Malabar naval exercise: Powerplay in the Indo-Pacific region

Malabar naval exercise: Powerplay in the Indo-Pacific region: (Live Mint, Editorial) (Malabar Exercise – An Indo-Pacific Powerplay)

Context:

• The 2017 Malabar exercise was the 21st edition of the exercise and conducted from 10 to 17 July 2017. This edition involved navies from India, USA and Japan.
• This exercise focused on Aircraft Carrier operations, Air defense, Anti-submarine warfare (ASW), Surface warfare, Visit Board Search and Seizure (VBSS), Search and Rescue (SAR), joint and tactical procedures.

Background:

• Exercise Malabar is a trilateral naval exercise involving the United States, Japan and India as permanent partners.
• Originally a bilateral exercise between India and the United States, Japan became a permanent partner in 2015.

Current Situation:

• The “Malabar” naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal came to an end by second week of July, 2017.
• The exercise ended with a drill involving Indian aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya, the US flat-top Nimitz, and Japan’s new helicopter carrier, the JS Izumo.

Signal to China:

• The expansive scope and complexity of the engagement led many to portray Malabar 2017 as a maritime response to China’s aggression in Dokalam where the Indian Army and People’s Liberation Army troops remain locked in a tense stalemate.
• With over 20 ships, including two submarines and over 100 aircraft and helicopters involved in complex maneuvers, the strategic messaging to China seemed more than clear.
• Notably, Indian commentators cast Malabar as a strategic precursor to a more proactive sea-denial strategy aimed at challenging People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ships and submarines in the Indian Ocean.

Signal from China:

• In the run-up to Malabar, the media had reported a “surge” in Chinese naval presence in the sub-continental littorals.
• PLAN units prowling India’s near-seas reportedly included the Luyang III class destroyers, hydrographic research vessels, and an intelligence-gathering ship, Haiwingxing, presumably to keep track of naval ships taking part in the trilateral exercises
• Indian analysts seemed more distressed by the reported presence of a Chinese conventional submarine in the Indian seas, confirmed by the docking of the Chongmingdao, a submarine support vessel, in Karachi last month.

Implications of Malabar Exercise:

• The emphasis on anti-submarine warfare (ASW) exercises in Malabar is a sign of India’s growing willingness to leverage its maritime partnerships in Asia to counter PLAN operations in the Indian Ocean.
• Most of the focus was on exercises involving P-8I and P-8A reconnaissance aircraft, MiG-29K fighters and Japanese ASW helicopters, lending credence to accounts that an Indian “sea-denial” strategy was at work in the Bay of Bengal.

International Relations over Sea-Waters:

• Modern-day trading nations regard the oceans as a shared global common, with equal opportunity rights for all user states.
• Thus, unless a sea-space is a site of overlapping claims (as in the case of the South China Sea) or a contested enclave in a geopolitically troubled spot (as the Persian Gulf), no coastal state ever actively denies another the use of the high seas.
• This balance only changes during war, when navies seek to block adversaries from entering critical sea spaces in the contested littorals.
• During peace-time operations, however, maritime forces enjoy assured access to the seas that lie beyond national territorial waters.

India’s Concern:

• The idea that Indian naval power can prevent Chinese warships and submarines from accessing India’s near-seas is flawed.
• Given Beijing’s key role in the politics and geo-economics of the Indian Ocean region, a peacetime plan to deny its warships entry into India’s surrounding seas is unlikely to succeed
• With the PLAN expanding its diplomatic engagements along the Indian Ocean rim, many regional states have been welcoming of Beijing’s maritime initiatives and investments in the Indian Ocean.
• India’s plans to constrain Chinese naval power in South Asia are bound to meet with regional opposition.
• In recent years, the PLAN has sought to project power in the Indian Ocean region through a constant naval presence in India’s near-seas.
• By refusing to accept the Indian Ocean as an Indian backwater, it has made successful inroads into India’s geopolitical sphere of influence.

Strategies for India:

• Firstly, India too must now resort to a strategy of counter-power projection by expanding the scope of its naval deployments in the South China Sea, long considered a Chinese preserve.
• Secondly, by gradually expanding security presence along the critical sea lanes of the Western Pacific, the Indian Navy must plan to use the South China Sea’s geopolitically sensitive spaces for the strategic power projection.
• Thirdly, China’s vulnerability in its near-seas must be taken advantage of by India.
• Finally, to challenge PLAN incursions into the Indian Ocean, the Indian Navy must plan for counter-presence in China’s near-seas, where Beijing cannot prove a territorial infringement, and yet feel the pinch of a perceived violation of its political sphere of influence.