Hello aspirants,
Today’s revision capsule of PSIR optional preparation covers “Principal Organs of Government. There are 5 ten-mark, 13 fifteen-mark, and 2 twenty-mark questions in the last 12 years PYQs
THE INDIAN PARLIAMENT — STRUCTURE, FUNCTIONING & KEY DEBATES
- WHY INDIA CHOSE A PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM
| Point | Details & Scholars |
| Strategic decision | Granville Austin – parliamentary form would weld India’s diversity into “a single, inclusive democratic framework,” rebutting Penderel Moon’s fear of failure in a heterogeneous society. |
| Universal adult suffrage | Ensured no communal / property electorates. |
| Against presidentialism | Assembly worried about authoritarian drift & federal friction. |
| Role of Rajya Sabha | N. Gopalaswamy Ayyangar: forum for “second thought”; not a replica of US equal-state Senate. W. H. Morris-Jones: justification lies more in deliberation than “state rights.” |
- CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE (Art. 79)
| Component | Composition & Unique Powers |
| President of India | Summons/prorogues, dissolves LS; assent/return; issues ordinances; acts on aid & advice (Cabinet). |
| Lok Sabha | Direct election; 5-yr tenure; money bills originate here; only House that can topple govt via no-confidence. |
| Rajya Sabha | Indirect election + 12 nominated; permanent body; Art 249 (State-List legislation) & Art 312 (All-India Services); cannot unseat govt; offers continuity & federal voice. |
- PRESIDING OFFICERS & NEUTRALITY
- Speaker, Lok Sabha – dignity, impartiality, certifies money bills, stays till successor.
- Vice-President / RS Chairperson – presides over Rajya Sabha with non-partisan expectation.
- LAW-MAKING FLOW
- Introduction (Minister / Private Member)
- First–Second–Third Reading → Committee reference (Select / Joint) or circulation.
- Deadlock? President may call joint sitting (Art 108).
- Money Bill – Speaker’s certificate; RS only recommends; 14-day rule.
- Presidential assent or reconsideration.
- PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGES & EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY
Freedom of speech, immunity from legal action & civil arrest.
Tools: Question Hour, Debates, Adjournment Motion, Call Attention + ultimate sanction no-confidence.
- COMMITTEE SYSTEM – EXPERT OVERSIGHT
| Committee | Function & Observers |
| Estimates Committee (LS only) | Scrutinises spending; Asok Chanda: rationalises expenditure. |
| Public Accounts Committee | Audits expenditure; Morris-Jones: “deterrent against waste.” |
| Committee on Public Undertakings | Monitors PSUs; early critique by Indrajeet Gupta. |
| Departmentally-related Standing Committees (post-1989) | Continuous subject oversight; blend of British & US practice. |
STATE LEGISLATURES
Mirror Parliament. Some bicameral (Legislative Council) – often questioned for cost/utility. Governor may reserve Bills → President can withhold indefinitely (union check).
- BASIC STRUCTURE & PARLIAMENTARY LIMITS
After Kesavananda Bharati (1973) Parliament’s power is not sovereign; Supreme Court’s judicial review ensures Constitution prevails.
- SOCIO-ECONOMIC COMPOSITION SHIFT
From elite lawyers → agriculturists, OBCs, SC/STs; women still under-represented. Populism & whips sometimes dilute deliberative quality.
- ANTI-DEFECTION LAW (Tenth Schedule, 1985; 91st Amendment 2003)
| Key Points | |
| Purpose | Halt “Aaya Ram, Gaya Ram”; secure party discipline & mandate. |
| Speaker as adjudicator | Political head + quasi-judicial role. |
| Kihoto Hollohan (1992) | Upheld Schedule; struck Para 7 bar; judicial review = basic structure; decision of Speaker first ➜ later court review. |
| Natural justice cases | A.K. Kraipak (1969), Tulshiram Patel (1985), Jagjit Singh (2006) applied to Speaker’s orders. |
| Practical controversies | Nabam Rebia (2016); Manipur episodes; “resort politics.” |
| Reform proposals | Dinesh Goswami Committee, 170th Law Commission – shift adjudication to President/Governor on ECI advice (model of Art 103). SC suggests independent tribunals; narrow law to survival votes; set 3-month timeline. |
- PARLIAMENT’S ENDURING CENTRALITY
Despite executive assertiveness, partisan frictions, low productivity and gender gaps, Parliament remains:
- The apex democratic forum,
- The keystone of federal–unitary balance (via Rajya Sabha),
- The guardian of accountability through its committee network, and
- The visible symbol of an ever-widening, still-evolving Indian electorate.
Ensuring robust debate, timely committee scrutiny and impartial anti-defection adjudication will decide whether this “hybrid creation” meets the framers’ aspiration for a vibrant, equitable, forward-looking republic.
THE EXECUTIVE SYSTEM IN INDIA
- ADOPTING THE EXECUTIVE FRAMEWORK
| Key Points | |
| Constituent Assembly options | British Cabinet, Swiss elected executive, American presidential model. |
| A.K. Ayyar | Warned “an infant democracy cannot afford” chronic executive-legislature conflict. |
| Jawaharlal Nehru | Wanted ministerial governance & legislative supremacy over any presidential activism. |
| Granville Austin | Parliamentary choice aimed at “strength with democracy.” |
| K.M. Munshi | Overlapping membership → stronger, more effective government. |
| Outcome | Parliamentary executive: President = nominal head; Council of Ministers (CoM) + Prime Minister (PM) wield real power. |
- THE PRESIDENT OF INDIA
| Details & Scholars | |
| Constitutional position | Mirror of British Crown; Dr. B.R. Ambedkar: a “ceremonial device” / seal. |
| Election | Indirect; formula by N. Gopalaswamy Ayyangar for equitable state weight. |
| Formal powers | Appointments, summoning Parliament, Article 111 assent, Article 123 ordinances, clemency (Art 72), Emergency provisions 352/356/360. |
| Scholarly views | Ambedkar, M.C. Setalvad, A.K. Ayyar: cabinet supremacy. Paul R. Brass: efficacy depends on PM’s trust. Walter Bagehot: may “advise, encourage, warn,” not govern. |
- THE PRIME MINISTER (PM) – “Luna inter stellas minores” (William Harcourt)
| Power / Function | Illustrations & References |
| Forming Ministry | Entire CoM resigns on PM’s exit. |
| Portfolio allocation | A. Lawrence Lowell’s “mismatched blocks” analogy. |
| Chairing Cabinet & Committees | Coordinates policy, mediates disputes. |
| Article 78 link to President | Sole channel of Cabinet decisions. |
| Parliamentary leader | Controls agenda, seeks confidence, may advise Lok Sabha dissolution. |
| Foreign policy face | Summits & negotiations carry PM’s imprint. |
| Evolution of styles | Nehru / Indira Gandhi → “prime ministerial government” & kitchen cabinet; Lal Bahadur Shastri → consensual; Atal Bihari Vajpayee / Manmohan Singh → coalition constraints (noted by James Manor, D.N. Panandikar, G.K. Mehra). |
| K.T. Shah caveat | Excessive concentration may erode accountability. |
| Overall status | Primus inter pares yet bounded by party, Parliament, President, press & public. |
- COUNCIL OF MINISTERS (CoM) & ITS TIERS
| Feature | Detail |
| Three-tier structure (1950, Gopalswamy Ayyangar): Cabinet Ministers → Ministers of State → Deputy Ministers. | |
| Collective responsibility | Core parliamentary convention. |
| Cabinet → inner / kitchen cabinets | Height under Indira Gandhi; powerful PMO noted. |
| Coalition era (1989-2009) | Quotas for allies diluted homogeneity; instability toppled govts (United Front etc.). |
| Cabinet sizes | 22 (early Nehru) → 31 (Indira 1971) → 32 (Rajiv 1984) ↔ inclusivity vs efficiency. |
- THE BUREAUCRACY – FROM ICS TO IAS
| Scholar / Source | Observation |
| Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel | Saw IAS as “steel frame” for unity. |
| Jawaharlal Nehru (Autobiography) | Colonial mindset persisted. |
| Max Weber principles | Competitive entry, hierarchy, permanence. |
| Chakrabarty & Bhattacharya; Sudarshan; Trivedi; Potter; Rudolph & Rudolph; Paul R. Brass | Paternalistic, ill-equipped for socio-economic transformation; issues of corruption & politicisation. |
| Fifth Pay Commission (1997) & Second ARC (Veerappa Moily) | Downsizing, transparency, RTI, Citizens’ Charters. |
| Rajiv Gandhi quote | Paternalist model obsolete for development. |
- PRESIDENTIAL DISCRETIONARY POWERS – TEXT vs PRACTICE
| Constitutional Articles labelled “power”, “pleasure”, “satisfaction”, “assent” | Judicial constriction |
| Art 72 pardon | Maru Ram (1980), Kehar Singh (1989) – must heed Council advice. |
| Art 111 assent | President may withhold / return (Dr. Rajendra Prasad on Hindu Code Bill). Stronger than US veto. |
| Art 123 ordinances | Courts (e.g., R.C. Cooper 1970) insist on ministerial advice; recent Presidents refuse ordinances—reclaiming discretion. |
| Emergency 352 / 356 | State of Rajasthan 1977, S.R. Bommai 1994: limited but existent discretion. |
| Article 74 debate | Word “functions” vs “powers”: earlier Ram Jawaya Kapur 1955, Samser Singh 1974 blur the distinction; 42nd Amendment broadened “shall act in accordance with advice” for functions only. |
| Natural-justice angle | President’s oath (Art 60) & immunity (Art 361) imply independent role. |
- ANTI-DEFECTION, SPEAKER & ADMINISTRATIVE-LAW PRINCIPLES
| Element | Key Mentions |
| Tenth Schedule 1985; 91st Amendment 2003 – curb “Aaya Ram, Gaya Ram”. | |
| Kihoto Hollohan 1992 | Upheld Schedule; struck Para 7 bar; Speaker’s decision first, then judicial review (basic structure). |
| A.K. Kraipak 1969; UOI v Tulshiram Patel 1985; Jagjit Singh 2006 – natural justice applies. | |
| Nabam Rebia 2016, Manipur, resort politics → Speaker delays & bias. | |
| Reform ideas: Dinesh Goswami Committee, 170th Law Commission, SC call for independent tribunal / ECI model, 3-month timeline; scope only for survival votes. |
- CABINET SYSTEM – HISTORICAL TRAJECTORY
| Phase | Salient Traits & Names |
| Interim Govt 1946 | Nehru’s pledge to Lord Wavell for collective responsibility. |
| Nehru era | From “national” cabinet to dominant PM but collegial façade. |
| Lal Bahadur Shastri | Consensus-driven primus inter pares. |
| Indira Gandhi (1966-77, 1980-84) | Prime-ministerial ascendancy, kitchen cabinets, CoM in “coma”. |
| Rajiv Gandhi | Continued centralisation. |
| Janata experiment (Morarji Desai 1977) | Factionalism eroded collective responsibility. |
| Coalition decade 1989-2009 | United Front, NDA, UPA – quota cabinets; outside support; diluted unity. |
| Institutions under Manmohan Singh | NAC (Sonia Gandhi), GoMs/E-GoMs – parallel policy channels. |
| Narendra Modi (2014-) | Abolished then revived GoMs/E-GoMs; reasserted formal cabinet primacy with strong PM role. |
- KEY ARTICLES, CASES & CONCEPTS
Articles: 53, 60, 61, 72, 74(1), 78, 85, 86, 87, 103, 108, 111, 112, 115, 118(3), 123, 124(2)(3), 127, 128, 148, 240, 249, 258, 263, 304, 352, 354, 356, 359, 360, 366(22).
Cases: Ram Jawaya Kapur 1955; R.C. Cooper 1970; U.N.R. Rao 1971; Samser Singh 1974; Maru Ram 1980; Kehar Singh 1989; A.K. Kraipak 1969; UOI v Tulshiram Patel 1985; Jayantilal Amritlal Shodhan 1964; State of Rajasthan 1977; S.R. Bommai 1994; Jagjit Singh 2006; Kihoto Hollohan 1992; Nabam Rebia 2016.
Committees / Commissions: Machinery of Government Committee 1918; Gopalswamy Ayyangar; Fifth Pay Commission 1997; NCRWC 2000; Dinesh Goswami Committee; 170th Law Commission; Second ARC (M. Veerappa Moily).
Concepts & Phrases: collective responsibility; primus inter pares; “keystone of the arch”; kitchen cabinet; “migration of power”; “prime ministerial government”; “luna inter stellas minores”; “Aaya Ram, Gaya Ram”; parliamentary secretaries; cabinet vs CoM; natural justice (nemo judex in causa sua / audi alteram partem); basic structure doctrine; judicial review; Right to Information; Citizens’ Charter.
The State Executive in India’s Federal Framework
- Why the State Executive looks “federal-unitary hybrid”
| Core Design Choice | Exam-worthy words |
| Twin Goals | “Unity & integrity of a diverse nation” vs. “local self-government for shaping one’s own future.” |
| Centre’s Over-ride Levers | Art. 257 (Union directions), Art. 249 (Parliament can legislate on State List), plus Emergency claws—gives Delhi a “watchful-eye” role in CM selection. |
| No State Constitutions | Unlike the U.S., Indian States share one parliamentary template (Part VI) to blunt “separatist tendencies.” |
| Yet not classical unitary | States elect Assemblies & run executives; courts stay unified outside this discussion. |
- Governor — nominal head, real flash-point
Granville Austin brands the office “acutely controversial.”
Why appointed, not elected
Constituent Assembly Debates (1948 vol 8): an elected Governor risked “dual power” conflict; nomination preserves unity.
Normal vs. Discretionary Arsenal
| Article / Power | Normal Operation | When Controversy Erupts |
| Art 154 | Executes, appoints, or ordinances on CoM advice. | — |
| Art 161 | Reprieve/commute sentences (not death or court-martial). | — |
| Art 163 (Discretion) | Act without advice where Constitution so directs. | Hung House, odd bills (Art 200), breakdown report (Art 356). |
Four discretionary zones
- Hung Assembly CM choice
H. M. Seervai warns a first-invited minority may “become majority by luring defectors.” - Dismissing CM/Ministry
After S.R. Bommai (1994) majority must be floor-tested, yet M. V. Pylee allows dismissal if CM “compromises national unity.” - Session gamesmanship
Governor can summon/prorogue/dissolve to foil avoidance of no-confidence; may edit the address. - Reserving Bills
Sends a State bill to the President if it dents national interest or High-Court turf.
- Chief Minister — real power, but with Delhi strings
| Ground Reality | |
| Appointment | In national parties, Delhi high command often decides the nominee—erodes State autonomy. |
| Coalition leverage | Example: Jharkhand 2006, Governor steered independent Madhu Koda to CM post. |
| Tenure rule | “Pleasure of Governor” = Assembly majority; Bommai makes floor test mandatory. |
| Cabinet size cap | 91st Amendment (2003) ► max 15 % of Assembly strength. |
| Development role | National Development Council gave CMs big say in Five-Year Plans. Nehru’s letter tradition shows Centre–State dialogue ideal. |
Update: CMs now sit in NITI Aayog’s Governing Council, GST Council, Zonal Councils, Inter-State Council. NDC – defunct
- Council of Ministers — collective in theory, CM-centric in fact
Balveer Arora & R. L. Goyal observe removals are “usually Union-directed via Governor.”
• Cabinets mirror caste-religion-region mosaic → inclusivity vs. competence trade-off.
• Strong CM = Council becomes rubber-stamp; weak CM/strong satraps = Council re-asserts.
- Governor’s Role — 14 constitutional pegs, per Supreme Court
| Function | Key Case / Clause |
| “Vital link” Union–State | B. P. Singhal v UoI (2010) 6 SCC 331) |
| Must heed CoM advice unless Constitution says otherwise | Art 163; BR Kapur v State of TN (2001) 7 SCC 231 |
| Independent head, not GoI employee | Court dictum: holds office “during President’s pleasure” but not subordinate. |
- Recap
- Executive – appoint CM, dismiss on loss of majority, top constitutional posts, act solo in emergency.
- Legislative – assent, return once, reserve (even money) bills, speak to House, ordinances.
- Financial – recommend money bills, Contingency Fund taps.
- Judicial – local pardons; consulted for High-Court appointments.
- Discretionary – Hung House choice, dissolution advice, Art 356 report, bill reservation, emergency counsel.
- Misuse Timeline and example
- Uttarakhand 2016 – Governor K. K. Paul’s pre-vote Art 356; HC quashed, govt restored.
- Goa 2017 – Mridula Sinha picked BJP though Congress largest.
- Manipur 2017 – Najma Heptulla ditto.
- Karnataka 2018 – Vajubhai Vala gave BJP extra time; SC cut it.
- Maharashtra 2019 – Dawn-time swearing-in under Bhagat Singh Koshiyari.
- Judiciary & Commissions: guard-rails against partisanship
| Body / Case | Guideline |
| S.R. Bommai (1994) | Art 356 only for “near-impossibility of governance.” Judicial review allowed. |
| Nabam Rebia (2016) | Governor’s discretion must rest on “reason, good faith & caution.” |
| Administrative Reforms Commission 1968 | Governor’s 356 report must be objective & independent. |
| Rajamannar 1971 | Scrap or safeguard 356/357; Governor mustn’t be Centre’s agent. |
| Sarkaria 1988 | Art 356 a “last resort”; issue prior warning. |
| Justice Chelliah 2002 | Exhaust all other options before 356. |
| Punchhi 2010 | Amend 355/356 to narrow Centre’s hand. |
- Reform Menu
- Tripartite Selection Panel – Vice-President + Lok-Sabha Speaker + Opposition Leader propose names.
- Consult State CM, fix 5-year term, removal only for stated misdeeds.
- One-time posting; bar serial appointments to curb political parking lot use.
- Codify conventions; elevate neutrality, integrity & public respect over party loyalty.
Mnemonics
- Austin–Seervai–Pylee → Governor controversies alphabet trio.
- B-S-N cases: Bommai, Singhal, Nabam → judicial leash.
- ARC–Rajamannar–Sarkaria–Chelliah–Punchhi → rising reform chorus.
The Evolution and Role of India’s Judicial System
- A “Blend of Two Worlds”
| Model borrowed | Core trait | Indian compromise |
| U.S. federalism | Judicial supremacy—Supreme Court guards Constitution & rights. | Wanted a rights-guardian. |
| British Parliamentarism | Parliament is sovereign; courts formally subordinate. | Wanted Parliament’s primacy. |
Granville Austin: framers sweated over tenure, salaries & appointments to “safeguard judicial independence.”
Sapru Committee blueprint → adopt neither unmonitored Lord Chancellor (UK) nor partisan Senate confirmation (US).
Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar’s caveat: independence must not create a “super-legislature or super-executive.”
- Independence
- Provisions on courts placed in the most rigid amendment category—needs state-legislature ratification.
- Basic-structure doctrine (Keshavananda Bharati, 1973) later added judicial independence to the untouchable core.
- Supreme Court of India
| Snapshot | Marks-fetching phrase |
| Started 1950, replacing Federal Court; first CJI Harilal Jekisundas Kania + 7 judges. | — |
| Strength now CJI + 25. | — |
| Appointments by President after consultation with SC & HC judges → aim: de-politicise selection. | “consultation” safeguard |
| Tenure: till 65 yrs; removal only via “arduous impeachment for proved misbehaviour or incapacity.” | Article 124(4) language |
| Justice V. Ramaswami impeachment (1991) failed—political manoeuvring & accountability debate. | first impeachment attempt |
| Chief-Justice convention = senior-most judge; breached 1973 (Justice A. N. Ray) → three seniors resigned, convention later restored. | “1973 supersession crisis” |
Jurisdiction
- Original
- Art 131 – Centre-State suits.
- Art 32 – “heart & soul” (B.R. Ambedkar): writs for fundamental rights.
- Presidential/Vice-Presidential election disputes.
- Appellate
- Constitutional, civil, criminal + Art 136 special-leave (discretion to cure injustice).
- Advisory – Art 143: President seeks opinion (not binding).
- Review – Art 137: SC may correct its own errors.
- High Courts — A Single, Integrated System
- Art 214 ensures one HC per state (now 25 HCs).
- Appointments: President consults CJI + Governor + HC-CJ. One-third judges from outside state—dilute local bias.
- Transfers (1980s policy) upheld—must not be malafide (SC peer-committee review, 1994).
- Art 226 writs “for any purpose”—wider than Art 32.
- Power of superintendence over subordinate courts; HCs are Courts of Record.
- Judicial Review — Core Concept & Indian Twist
| Feature | U.S. line | Indian line |
| Genesis case | Marbury v. Madison (1803) — John Marshall: courts police constitutionality. | Not explicit; implied via Art 13, 32, 131-136, 226, 245-246. |
| Due-process test | “Substantive due process” scrutiny. | Chosen alternative: “procedure established by law.” |
Sir B. N. Rau warned substantive due process would let judges veto socio-economic policy.
Landmark Evolution
- Shankari Prasad (1951) – Amendments can alter rights.
- Sajjan Singh (1965) – repeats Shankari.
- Golak Nath (1967) – 6-5: Parliament cannot abridge Fundamental Rights.
- Keshavananda Bharati (1973) – births basic-structure doctrine; amending power survives but is limited.
- Minerva Mills (1980) – 42nd Amendment curbs struck; balance between Parts III & IV basic.
- I.R. Coelho / Ninth Schedule (2005) – even 9th-Schedule laws reviewable if they damage basic structure.
Judicial Self-Restraint Canons
- Presumption of constitutionality
- Prefer validity if two interpretations
- Avoid constitutional question if unnecessary
- Decide minimum needed
- Standing doctrine
- No advisory rulings on unenforced laws
- Substantive Due Process Debate (Art 21)
- Rajbala v. Haryana (2015) – SC rejects substantive due process: no strike-down merely for “arbitrariness.”
- Yet cases like Selvi (2010), Ramlila Maidan (2012), Shaikh Zahid Mukhtar (2016) invoke privacy/autonomy language → scholars (e.g. Abhinav Chandrachud) tag this as “SDP-thinking.”
- Lines to Memorise
- Ayyar: judiciary must not be a “super-legislature or super-executive.”
- Ambedkar: Art 32 is the “heart & soul of the Constitution.”
- Marshall (Marbury): “It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is.”
- Basic-structure dictum – Parliament may amend but not destroy the Constitution.
- Sir B. N. Rau on due process: would make judges a “continuous unpredictable check.”
Judiciary taking on legislative / executive roles — key instances since 2014
| Year | Court / Order (case) | Sphere stepped into | What the Court did (in brief) | Usual domain of that action | Reactions / present status |
| 2014 – 15 | Supreme Court, Fourth Judges’ case (struck-down 99ᵗʰ Amendment & NJAC Act) | Legislature | Voided a constitutional amendment and statute that gave the executive and Parliament a part in appointing judges; revived the judge-run “collegium”. | Framing the rules for appointments (Parliament + executive) | Widely called judicial law-making; Parliament has not yet devised an alternative. |
| 2015 | Allahabad High Court order on government-school enrolment | Executive | Directed that all public-sector employees must send their children only to state schools. | Education policy & service rules (state executive) | Order criticised as impractical; later kept in abeyance by the Supreme Court. |
| 2017 → ongoing | Supreme Court ban / tight curbs on Diwali fire-crackers | Executive / Legislature | Imposed licensing, timing and “green cracker” rules nationwide citing Article 21 right to clean air. | Environmental regulation (Parliament & pollution-control authorities) | Industries cited economic hit; the Vice-President called it “judicial overreach”. |
| Jan 2021 | Supreme Court stay on the three Farm Acts; creation of expert committee | Legislature / Executive | Suspended operation of central laws already in force and set up a panel to renegotiate policy. | Law-making & farm policy (Parliament & Ministry of Agriculture) | Critics said the stay blurred separation of powers; Acts repealed in Nov 2021. |
| May 2022 | Supreme Court puts sedition provision (Section 124A) “on hold” | Legislature | Directed Centre and states not to register new sedition cases and to keep existing ones in abeyance until the law is re-examined. | Criminal-law policy (Parliament) | Move praised by civil-liberty groups; queried by some as law-making by court. |
| 2023 | Supreme Court directions on stray dogs / euthanasia code (Benita Das batch) | Executive | Laid down detailed SOPs for catching, vaccinating and feeding stray dogs. | Local-government / municipal regulation | Urban bodies said compliance costs high; praised by animal-rights groups. |
| 2023 | Supreme Court bans “two-finger test” in sexual-assault cases; orders nationwide training | Executive | Prohibited the examination and instructed the Health Ministry to issue new medico-legal protocols. | Health regulation & police procedure | Centre accepted; court effectively issued executive-style instructions. |
Practice Questions (Write before 4 p.m.)
Question 1. The Speaker represents the freedom and dignity of the House. Examine. [2022/15 m]
Question 2. The role of the President of India becomes more significant during a minority government and a coalition government. Explain. [2021/15 m]
Question 3. Judiciary has acquired the role of both, legislature and an executive in recent years. Examine with suitable examples. [. [2017/20m]
📌 Model answers drop this evening on the Telegram channel: https://t.me/psirbyamitpratap – keep notifications on.
See you tomorrow on Day 20. Keep practicing!
—Amit Pratap Singh & Team
A quick note on submissions of copies and mentorship
- 2025 Mains writers: Cohort 1 of O-AWFG started on 12 June and ATS on 15 June. The above practice set will serve as your revision tool, just do not miss booking your mentorship sessions for personalised feedback especially for starting tests. Come with your evaluated test copies.
- 2026 Mains writers – keep uploading through your usual dashboard. Act on the feedback and improve consistently.
- Alternate between mini-tests (O-AWFG) and full mocks (ATS) has been designed to tackle speed, content depth, and structured revision—line-by-line evaluation pinpoints your weaknesses and errors. Follow your PSIR O-AWFG & ATS schedule and use the model answers to enrich your content, as rankers recommended based on their own success.
