UPSC Syllabus Topic: GS Paper 3 – Internal and external security
Introduction
The Mumbai terror attacks of November 2008 exposed serious gaps in India’s intelligence system. The failure was seen not as a lack of information, but as an inability to connect scattered data. This belief shaped the push for a technology-based solution. Over time, this response has expanded into a system of mass surveillance, raising concerns about legality, accountability, and democratic control. ‘Natgrid’ – the search engine of digital authoritarianism.
What is NATGRID?
The National Intelligence Grid, better known as NATGRID, is an integrated IT solution which would allow user agencies to access data gathered from various databases such as credit and debit cards, tax, telecom, immigration, airlines and railway tickets, passports, driving licenses among others.
Aim: It is being developed as a measure to help security agencies such as the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), Research & Analysis Wing (RAW) etc. in tackling crime and terror threats in the country.
Evolution of NATGRID From Intelligence Tool to Mass Surveillance System
1.Origin in the 26/11 intelligence failure: The idea of National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) emerged after the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks. The failure was defined as the inability to connect scattered intelligence inputs. NATGRID was proposed as a system to stitch together data points like travel, visas, and financial records.
- Initial design and limited scope: NATGRID was announced publicly in December 2009. It was designed as a middleware platform allowing 11 central agencies to query 21 categories of databases. Its stated purpose was counter-terrorism and serious national security threats.
- Approval without legislation: In June 2012, NATGRID was approved by executive order and the Cabinet Committee on Security. It was not backed by a law passed by Parliament. The first phase, Horizon–I, received ₹1,002.97 crore, despite unresolved concerns over safeguards and oversight.
- Long delay and perception of inactivity: For several years, repeated delays led to the belief that NATGRID existed only on paper. It was widely seen as a response to public anger after 26/11 rather than a functioning system.
- Operational revival and expansion of usage: By 2025, NATGRID became fully operational. States were asked to scale up its use after a national conference of Directors General of Police. The system began handling around 45,000 queries every month.
- Expansion beyond central agencies: Access to NATGRID expanded from central intelligence agencies to State police units. Officers down to the rank of Superintendent of Police were allowed access, shifting NATGRID from exceptional intelligence use to routine policing.
- Integration with population-wide databases: NATGRID was integrated with the National Population Register, which holds data on 1.19 billion residents. This marked a shift from tracking specific threats to mapping the entire population.
- Shift to algorithm-driven surveillance: Advanced analytics like entity resolution and facial recognition were added. NATGRID moved from being a search platform to an inference system, where algorithms draw conclusions about individuals.
Concerns Related to NATGRID
- Lack of legal foundation and independent oversight: NATGRID operates without a law passed by Parliament. It was approved through executive action, without any independent authority to supervise its functioning. This creates a system of surveillance without clear constitutional safeguards or democratic accountability.
- Expansion beyond counter-terrorism: NATGRID was justified as a tool for counter-terrorism and serious national security threats. Its use has expanded into routine policing and has been integrated with the National Population Register, which holds data on 1.19 billion residents. This shifts surveillance from tracking specific threats to mapping the entire population, raising serious concerns about proportionality and purpose.
- Algorithm-driven inference and loss of human judgment: With tools like entity resolution and facial recognition, NATGRID no longer works as a simple search system. Algorithms now infer identity and intent, increasing the risk of errors based on machine-generated conclusions.
- 4. Bias and unequal impact of errors: Analytical systems reflect existing distortions in policing data. Caste, religious, and regional biases can be reinforced and presented as objective outcomes. False matches affect citizens unequally, with marginalised groups facing harsher consequences.
- 5. Tyranny of scale and weak safeguards: Around 45,000 queries are processed every month. At this scale, safeguards such as logging and classification risk becoming routine formalities, especially in the absence of independent scrutiny.
- Judicial and parliamentary silence: Despite strong privacy principles laid down in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy vs Union of India, the legality of large-scale intelligence programmes has not been squarely examined. Parliamentary oversight remains minimal.
Conclusion
The shock of 26/11 continues to shape India’s security choices, but the remedy has been misdirected. Intelligence failures arise more from weak institutions and poor accountability than from lack of data. NATGRID has expanded from a counter-terror tool into a system of population-wide surveillance without legal backing or oversight. In the absence of parliamentary and judicial scrutiny, technology risks replacing judgment, and security risks sliding into digital authoritarianism.
Question for practice:
Examine how the creation and expansion of NATGRID, as a response to the 26/11 intelligence failure, has raised concerns about mass surveillance, legality, and democratic accountability in India.
Source: The Hindu
