Election Commission of India (ECI) – Roles, Responsibilities & Limitations – Explained Pointwise

A recent investigation by a leading newspaper has brought renewed attention to the internal functioning and decision-making process of the Election Commission of India (ECI). According to the investigation, Election Commissioners Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Vivek Joshi reportedly recorded objections at least 14 times over the past 10 months regarding decisions and orders connected with the Special Intensive Revision (SIR), including voter registration, deletion and restoration of names and electoral-roll management.

What is the Election Commission of India (ECI) & What are its constitutional status and composition?

• The Election Commission of India (ECI) is an autonomous, permanent constitutional body established on January 25, 1950, responsible for supervising, directing and controlling elections to Parliament, State Legislatures, and the offices of the President and Vice-President.
• It is a permanent constitutional body and derives its authority directly from the Constitution.
• Since October 1993, the ECI is a three-member body comprising the CEC and two Election Commissioners.

Constitutional Status:

• Part XV (Articles 324–329): Governs the electoral system in India.
• Article 324 of the Constitution provides for the establishment of the ECI.

Composition:

• Under Article 324, the ECI consists of:
  • Chief Election Commissioner (CEC)
  • Such number of Election Commissioners (ECs) as the President may determine from time to time.
• The President appoints the CEC and other Election Commissioners, subject to the law made by Parliament. Currently, appointments are governed by the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners Act, 2023.
• When other Election Commissioners are appointed, the CEC acts as the Chairperson of the Commission.
• The Commission may also have Regional Election Commissioners, who may be appointed by the President after consultation with the ECI.
• Tenure: 6 years or until attaining the age of 65 years, whichever occurs earlier.
• All Election Commissioners enjoy equal voting rights and equivalent status, with decisions of the Commission taken by majority.
• They are entitled to salary and other conditions of service equivalent to those of a Judge of the Supreme Court of India.

What are the major roles and responsibilities of the Election Commission of India (ECI)?

What are the key powers of the Election Commission of India under the Constitution?

1. Superintendence, direction and control of elections: The ECI has overall constitutional authority to supervise and manage elections to Parliament, State Legislatures, and the offices of the President and Vice-President.
2. Preparation of electoral rolls: It supervises the preparation and revision of electoral rolls and ensures that electoral rolls are properly maintained.
3. Appointment of election officials: The ECI can require the necessary staff and personnel for conducting elections and exercises control over election-related officials during the electoral process..
4. Fixing the election schedule: It determines the election programme, including the timing of various stages of elections, subject to the statutory framework.
5. Regulating electoral conduct: The ECI monitors compliance with the Model Code of Conduct and can issue directions to maintain a level playing field during elections.
6. Countermanding or postponing polls: In appropriate circumstances provided by law, the ECI can order adjournment or fresh polling where serious electoral irregularities, violence or other disruptions affect the integrity of the poll.
7. Residual powers under Article 324: Where legislation is silent or inadequate, the Supreme Court has recognised that the ECI can exercise plenary powers under Article 324, provided such action is consistent with the Constitution and existing law.

What are the major limitations & criticisms of the Election Commission of India (ECI)?

1. Appointment-related concerns: The method of appointing Election Commissioners has been debated in the context of institutional independence. The current statutory framework provides for a selection committee comprising the Prime Minister, a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the Prime Minister and the Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha.
2. Post-Retirement Appointments: The absence of restrictions on CECs and Election Commissioners accepting government or political appointments after retirement may raise concerns about potential conflicts of interest and the perceived independence of the Commission.
3. Unequal removal protection: Under Article 324(5), the CEC enjoys protection similar to a Supreme Court judge regarding removal, while other Election Commissioners can be removed by the President only on the recommendation of the CEC. The ECI itself has previously advocated stronger constitutional protection for all its members.
4. Dependence on government machinery: The ECI relies considerably on central and state government officials and administrative machinery for conducting elections, which can raise questions about operational autonomy.
5. Limited control over political parties: Although the ECI can register and recognise political parties and regulate aspects of their electoral conduct, its powers over internal democracy, organisational functioning and political-party finances remain limited by the existing legal framework.
6. Non-statutory Model Code of Conduct: The MCC is an important mechanism for maintaining a level playing field, but much of it does not have the status of a standalone statute. The ECI therefore often relies on existing election laws and its constitutional powers for enforcement.
7. Challenges in regulating election expenditure: Monitoring actual campaign expenditure can be difficult because of the scale of elections, indirect spending and expenditure by political parties and third parties.
8. Non-Charged Expenditure: Unlike the salaries of Supreme Court judges or the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) – which are directly charged to the Consolidated Fund of India – the ECI’s administrative budget relies on parliamentary approval, leaving it financially dependent on the government.
9. Special Intensive Revision (SIR): The SIR exercise faced criticism over the large-scale deletion or potential exclusion of voters, with concerns that marginalised and vulnerable groups could be disproportionately affected due to difficulties in verification and documentation requirements. Questions were also raised regarding the transparency of the verification process, the basis for identification of voters and procedural safeguards.

What are the various recommendations made by different commissions & Supreme Court to improve the effectiveness, transparency and accountability of the Election Commission of India (ECI)?

1. Independent appointment mechanism:
   • Tarkunde Committee (1975), Dinesh Goswami Committee (1990), and the Law Commission (255th Report, 2015) recommended that appointments of the CEC and Election Commissioners (ECs) should be by a multi-member collegium consisting of: the Prime Minister, Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha, and Chief Justice of India (CJI).
   • 2nd Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) recommended adding the Union Law Minister and Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha to the selection panel
   • The Supreme Court in Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023) directed that, until Parliament enacted a law, the CEC and ECs should be appointed on the recommendation of a committee comprising the Prime Minister, Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha and Chief Justice of India. The Court emphasised the need for a fair, transparent and independent selection process.
2. Strengthen institutional independence: The Law Commission’s 255th Report (2015) recommended reforms to strengthen the independence and effectiveness of the ECI. The Commission’s electoral-reform work specifically identified strengthening the Election Commission as an important objective.
3. Equal protection for all Election Commissioners: The Law Commission (255th Report) argued for greater security of tenure for Election Commissioners, including protection comparable to that available to the CEC, to reduce the possibility of executive influence.
4. Greater financial autonomy: The ECI’s institutional independence can be strengthened by providing greater financial autonomy, including consideration of charging its administrative expenditure on the Consolidated Fund of India, rather than making it dependent on the annual appropriation process.
5. Statutory backing to the Model Code of Conduct: The Law Commission and other reform bodies have suggested strengthening the legal framework governing electoral conduct and MCC violations, enabling more effective and timely action against serious violations.
6. Strengthen electoral-roll management: Electoral-roll revision should combine accuracy with due process, ensuring that eligible voters are not inadvertently excluded. Clear notice, accessible claims-and-objections procedures and effective grievance redressal are important safeguards. The Supreme Court’s 2026 decision concerning Bihar’s SIR recognised the ECI’s power to undertake such revision while examining its statutory and constitutional safeguards.
7. Promote coordination with State Election Commissions: The 2nd Administrative Reforms Commission recommended an institutional mechanism bringing the ECI and State Election Commissions onto a common platform for coordination, sharing of experience and resources.

Conclusion: One of the objectives of electoral reforms in India should be to strengthen the ECI by making it financially autonomous as well as transparent & accountable. Strengthening the Commission while ensuring appropriate checks and judicial oversight can enhance public confidence in India’s electoral democracy.