The maritime signalling after Operation Sindoor

UPSC Syllabus Topic: GS Paper 3 –Security .

Introduction

Operation Sindoor has shifted focus to the sea. Visible deployments, missile activity, new inductions, and sharp public warnings now define the signalling space in the Arabian Sea. India emphasises a forward deterrent posture and wider Indo-Pacific alignment; Pakistan has moved to dispersal, survivability, and denial. External footprints around Karachi and Gwadar add uncertainty. The core challenge is how to deter, control escalation, and terminate any future crisis on terms favourable to India. The maritime signalling after Operation Sindoor.

Maritime shift after Operation Sindoor

1. Focus moved to sea: After the air engagement, both sides prepared for a possible maritime phase of confrontation.
   2. India’s position: Operation Sindoor was presented as a forward deterrent plan, with readiness for a more active naval role .
   3. Surveillance and reach: India maintained continuous surveillance along the Makran coast (Jiwani, Gwadar, Pasni, Ormara, Karachi, Port Qasim), building maritime domain awareness and options for sea and shore strikes.
   4. Persistence and risk. Naval deployments last longer and keep steady pressure. At sea, escalation control is harder than in short air fights.

Both-sides signalling at sea

1. India’s signals. Public warnings (including Sir Creek), the statement that the Navy would act first, carrier-led presence, firing exercises beyond adversary zones, and joint patrols with the Philippines show resolve, preparedness, and willingness to sustain pressure at sea.
2. Pakistan’s signals.

• For survivability, forces were dispersed from Karachi to Gwadar.
• Capability was showcased through the launch of Hangor-class PNS Mangro and the P282 ship-launched missile.
• Repeated NOTAMs (Notice to Air Missions), missile tests, and live-fire drills that keep the theatre on alert and complicate Indian planning.

3. Net effect. India signals forward deterrence and compellence; Pakistan signals denial and survivability. The Arabian Sea remains in a state of persistent operational pressure.

Capability balance & modernisation trajectories

1. Historical templates: The 1971 war, Operation Talwar (1999), and Operation Parakram (2002) show that full-fleet mobilisations shaped outcomes on land.These experiences now provide a planning template that is updated for today’s technology, political directives, and force levels.
2. Network-centric operations: Continuous surveillance along the Makran coast feeds maritime domain awareness and precise target lists at sea and on shore. Joint integration with the Army and Air Force acts as a key operational enabler for detection, targeting, and strike.
3. Force projection vs denial.: India uses the Carrier Battle Group and wider deployments to project force and enable compellence. Pakistan prioritises dispersal, submarines, and denial tactics to reduce vulnerability and complicate Indian planning.
4. Modernisation urgency: India has more ships and a better position at sea, but many ships are old and need faster upgrades. Pakistan’s selective additions—such as Hangor-class submarines and Babur-class corvettes from Türkiye—narrow the gap.

Strategic significance of these developments

1. Control at sea: Naval fights—ship-on-ship or sea-to-shore—can cross red lines fast. The memory of 1971 war makes Pakistan especially sensitive to even limited maritime strikes.
2. From deterrence to compellence: After repeated terrorist triggers, deterrence alone is weaker. Planned compellence—using visible naval power to shape choices—gains importance; the carrier group played this role during Sindoor.
3. Firepower and legal signalling: Exclusion zones and any blockade must be announced and justified. A blockade is an act of war, so it must be deliberate, lawful, and carefully calibrated.
4. Nuclear threshold and carrier risk: Naval asymmetry could push Pakistan to signal tactical nuclear options at sea, with carriers as likely targets. India’s nuclear doctrine—covering major attacks on its territory or forces anywhere—requires intense but controlled conventional operations.

Geopolitical overlays

1. CPEC (China–Pakistan Economic Corridor) and Gwadar’s role: Pakistan presents Gwadar as part of its own security plan, not just a Chinese project. Gwadar and Karachi are both military and psychological pressure points that shape planning on both sides.
2. External involvement: A visible Chinese presence at Karachi and Gwadar, and Turkish support in platforms and training, add uncertainty during any crisis. These links can affect supply, signalling, and escalation choices.
3. Indo-Pacific context: India’s joint patrols with the Philippines show that near-sea signalling is connected to a wider regional posture. They also indicate India’s intent to align capacity-building with broader partnerships.
4. Trade routes and mediation: Tension near the Strait of Hormuz or Bab-el-Mandeb can disrupt global shipping and trigger quick external pressure to de-escalate.

Strategic choices for India

1. Use sea early or hold in reserve: Decide whether to signal early at sea to shape the crisis from the start, or hold naval power back for a decisive move later. Early signalling can deter but may raise tensions; holding in reserve preserves surprise but risks losing narrative control.
2. Reaffirm doctrine and strategy.

• Use the Indian Navy’s 2015 strategy Ensuring Secure Seas as the guiding framework.
• Set clear effects on land—protect critical assets, pressure military targets, shape adversary choices.
• Predefine lawful targets and rules of engagement to keep signalling and strikes credible and defensible.
• Plan through jointness (Navy–Army–Air Force), strong maritime domain awareness, and reliable logistics.
• Prefer calibrated, effects-based actions (not theatrics); use measures like limited strikes or exclusion notices when needed.
• Review outcomes after each move and adjust posture quickly.

3. Policy shift on terrorism: If the maritime role expands against state-sponsored terrorism, cut response times. Activate forward operating bases, harden and pre-position logistics, and ensure sustainment for longer deployments.
4. Blend deterrence and compellence: Keep deterrence credible, but prepare scalable compellence options. Update plans for drones, hypersonics, and long-range precision, and manage signalling carefully under the nuclear risk.
5. Modernise: Upgrade our ships, submarines, and missiles faster. Ensure interoperable C2 (Command and Control), continuous Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), stronger targeting networks, and reliable repair-overhaul capacity. These steps preserve initiative and keep forces ready for rapid action.

Conclusion

Sea power is now central to crisis signalling. Both sides are shaping thresholds and templates for the next confrontation. India should modernise at speed, sharpen MDA, institutionalise jointness, and codify signalling protocols (including hotlines and exclusion-zone discipline) to lower miscalculation. Combined with calibrated compellence, sound legal targeting, and resilient logistics, this approach keeps initiative with India, controls escalation, and supports early, favourable conflict termination.

Question for practice:

Examine how the shift to the sea after Operation Sindoor affects escalation risks and India’s choices at sea.

Source: The Hindu