Dancing around the Supreme Court

Dancing around the Supreme Court

News: The article discusses the Maharashtra dance bars case and the nature of interactions between government and the courts.

Facts:

• On January 17, the Supreme Court struck down several statutory provisions and rules governing Maharashtra’s dance bars.
• In 2005, the Maharashtragovernment imposed a ban on dance performances in bars, with the exception of hotels rated three stars and above on the basis that dance performances in bars were obscene, morally corrupt, and promoted prostitution.
• Dance performance licenses were cancelled by Maharashtra government with immediate effect, prompting affected parties to file petitions in courts. The High Court ruled against government.
• The SC held in 2013 that government could not discriminate between luxury hotels and other bars and that the ban resulted in unemployment of over 75,000 women, many of whom were forced by circumstances to engage in prostitution.
• Maharashtra government in response imposed an outright ban on all dance performances, whether in street bars or upmarket hotels but failed to address the unemployment concern.
• Later when SC again ruled in the negative, the Maharashtra government, though allowed dance performances but imposed a number of other conditions on establishments seeking a license like :
  • Applicants were required to “possess a good character” with no criminal antecedents.
  • Dance bar could not be within one kilometre of an educational or religious institution.
  • A CCTV camera would need to be fitted at the entrance.
  • Customers could not be permitted to throw coins or currency notes on the dancers, but could add tips to the bill.
  • The permit room (where alcohol was served) and the dance room would need to be separated by a partition and the stage could not be smaller than a prescribed size.
• The SC in recent judgment upheld a few of these conditions, but struck down others. For example, it noted that :
  • The CCTV requirement violated the right to privacy of the dancers and the patrons.
  • The “good character” requirement was vague and undefined.
  • The partition between the permit room and the dance room was unjustified and the one kilometre distance requirement was impractical.

Nature of institutional interactions between government and judiciary in this case:

• Maharashtra government has responded more swiftly to judicial decisions than the Supreme Court has to the government’s counter measures.
  • The final judicial decision in the first round took around 8 years, while the government’s response took about 11 months.
  • In the second round, the court took a year and three months to make its decision; the government responded in six months.
• Thus there has been significant delay in court’s rulings as compared to governments counter actions.
• This case highlights the vulnerability of SC, especially when it depends on the government to comply with its decisions. Even when the SC strikes down the legislations, their compliance lies with the executive.
• The SC often uses the writ of continuing mandamus (issuing a series of interim orders over a period of time to monitor compliance with its decisions) to check the status of implementation of its decisions.
• There is a need for the SC to explore an enforcement strategy for its decisions on the government. For example, in this case, though the court cannot direct the enactment of legislation to the government but it can monitor compliance with an order to issue licenses to qualified applicants by the government.