Contents
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Tough Law: Constitutional Design to Protect Judicial Independence
- 3 Loopholes: Procedural Gaps Undermining Accountability
- 4 Political Challenges: Accountability in a Polarised Democracy
- 5 Judicial Pronouncements: Lofty Standards, Limited Enforcement
- 6 Evaluation: Balance Between Independence and Accountability
- 7 Conclusion
Introduction
By 2026, repeated impeachment attempts and resignations underline India’s judicial accountability crisis. Despite Articles 124 and 217, India faces a paradox: constitutionally strong safeguards, yet procedurally fragile enforcement.
Tough Law: Constitutional Design to Protect Judicial Independence
- High Constitutional Threshold: Articles 124(4) and 217 mandate removal only for ‘proved misbehaviour or incapacity’, reflecting the Constituent Assembly’s fear of executive or legislative reprisals against judges.
- Rigorous Parliamentary Majority: Removal requires a special majority—absolute majority plus two-thirds of members present and voting in both Houses—making impeachment politically rare in coalition-era legislatures.
- Quasi-Judicial Investigation Mechanism: Under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, a three-member committee (SC judge, HC Chief Justice, eminent jurist) ensures due process, reinforcing the doctrine of judicial independence as part of the basic structure (Kesavananda Bharati).
Loopholes: Procedural Gaps Undermining Accountability
- Speaker/Chairman’s Discretion at Admission Stage: The presiding officer may admit or disallow a motion without statutorily defined criteria. This threshold veto can nullify a motion supported by 100 Lok Sabha MPs, creating scope for arbitrariness and politicisation.
- Resignation as an Escape Route: Cases such as Justice Soumitra Sen (2011) and later instances show judges resigning mid-process, terminating proceedings and retaining post-retirement benefits—undermining the principle of proved misbehaviour.
- Absence of Graduated Sanctions: The framework lacks intermediate penalties (censure, suspension, pension curtailment). Consequently, ethical violations often go unaddressed because impeachment is viewed as a ‘nuclear option’.
Political Challenges: Accountability in a Polarised Democracy
- Partisan Calculus over Constitutional Morality: Impeachment motions often succeed or fail based on political alignment rather than evidentiary merit, diluting Parliament’s role as a constitutional sentinel.
- Executive Influence by Indirection: Though formally excluded, the executive may influence outcomes through majority control or persuasion of the presiding officer, weakening the separation of powers.
Judicial Pronouncements: Lofty Standards, Limited Enforcement
- Ethical Absolutism in Judicial Conduct: In K. Veeraswami v. Union of India (1991), the Court stressed that judicial honesty admits “no legal relativity”, demanding conduct beyond reproach.
- Narrow Interpretation of Misbehaviour: M. Krishna Swamy v. Union of India (1992) clarified that only wilful misconduct with mens rea qualifies, excluding mere errors of judgment—raising the evidentiary bar further.
- In-House Procedure: Soft Accountability: The judiciary’s internal mechanism, evolved in C. Ravichandran Iyer, promotes peer review but faces criticism for opacity and lack of public confidence, as noted by the Second Administrative Reforms Commission.
Evaluation: Balance Between Independence and Accountability
- Strength in Design, Weakness in Operation: While the framework robustly protects independence, procedural chokepoints and political discretion erode accountability, producing what scholars call an ‘accountability vacuum’.
- Comparative and Reform Perspectives: Law Commission Reports and global practices (UK Judicial Conduct Investigations Office) suggest independent oversight bodies with graded sanctions can reconcile autonomy with responsibility.
Conclusion
As Justice J.S. Verma warned, independence without accountability risks erosion of trust. Reforms aligning procedure with constitutional morality are vital to preserve the judiciary’s democratic legitimacy.”


