Source: The post “Status of Maoist or Naxalite movement” has been created, based “It’s time for Maoists to lay down arms” published in “The Hindu” on 8 October 2025. Status of Maoist movement in India.
UPSC Syllabus: GS-3-Internal security
Context: The Maoist or Naxalite movement, spearheaded by the proscribed Communist Party of India (Maoist), has witnessed a steady decline over the last two decades. Union Home Minister Amit Shah recently reiterated that Maoists must surrender and join the mainstream under the government’s “lucrative surrender and rehabilitation policy.”
Background: Origin and Expansion
- The CPI (Marxist–Leninist) People’s War Group and Maoist Communist Centre merged in 2004 to form CPI (Maoist).
- The movement drew strength from underdeveloped and tribal areas of Andhra Pradesh, Odisha, Jharkhand, and Chhattisgarh.
- Maoists established a ‘Liberated Zone’ in central India with their own administrative setup called “Janatana Sarkar.”
- Initially, the movement thrived as a peasant-led struggle rooted in issues of land, inequality, and exploitation.
Present Situation: Decline of the Movement
- The Central Committee has shrunk from about 42 members in 2004 to nearly 20 in 2025; most are aged or ailing.
- The Politburo has been reduced from 25 to merely 7 members.
- Security operations like Operation Black Forest and deployment of the District Reserve Guard (DRG) have been effective.
- Around 1,450 Maoists have surrendered, and 1,460 have been arrested; over 430 Maoists, including 45 operatives, have been killed in the last 18 months.
- Maoist bases in Sukma, Bijapur, Narayanpur, Bastar, Rajnandgaon,, have been neutralised.
Factors Behind the Decline
- Leadership Crisis – Killing of top leaders like Basavaraj reduced cohesion; new leaders like Tipiriti Tirupathi alias Debuji (new general secretary) lack mass influence.
- Loss of Ideological Base – The movement, once people-centric, now depends on coercion rather than ideology.
- Erosion of Local Support – Tribal communities disillusioned due to atrocities by both Maoists and state-sponsored vigilante groups like Salwa Judum.
- Modernised Security Forces – Enhanced coordination, intelligence-sharing, and deployment of specialised units (e.g., Commando Battalion for Resolute Action).
- Improved Governance – State presence through roads, schools, and health services in Maoist areas.
- Surrender and Rehabilitation Policy – Incentivised surrender with financial aid, housing, and employment.
Regional Variations
- Chhattisgarh remains the main theatre of Maoist activity, though even there, the influence is waning.
- Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, once Maoist strongholds, have seen a near-total decline due to sustained policing and social development.
- Jharkhand, Odisha, and Bihar retain residual Maoist presence, mostly in small pockets.
Consequences of Militarisation
- Militarisation reduced Maoist influence but also caused civilian casualties and loss of tribal trust.
- Programmes like Salwa Judum backfired, leading to rights violations and alienation of local populations.
- Critics argue that addressing socio-economic grievances and political integration would yield more sustainable peace.
Way Forward
- Surrender and Rehabilitation: Continue to encourage reintegration with social security and livelihood support.
- Developmental Governance: Strengthen infrastructure, education, and employment in tribal belts.
- Dialogue and Trust-Building: Rebuild faith between state and tribals through participatory governance.
- Ideological Counter-Narrative: Promote democratic activism to replace violent struggle.
Conclusion: It is evident that the Maoist insurgency is at its weakest, with leadership decimated and public support waning. The movement’s reliance on violence over ideology has eroded its legitimacy. Sustained democratic engagement, inclusive development, and rehabilitation policies can finally help integrate remaining cadres into the mainstream — marking an end to one of India’s longest-running internal conflicts.
Question: Critically examine the factors responsible for the decline of Left-Wing Extremism (LWE) in India. How can the State ensure that this decline translates into lasting peace and inclusive development?
