[Answered] Despite signals to move past the Galwan clashes, a genuine reset in India-China ties remains elusive. Examine the geopolitical and strategic challenges impeding a full normalization of relations.

Introduction

Since the 2020 Galwan clashes, India-China engagement has resumed in fits and starts—talks by Special Representatives, limited CBMs (flights, visas, border trade)—yet the relationship remains adversarial. Structural, not episodic, frictions impede full normalization.

What still blocks a reset?

The boundary is quiet, not settled

1. Status quo ante unresolved: Friction points (e.g., Depsang, Demchok) are not fully restored to pre-2020 positions. Differing LAC perceptions prevent routine patrolling and keep large forward deployments in place.
2. Military asymmetry and posture: PLA’s border infrastructure, dual-use “model villages”, bridges (e.g., Pangong Tso), UAVs and integrated air-defence create persistent pressure; India must mirror-deploy, raising costs and escalation risks.
3. CBMs frayed: The 1993/1996 agreements, 2005 “Political Parameters”, and 2013 BDCA are stressed; verification, patrolling protocols, and crisis hotlines have not rebuilt trust.

The China-Pakistan nexus

1. CPEC across PoK undercuts India’s sovereignty claims and is now linked to prospective extensions into Afghanistan.
2. Diplomatic shielding of Pakistan-based militants at the UN and coordinated messaging after terror incidents deepen India’s security concerns.

Strategic competition beyond the Himalayas

1. Indian Ocean & Indo-Pacific: PLA Navy’s growing presence, dual-use ports, and surveillance around critical sea lanes collide with India’s SAGAR vision and QUAD cooperation.
2. Technology & cyber: Suspicion over 5G vendors, critical minerals, and data security, plus cyber intrusions on Indian grids and ports attributed to China, make tech decoupling/derisking sticky issues.
3. Space and emerging tech: Rivalry in launch, EO/communication satellites, and standards-setting adds a long-tail strategic contest.

Economic entanglement without trust

1. Trade imbalance (~$100+ bn deficit): India depends on Chinese inputs (electronics, APIs, solar), while maintaining investment and procurement scrutiny. This “security-first interdependence” is hard to unwind or to normalize.
2. Coercion fears: App bans, investment screening and tariff/standards spats reflect a cycle of defensive measures that dampen business confidence.

Narrative and domestic politics

1. Public opinion after Galwan constrains political space for overt concessions.
2. Cartographic/identity disputes (maps, stapled visas for Arunachal, naming places) repeatedly reignite sentiment.

Multilateral friction: NSG membership, UNSC reform, BRI norms, debt diplomacy: Divergences recur in nearly every forum (SCO/BRICS/UN), limiting space for a broad détente.

Why “manage, not solve” has limits

The traditional formula—compartmentalize the boundary, grow economics—has flipped: the boundary now conditions economics and politics. Deterrence without reconciliation is fiscally heavy, crisis-prone, and vulnerable to a single incident unraveling gains.

What India must do—strategic imperatives

1. Deterrence with endurance: Multi-domain denial: ISR, air mobility, precision fires, winter logistics, and redundant comms; harden critical grids against cyber/space disruption. Complete eastern/central sector connectivity (tunnels, feeder roads) and tri-service theatre synergy.
2. Codify robust border guardrails: Restore verifiable patrolling regimes, disengagement templates, and incident-prevention SOPs; push for sector-wise LAC clarification even if a final settlement is distant.
3. De-risk the economy: Targeted import substitution in APIs/electronics, trusted-vendor rules for critical infrastructure, diversified supply chains (Japan+1, Europe, ASEAN), and calibrated FDI screening that still allows non-sensitive capital.
4. Coalitions without containment: Deepen QUAD and minilateral practicals (HADR, maritime domain awareness, critical tech), while keeping issue-based cooperation with China (climate, health, financial stability) to avoid total fracture.
5. Leverage competitive statecraft: Offer credible alternatives to BRI: IMEC, east-west corridors, neighbourhood connectivity, and development finance that is timely and transparent.
6. Narrative management and crisis communication: Institutionalized media transparency on border incidents, regular SR-level reviews, and Track-II/Track-1.5 channels to reduce misperception.

Conclusion

A durable reset needs more than quiet borders; it requires verifiable de-escalation, balanced interdependence, and guardrails in every domain. Until structural divergences narrow, India must pursue deterrence, de-risking, and disciplined dialogue—engagement without illusion, stability without surrender.