on reserved Bills remains non-justiciable → Centre influence persists.
- Judicial review limited to inaction, not misuse of reservation power
Implications for Centre-State Legislative Relationship
| Positive Outcomes | Concerns Persist |
| Limits potential arbitrariness of Governors | Ambiguity allows continued Centre leverage |
| Faster disposal of Bills → policy continuity | Reservation power could bypass States |
| Strengthens bicameral legislative accountability | Judiciary’s inability to prescribe timelines may weaken direction |
| Protects State mandates in politically competitive federalism | Potential for asymmetric federal tensions |
This reflects India’s evolution toward a “functional federalism” where neither constitutional office can paralyze governance.
Way Forward
- Constitutional amendment or National Commission to Review Centre-State Relations–like framework can set reasonability standards
- Codification of Governor’s discretionary boundaries
- Parliamentary guidelines on assent processing timelines
- Increase accountability through annual constitutional conduct reports
Conclusion
As Granville Austin’s Working a Democratic Constitution notes, India’s federalism embodies cooperation. The Court’s ruling strengthens democratic legitimacy, ensuring Governors act as constitutional guardians, not political gatekeepers in legislation.
