Standing with Kabul – India’s Afghan policy

Relevance: India’s Afghan policy post-US-exit from Afghanistan

Synopsis: A lack of consensus on Afghanistan amongst the permanent members of UNSC means India will have to build international opinion around this topic gradually. Also, it should put pressure on Pakistan and the Taliban to make peace with Kabul.

• Analysis of India’s Afghan policy in the historical context.

Context

Recently, a special meeting of the United Nations Security Council on Afghanistan convened under India’s presidency. It failed to bring a new international consensus on controlling the Taliban’s military offensive with the full support of the Pakistan army.

No consensus on Afghanistan

In Afghanistan, there is no unanimity amongst the five permanent members, which is critical for any consequential decisions by the UN Security Council (UNSC).

• China: An ambitious China is seeking to extend its regional footprint
• Russia: An opportunistic Russia is tagging behind Beijing. Both China and Russia seem to support Pakistan’s game plan to reinstall the Taliban in Kabul.
• UK: Given its special ties with the Pakistan army, London tends to be unstable on the Taliban.
• US: The US has ceded much ground by deciding to withdraw all its troops in Afghanistan by the end of this month.
• France: In Europe too (represented by France which has a permanent seat in the UNSC),  there is a decline in political support for continued Western military intervention in Afghanistan.

India’s policy: Historical context

From 1986 to 1988, the Soviets tried hard to put in place an inclusive government in Afghanistan. Najibullah, a forceful Afghan leader of Pashtun ethnicity, became President in 1986. He virtually abandoned communist ideology for Afghan nationalism and stressed the country’s Islamic heritage. He reached out to all sections of Afghan society. The U.S. and Pakistan seemed to go along with the idea of an inclusive government as long as the final assurance of Soviet withdrawal was not gained.

India’s role

Significantly, India too advocated a broad-based government and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was in the forefront in advocating it.

• India took active measures, including contacting the former King Zahir Shah, living in exile in Rome, to lead it.
• This annoyed the U.S. and Pakistan. Both wanted India to assume a non-operational position on Afghan developments and restrict its role to pressing the Soviets to leave.
• Once it became clear that Pakistan wanted a mujahideen government without Najibullah’s participation or Zahir Shah’s leadership, India decided to fully support the Najibullah government.

As part of its outreach to all Afghan parties in 1987 and 1988, India was also in contact with the mujahideen. This showed that if Indian interests demanded so, India was not hesitant to do business with any Afghan group howsoever regressive its ideology.

Similar dilemma

India’s 2021 Afghan dilemma mirrors, to an extent, the one it faced post the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. Now, like Rajiv Gandhi in the 1986-1988 period, Indian foreign policy and security managers, including the western powers, are advocating the formation of an inclusive government. There are some differences though.

• Lack of strong leadership: In 1989, Kabul was led by a strong Afghan leader, Najibullah, who had the capacity to hold the situation together with Soviet assistance. Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani is no Najibullah. His capacity to hold Kabul together is questionable.
• Besides, the Afghan political elite has mutual disagreements.

Conclusion

Foreseeing such a situation, India should have maintained open and direct contacts with all Afghan political parties. India now has no real capacity to impact the ground situation in Afghanistan.

And, even if the formation of an inclusive government takes place, India’s lack of open contacts with the Taliban will place it at a great disadvantage.

Terms to know: 

• UNSC
• Who are Taliban? 
• The Great Game
• Durand Line