Security camps, the game-changer in the Maoist fight

UPSC Syllabus Topic: GS Paper 3 –internal security

Introduction

Maoism in India has witnessed a sharp decline in recent years, with violence now confined to limited pockets of south Bastar in Chhattisgarh. This transformation is not accidental. It is closely linked to the expansion of security camps in remote and previously inaccessible areas. These camps have altered the security, governance, and development landscape, weakening Maoist influence and restoring the presence of the state. Security camps, the game-changer in the Maoist fight.

Current status of Maoism in India

1. Decline in violence: Maoist-related violence declined by nearly 90% between 2010 and 2025, showing a sustained and not cyclical downturn.
   2. Reduction in affected districts: LWE-affected districts fell from 126 in 2018 to just 11 by October 2025, indicating near-territorial collapse.
   3. Geographical confinement: Maoist activity is now limited mainly to south Bastar, reflecting loss of influence across the Red Corridor.
   4. Most affected districts: Only Bijapur, Narayanpur, and Sukma remain most affected, highlighting the shrinking core area.

Reasons behind Maoist expansion

1. Strategic relocation to Dandakaranya: Pressure in Andhra Pradesh pushed Maoists into DKR, whose forests and inter-State borders offered protection and mobility.
   2. Administrative neglect: Remoteness and weak state presence created governance vacuums, which Maoists systematically exploited.
   3. Governance deficit as enabler: Absence of justice, welfare, and administration enabled Maoists to establish parallel authority, not ideology alone.
   4. Tribal alienation: Dispossession from land and forests weakened trust in the state, making Maoist promises attractive.
   5. Failure of Fifth Schedule protections: Constitutional safeguards existed but were poorly enforced, rendering them ineffective on the ground.
   6. Weak representation: Outsider-dominated administration deepened alienation, limiting tribal participation in governance.

Security-led turnaround and decline of Maoism

1. Expansion of security footprint: Security camps placed permanent forces inside remote Maoist areas, ending their uncontested control.
2. Improved police–population ratio: Higher force density deterred Maoists from operating with impunity, reducing open movement and coercion.
3. Faster reaction time: Emergency response time dropped sharply, pushing Maoists into a defensive position.
4. Psychological setback to Maoists: Visible security dominance convinced locals that the state, not Maoists, holds real power, weakening Maoist legitimacy.
5. Improved human intelligence (HUMINT): Local confidence in forces improved intelligence flow, directly degrading Maoist planning and survival.
6. Infrastructure and civil administration piggybacking: Roads, mobile towers, and entry of collectors, tehsildars, and patwaris followed camps, converting security gains into governance presence.

Emerging challenges in the post-conflict phase

1. Rights-based assertion: With violence declining, tribal communities are raising constitutional and land rights claims, shifting the conflict from arms to governance.
   2. Democratic repositioning of ex-cadres: Surrendered Maoist leaders now seek democratic means, creating pressure for fair political engagement.
   3. Weak justice delivery: Courts, policing, and grievance redressal remain thin, risking return to informal or parallel justice systems.
   4. Fragile social services: Health and education systems remain inadequate, limiting trust despite improved security.
   5. Governance deficit persistence: Development expanded faster than governance reform, creating uneven state presence.
   6. Under-representation of locals: Administration remains outsider-dominated, sustaining alienation and low institutional trust.
   7. Risk of post-security vacuum: Without governance consolidation, security gains may not translate into durable peace, risking relapse.

Way forward

1. Implement constitutional safeguards: Strict enforcement of PESA and the Forest Rights Act is essential to address long-standing tribal grievances.
2. Rebuild governance from scratch: Civil administration must be established in areas that earlier had minimal state presence, ensuring routine governance.
3. Strengthen justice institutions: Courts, policing, and grievance mechanisms must reach remote regions to prevent return to parallel justice.
4. Correct representation imbalance: Reducing outsider dominance in administration is vital to rebuild trust among adivasis.
5. Restore real self-governance: Gram Sabhas need autonomy and financial power, not symbolic participation.
6. Learn from Sixth Schedule regions: Autonomous council models offer lessons for deeper tribal self-rule.
7. Plan for long-term peace: A task force with a 2047 vision can convert security success into sustainable governance outcomes.

Conclusion

Security camps have structurally weakened Maoism by restoring state presence, confidence, and access in remote tribal regions. Data shows near-territorial collapse, but peace will last only if governance failures are corrected. Implementing constitutional safeguards, strengthening representation, and rebuilding justice and service delivery systems are essential to prevent relapse.

Question for practice:

Examine how the expansion of security camps has contributed to the decline of Maoism in India and discuss the governance challenges that must be addressed to ensure durable peace.

Source: The Hindu