Contents
Introduction
With Pakistan’s political volatility intensifying after Imran Khan’s imprisonment and the military consolidation under General Asim Munir, India faces a nuclear-armed neighbour whose instability, as per SIPRI 2024, raises unpredictable cross-border security risks.
Implications of Pakistan’s Internal Dysfunction for India’s National Security
A. Civil–Military Disequilibrium Intensifying Strategic Ambiguity
- Pakistan’s elevation of Asim Munir as the first Chief of Defence Forces formalises Rawalpindi’s primacy over political institutions.
- Strategic decisions—including Kashmir policy, ceasefire violations, and terror sponsorship—are now shaped by a narrower, security-maximalist military calculus.
- A “military-first state” tends to employ diversionary tactics, historically seen after domestic crises (Kargil 1999, Operation Parakram 2001, Pathankot 2016).
B. Erosion of Civilian Legitimacy fuels Impulsive Behaviour
- A weakened Shehbaz Sharif government, lacking electoral credibility, reduces Pakistan’s diplomatic bandwidth.
- Foreign policy becomes reactive, raising the possibility of uncoordinated escalations, particularly after incidents like the Pahalgam attack.
- Nuclear signalling may be used to compensate for internal fragility, increasing crisis instability in the Subcontinent.
Regional Security Spillovers from Pakistan’s Domestic Crisis
- Rise of Non-State Actors and Unchecked Terror Ecosystems: Domestic dysfunction creates permissive environments for groups like: TTP (with safe havens in Afghanistan), LeT/JeM elements historically sheltered by Pakistan’s deep state.
With Pakistan accusing Kabul of hosting TTP, the risk of two-front militancy increases. For India, this heightens threats along the LoC and raises infiltration probabilities. - Economic Distress and Strategic Adventurism: Pakistan’s chronic economic crisis—debt, IMF conditionalities, 30% inflation—creates incentives for externalisation of internal pressures. According to World Bank 2024, states with declining economic resilience often resort to risk-prone foreign policy. India must anticipate sudden escalatory postures from a fiscally cornered neighbour.
- External Actors Recalibrating Policies: China remains invested through CPEC but is increasingly risk-averse after repeated attacks on Chinese workers. Saudi Arabia’s growing warmth toward India limits Pakistan’s financial leverage. The U.S. maintains tactical ties, especially for counter-terror cooperation. This multipolarity fragments Pakistan’s external anchors, amplifying unpredictability for India.
Why India Requires a Policy of “Firmness Without Agitation”
- Managing a Nuclear-Neighbour with Multiple Power Centres: India cannot allow domestic turbulence in Pakistan to provoke emotion-driven escalation, especially when “command cohesion” is uncertain. Controlled firmness—calibrated military responses, robust border management, and counter-terror intelligence—ensures deterrence without spiralling crises.
- Preserving Strategic Focus in the Indo-Pacific and West Asia: A reactive Pakistan-centric posture could dilute India’s capacity for: Indo-Pacific partnerships (Quad, IPEF), West Asian outreach (I2U2, oil-security ties), Central Asian engagement. Composure ensures India’s strategic bandwidth is not hijacked by a weakened neighbour.
- Behavioural Realism and Crisis Stability: Successful statecraft requires signals without provocation: targeted retaliation (Balakot model), denial capabilities (counter-infiltration grid), diplomatic isolation of terror networks, maintaining backchannel communication for crisis de-escalation. This reflects the doctrine of offensive defence + strategic restraint.
Conclusion
Unstable neighbours demand calibrated diplomacy. India’s future policy must blend quiet strength, crisis stability, and strategic patience to safeguard long-term national security.
