Contents
Introduction
By 2026, declining Global South participation and WEF surveys reveal Davos’ drift from economic coordination to strategic signalling, reviving critiques of the ‘Davos Consensus’ as Western-centric global governance.
WEF’s Transformation into a Western Geopolitical Forum
- Geopoliticisation of an Economic Platform: Originally envisioned by Klaus Schwab as a space for stakeholder capitalism, the WEF has increasingly prioritised geopolitics over growth. Recent Davos agendas have been dominated by NATO expansion, sanctions, technology decoupling, and transatlantic frictions—issues reflecting Western strategic anxieties rather than developmental concerns of the Global South.
- Western Dominance and Representational Deficit: Despite rhetoric of “Global South inclusion,” panels and outcomes remain dominated by G7 policymakers and Western multinational CEOs. Oxfam’s 2024 Davos inequality report noted that over 60% of speakers represented advanced economies, reinforcing perceptions that developing countries are “subjects of discussion, not agenda-setters.”
- Normative Conditionalities and the ‘Values Gap’: The emphasis on ESG norms, carbon border taxes (CBAM), and liberal political conditionalities is often perceived as regulatory imperialism. For low-income countries prioritising poverty reduction and infrastructure, such standards raise compliance costs without commensurate capacity support, undermining policy autonomy.
China’s Strategic Response: Institutionalising Economic Alternatives
- Development-First Multilateralism: China has leveraged this vacuum through platforms like the Boao Forum for Asia and the Annual Meeting of the New Champions (AMNC), focusing on trade facilitation, industrial value chains, digital economy, and green manufacturing—minimising overt geopolitical contestation.
- Narrative of ‘True Multilateralism’: Through initiatives such as the Global Development Initiative (GDI) and Global Civilization Initiative (GCI), China projects an alternative discourse centred on sovereignty, non-interference, and “shared development.” This resonates with countries wary of Western interventionism.
- Parallel Financial and Technological Architectures: China showcases alternatives to Western-dominated systems—AIIB for infrastructure finance, the Digital Yuan via mBridge for cross-border payments, and BeiDou for navigation—reducing dependence on institutions like the IMF, World Bank, and SWIFT, often associated with political conditionalities.
Why the Global South Is Pivoting Away from Davos
- Pragmatic Minilateralism: Many African, Southeast Asian, and Latin American states prefer issue-based coalitions delivering tangible outcomes. Belt and Road projects, despite criticisms, have financed ports, railways, and energy grids where Western finance retreated post-2008.
- Economic Complementarity with China: China is the largest trading partner for over 120 countries (UNCTAD, 2024). Its forums offer direct market access to the world’s largest manufacturing base at a time when Western economies pursue protectionism and industrial subsidies.
Implications for Global Economic Governance
- Fragmented Multilateralism: The erosion of Davos’ neutrality signals a shift toward club-based governance, with competing norm-setting hubs rather than universal platforms, risking regulatory fragmentation.
- Strategic Space for Middle Powers: Countries like India, Brazil, and Indonesia are emerging as swing states, engaging both Western and Chinese platforms to maximise strategic autonomy—evident in India’s G20 presidency emphasising “development over dogma.”
Conclusion
Inclusive global governance demands plural platforms. As President Droupadi Murmu noted, development must unite, not divide—beyond Western or Chinese binaries.
