[Answered] Examine the potential of the Colombo Security Conclave (CSC) as a template for Indian Ocean security cooperation. Critically analyze the challenges hindering deeper member-country engagement.

Introduction

Over 80% of global seaborne trade passes through the Indian Ocean (UNCTAD), making cooperative security frameworks critical. The Colombo Security Conclave (CSC) emerges as a promising Indo-Pacific mechanism addressing shared non-traditional maritime threats.

CSC as a Template for Indian Ocean Security Cooperation

1. A regionalised, issue-specific security architecture: CSC’s focus on maritime security, counterterrorism, cyber security, and trafficking aligns with the IMO’s assessment that coastal nations face interconnected non-traditional threats such as Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, piracy, and narcotics flows. Its NSA-level mechanism ensures political oversight.
2. Expanding membership and convergence: From a 2011 trilateral initiative (India-Sri Lanka-Maldives) to its evolution into a five-member grouping (India, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius, Bangladesh) plus Seychelles, CSC reflects rising willingness for functional cooperation in the Indian Ocean. The admission of Malaysia as a guest signals its potential Indo-Pacific outreach.
3. Alignment with India’s ‘Security and Growth for All in the Region’ (SAGAR): CSC operationalises SAGAR’s principles by focusing on capacity-building, white-shipping agreements, joint patrols, and maritime domain awareness (MDA)—key for small littoral economies dependent on blue-economy sectors.
4. Complementarity with other regional mechanisms: CSC can bridge gaps left by fragmented IOR institutions:

• IORA (economic focus)
• IAFNet, IFC-IOR, IOR Information Fusion Center (information-sharing)
• QUAD and AUKUS (broader strategic groupings) CSC’s niche in operational cooperation fills a structural void.

1. Addressing growing China presence in the Indian Ocean: CSC offers a platform to discuss dual-use infrastructure, PLA Navy’s deployment, string-of-pearls strategy, and port-led dependencies, without direct militarisation.

Challenges Hindering Deeper Engagement

1. Divergent threat perceptions (China factor): India views expanding Chinese naval activity—from Hambantota to Gwadar—as a strategic challenge. However, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bangladesh, and Mauritius view China as a developmental partner, not a security threat. This asymmetry limits consensus on maritime posture, joint exercises, and strategic messaging.
2. Weak institutionalization: CSC currently functions through summit-level engagement. Absence of: a permanent secretariat, standard operating procedures, enforceable information-sharing protocols, reduces continuity, making cooperation personality-driven.
3. Domestic political volatility: Political changes in Sri Lanka (2015–19), Maldives (2023), and Bangladesh’s current instability have historically derailed trilateral cooperation. External alignment swings—e.g., Maldives’ “India Out” campaign—affect CSC cohesion.
4. Resource and capability asymmetry: Small island nations lack: coastal surveillance infrastructure, hydrographic capacities, cyber-forensics capabilities. Without sustained financing and technology-sharing by India, uneven participation persists.
5. Overlapping regional architectures: Member countries already engage with: China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific, US Indo-Pacific Strategy,
   creating competing incentives and diluted commitment.
6. Reluctance toward security alignment: Smaller states prefer non-alignment in security affairs to protect strategic autonomy. This restricts CSC’s evolution beyond non-traditional security cooperation.

Conclusion

The ocean’s geopolitical centrality, CSC’s promise depends on institutionalisation, shared threat perception, and India-led capacity building to transform Indian Ocean cooperation into a resilient regional security architecture.