[Answered] India should reconsider or even abrogate the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), given its unfair provisions and Pakistan’s non-cooperative behavior. Critically examine the validity of this assertion in light of international law, water-sharing ethics, and India’s strategic interests.

Introduction

The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), signed in 1960 under World Bank mediation, has long been cited as a successful example of water diplomacy between hostile neighbors. However, growing asymmetry in benefits, persistent Pakistani obstruction, and the absence of exit provisions have triggered calls in India for reconsidering or abrogating the treaty. This assertion, however, needs to be critically examined in legal, ethical, and strategic dimensions.

Unfair Provisions of the IWT

1. Asymmetrical Water Allocation: IWT allocates 80% of Indus basin waters to Pakistan (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) while India, the upper riparian and originator of the rivers, receives only 20% (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej).
2. Disproportionate Control: India controls 39% of the basin’s area, while Pakistan controls 47%, yet enjoys a far larger water share.
3. Restricted Usage Rights for India: India can use western rivers only for non-consumptive purposes (run-of-the-river hydroelectricity, irrigation within limits), and minimal storage is allowed.
4. No Exit Clause: Unlike many modern treaties, IWT has no provision for withdrawal, making it outdated and inflexible in current geopolitical and environmental contexts.

Pakistan’s Obstructionist Approach

Despite receiving a favorable deal, Pakistan has:

1. Objected to almost every Indian project in Jammu & Kashmir: Salal (1970s), Tulbul (1980s), Baglihar (1999), Kishanganga, and Ratle (2000s–2020s).
2. Exploited legal and procedural mechanisms (e.g., Neutral Experts, Courts of Arbitration) to delay India’s projects.
3. Avoided constructive dialogue, leading to the non-functioning of the Permanent Indus Commission since 2022.

These actions hinder India’s development rights under the treaty and create geostrategic vulnerabilities, especially in Jammu & Kashmir.

International Legal and Ethical Considerations

1. Customary International Law: Evolved post-1960 towards the principle of “equitable and reasonable utilization” (UN Convention on International Watercourses, 1997), which contrasts with IWT’s rigid partition model.
2. Sovereignty of Upper Riparians: Countries like China and Turkey assert strong sovereign rights over transboundary rivers, unlike India’s concessions.
3. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969): Allows for treaty termination if fundamental circumstances change. India can potentially argue that Pakistan’s misuse of the treaty and regional hydrological changes (e.g., climate impacts) qualify.

Strategic and Diplomatic Implications

1. Pros of Reconsideration/Abrogation:

• Asserts India’s upper riparian rights.
• Enhances strategic leverage over Pakistan.
• Allows optimal use of western rivers for agriculture and hydropower.

1. Risks of Abrogation:

• Could trigger international backlash and damage India’s image as a responsible power.
• May affect downstream trust with neighbors like Bangladesh and Nepal.
• Escalates diplomatic and military tensions with Pakistan, potentially destabilizing the region.

Way Forward

1. Diplomatic Renegotiation: Seek a revision of the treaty under changing international norms, highlighting principles of equity and sustainability.
2. Leverage Treaty Clauses: Fully utilize India’s rights under the existing treaty, including maximum permissible storage and hydropower.
3. Use Green Diplomacy: Frame the issue within climate-resilient infrastructure needs and water security imperatives.
4. Internationalization Strategy: Highlight Pakistan’s misuse of mechanisms and reluctance for cooperation in global forums.

Conclusion

While the IWT is outdated and asymmetrical, outright abrogation may do more harm than good. India must adopt a strategic recalibration—asserting its rights within the treaty’s framework, pushing for renegotiation, and preparing the legal groundwork for possible exit under international law if necessary. A strong, self-reliant India must also be a prudent global actor—one that balances national interests with ethical leadership.