Too close for comfort?

Too close for comfort?

Article:

1. Mr. Happymon Jacob, has critically analysed the outcomes of India-U.S. 2+2 Dialogue meeting.

Important Analysis:

2. Considering it as a singularly one-sided affair, Mr. Jacob criticised the 2+2 Dialogue meeting as, India was found to wriggle out of U.S. pressure without much success. The criticality can be seen in,

3. Forcing India to buy American:

• India is irrationally insisted to bring down its oil imports from Iran to ‘zero’.
• India is recommended to buy the American oil to make up the deficit, while the U.S. sanction fears has already doubled the U.S. oil exports to India last year.
• India could not get any waiver for importing Iranian crude oil during the Dialogue.
• The punitive provisions of Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) making it difficult for India to buy the much-needed S-400 missile system.
• The joint statement is silent on whether India’s request for a “one-time waiver” was granted by the U.S. to buy Russian weapons at the 2+2 meeting.
• It shows clearly the U.S. intentions for India, to buy its weapons instead.
• For India with close to 60% of its weapons systems originating from Russia, this would be a huge setback.
• S. in the meetings also seen to put considerable pressure on India to reduce the bilateral trade deficit, which is in India’s favour, by buying more American goods.

4. b) Security Agreements Between India and U.S.:

1) The agreements signed between India and the U.S includes:

• The Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) :
  • In the absence of COMCASA, and the attendant high-tech equipment, the interoperability between Indian and U.S. forces is said to be severely hampered.
  • S. could not provide India with such technologies such as P-8I and C-130J aircraft, due to domestic legal restrictions, unless India signed COMCASA.
  • India now can access advanced defence systems and will be enabled to optimally utilise its existing U.S.-origin platforms.
• The Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) (2016) : allows India and the U.S. militaries to replenish from the other’s bases.
• The Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-spatial Cooperation (BECA), is yet to be negotiated.

2) However, the criticality behind the COMCASA is,

• It is not a public document and the scope of the agreement is still unknown. Thus, U.S. needs to clarify several concerns like,
  • Issue of visits by U.S. inspectors to Indian bases to carry out inspections on the COMCASA-safeguarded equipment sold to India.
  • The original End-Use Monitoring Agreement (EUMA) (2009) between India and the U.S., which ensures that, U.S. inspectors would stay away from Indian bases. This condition is unclear in COMCASA.
  • nstallation of U.S. communication systems may compromise the secrecy of Indian military communication systems.
• It will apply end-use monitoring and reconfiguration restrictions on India like that of South Korea.
• By signing COMCASA and by agreeing to reduce the purchase of Russian weapon systems (in line with CAATSA), India has implicitly accepted the extraterritorial application of U.S. law on itself.
• Since the two countries are not likely to be deployed alongside each other in a conflict situation at the end, the utility of such India-U.S. agreements should have more clarity on what it entails.

5. c) Balancing China in Indo-Pacific Region:

• Even though ‘the India-U.S. 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue’ did not explicitly mention ‘China threat’, as a major concern, the section on the Indo-Pacific region implicitly referred it.
• India-U.S. cooperation cannot do so much to address the Chinese challenge in Indo-Pacific Region.
• Being an Asian country, the defence agreements under meetings cannot resolve all Southern Asian security challenges, and India’s ability to meet those challenges.

6. Way forward:

7. The India-U.S. relationship shouldn’t be allowed to define India’s geopolitical character, strategic future or the limits of its other bilateral relationships.

8. India must keep its options open and be multi-aligned, even as the U.S. forms a key part in that scheme of things.