Contents
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Fifth Schedule: Constitutional Promise
- 3 Administrative Neglect and Governance Failure
- 4 Land Alienation and Resource Dispossession
- 5 Representation Deficit in Local Governance
- 6 PESA: Missed Opportunity for Self-Governance
- 7 Governance Vacuum and Maoist Mobilisation
- 8 Security-Development Paradigm: Incomplete
- 9 Post-Maoist Governance Imperatives
- 10 Conclusion
Introduction
Fifth Schedule areas, home to over 100 million adivasis, witnessed intense Maoist mobilisation; Planning Commission (2008) and MPI data reveal chronic governance deficits, not mere poverty, as key drivers of insurgency.
Fifth Schedule: Constitutional Promise
- Original Vision: Envisaged as a special social contract ensuring protection of tribal land, culture and autonomy.
- Key Instruments: Tribal Advisory Councils, Governor’s discretionary powers, Tribal Sub-Plan.
- Reality: Provisions remained largely on paper, eroding constitutional credibility.
Administrative Neglect and Governance Failure
- Colonial Administrative Continuity: Retention of alien bureaucratic rules and justice systems unsuitable for low-literacy tribal societies.
- Service Delivery Deficits: Weak health, education, policing and revenue institutions in Scheduled Areas.
- Empirical Evidence: Planning Commission Expert Group (2008) termed governance failure as “central to alienation”.
Land Alienation and Resource Dispossession
- Structural Exploitation: Despite safeguards, large-scale land acquisition for mining and infrastructure persisted.
- Scholarly Findings: Walter Fernandes documented maximum tribal displacement post-liberalisation.
- Outcome: Loss of livelihood → distrust in state institutions.
Representation Deficit in Local Governance
- Administrative Exclusion: Bureaucracy and frontline officials overwhelmingly non-tribal.
- Critical Observation: B.D. Sharma highlighted outsider bias in governance.
- Institutional Failure: Governors rarely exercised Fifth Schedule powers.
PESA: Missed Opportunity for Self-Governance
- Intent of PESA (1996): Empower Gram Sabhas over land, forests, minor minerals and development decisions.
- Ground Reality: Routine violations, especially in land acquisition and mining approvals.
- Case Study: Chhattisgarh shows highest PESA violations alongside intense Maoist presence.
Governance Vacuum and Maoist Mobilisation
- Parallel Institutions: Maoists provided dispute resolution, schools, ration distribution (Janatana Sarkar).
- Ideological Appeal: “Jal, Jungle, Zameen” resonated amid state absence.
- Trust Deficit: Tribals perceived Maoists as accessible justice providers.
Security-Development Paradigm: Incomplete
- State Response: Two-pronged approach: security operations + welfare delivery.
- Limitation: Welfare without accountability failed to rebuild institutional trust.
- Policy Gap: Governance reforms remained secondary.
Post-Maoist Governance Imperatives
- Strengthening Representation: Real administrative and fiscal autonomy to local bodies.
- Rights-based Governance: Effective implementation of FRA and PESA.
- Institutional Innovation: Learning from Sixth Schedule Autonomous Councils.
- Human Resource Reform: Greater recruitment of tribal officials in permanent bureaucracy.
Conclusion
Legitimacy flows from local knowledge and autonomy; post-Maoist stability demands governance that empowers adivasis, not merely administers them.


