Contents
Introduction
The recent Presidential Reference to the Supreme Court under Article 143, seeking clarity on timelines for gubernatorial assent to Bills, raises fundamental questions of constitutional governance, federalism, and judicial interpretation.
The April 8 Judgment and Its Aftermath
- In April 2025, the Supreme Court held that prolonged inaction by Governors and the President on State Bills is unconstitutional, imposing judicially enforceable timelines.
- The judgment stemmed from Tamil Nadu’s challenge to Governor R.N. Ravi’s delay in acting on ten Bills, later reserved for Presidential assent.
- This ruling was a constitutional landmark — the first to articulate time-bound obligations on constitutional heads under Articles 200 and 201, bolstering the legislative autonomy of States.
- Subsequently, President Droupadi Murmu invoked Article 143 to refer 14 legal questions to the Supreme Court, seeking clarification on whether courts can prescribe timeframes for the President and Governors. Critics argue this is a backdoor challenge to the April 8 ruling.
Presidential Reference and Its Legal Scope
- Under Article 143(1), the President may seek the Court’s advisory opinion on questions of law or fact that are of “public importance”. This is a non-binding opinion, but commands high persuasive value. However, the Supreme Court is not obligated to respond — as seen in the Ayodhya Reference (1993) and J&K Resettlement Bill (1982) cases.
- Notably, in In Re: Cauvery Water Disputes (1991), the Court held that Article 143 cannot be used to revisit settled rulings. The April 8 decision, given under adjudicatory jurisdiction, is binding under Article 141, and a Presidential Reference cannot override it.
Constitutional Implications
- Legislative Process and Federalism: The Reference touches the core of legislative federalism. Delays by Governors in granting assent disrupt the will of democratically elected State legislatures. The April 8 ruling reaffirmed the Westminster principle that Governors act on the aid and advice of the State Cabinet. If the Court dilutes this by favouring wide discretionary leeway, it could entrench executive centralism, damaging cooperative federalism — a principle upheld in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) and Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India (2006).
- Separation of Powers: The Reference raises questions about judicial encroachment into executive discretion. However, the judiciary has consistently interpreted inaction or mala fide delay by constitutional authorities as justiciable. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978), procedural arbitrariness was struck down as unconstitutional. Likewise, the April 8 ruling promotes accountability, not interference.
- Judicial Precedent and Advisory Jurisdiction: While advisory opinions are not binding, they have influenced jurisprudence. In R.K. Garg (1981), the Court treated its earlier advisory opinion on the Special Courts Bill (1978) as binding. Thus, even if the April 8 verdict stands, a new opinion could refine or nuance the law. The 1998 Presidential Reference on judicial appointments led the Court to revise the Collegium system without overturning the 1993 ruling — a precedent suggesting that evolution of precedent via advisory input is possible.
Way Forward
- The Court must preserve the April 8 ruling’s core — safeguarding legislative autonomy and holding constitutional authorities accountable.
- A balanced clarification, ensuring that timelines are binding but reasonable, can uphold both federal values and institutional dignity.
- The advisory opinion must not substitute judicial review, which remains the only constitutional means to challenge settled law.
Conclusion
The Presidential Reference offers an opportunity to clarify constitutional duties without reversing settled law. It must reinforce federalism, uphold separation of powers, and preserve judicial independence in India’s democratic framework.
