Challenges to Nuclear Restraint and India’s Position

Source: The post “Challenges to Nuclear Restraint and India’s Position” has been created, based on “Restraint has a half life” published in “Indian Express” on 1 November 2025. Challenges to Nuclear Restraint and India’s Position.

UPSC Syllabus: GS Paper -3- Science and technology

Context: The global consensus against nuclear testing, sustained for over three decades, is weakening. The voluntary moratorium on testing, not mandated by any binding international treaty, was upheld largely because it was politically convenient and morally persuasive. However, with growing geopolitical competition and technological advances, this restraint now appears to have a limited “half-life.” India, as a responsible nuclear power, faces the challenge of reassessing its position amid this shifting landscape.

Challenges to Global Nuclear Restraint

1. Erosion of Political Consensus
   1. The post–Cold War nuclear restraint rested more on political will than legal obligation.
   2. The voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing was maintained as long as it suited the strategic convenience of major powers.
   3. Today, this moral consensus is fraying as nations prioritize renewed deterrence credibility.
2. Shifts in Major Powers’ Nuclear Postures
   1. United States: Discussion under the Trump administration about resuming testing reopened a long-settled debate. While advanced simulations have replaced actual tests, U.S. experts now question whether such models can indefinitely ensure reliability.
   2. Russia: Has revived activity at its Arctic test sites, signaling preparation for potential new tests.
   3. China: Expanding its nuclear arsenal, constructing new missile silos, and increasing fissile material production — openly questioning arms control regimes.
   4. These developments collectively undermine the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) framework.
3. Technological Evolution and Strategic Necessity
   1. Since 1998, technology, materials, and delivery systems have advanced. Missiles like Agni-V and submarine-launched systems are now operational, requiring validation for accuracy, reliability, and miniaturization.
   2. Newer, multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) demand higher assurance levels that computer modeling alone may not provide.
   3. The next generation of deterrence systems thus faces pressure for renewed empirical testing.
4. Weakening of Arms Control Architecture
   1. The CTBT, though adopted in 1996, has not entered into force due to non-ratification by key states (including the U.S. and China).
   2. Its uncertain future has left the nuclear order “in limbo,” with restraint now dependent solely on political choice rather than treaty obligation.
   3. The stability of the nuclear order has shifted from shared conviction to temporary convenience, eroding global trust.
5. Credibility Crisis in Deterrence
   1. When major powers doubt the sufficiency of their own self-restraint, others are likely to follow suit.
   2. The absence of credible verification mechanisms heightens mistrust, prompting states to consider renewed tests to ensure deterrent credibility.

India’s Position in the Changing Nuclear Landscape

1. India’s Historical Commitment to Restraint
   1. India’s nuclear tests in 1998 symbolized strategic maturity and national confidence.
   2. The voluntary moratorium that followed represented India’s recognition of the moral dimension of restraint while affirming credible minimum deterrence and a No-First-Use (NFU) policy.
   3. India’s approach demonstrated that responsible nuclear behavior could coexist with strategic assertion.
2. Current Strategic Environment
   1. With major powers reconsidering testing, India cannot ignore the potential impact on its own deterrence credibility.
   2. Technological shifts and new delivery systems (Agni-V, SLBMs) necessitate reassessment of reliability and readiness.
   3. If India’s adversaries resume testing, maintaining unilateral restraint indefinitely could put India at a relative disadvantage.
3. The Dilemma of Deterrence vs. Restraint
   1. India must navigate between two imperatives:
      1. Preserving its image as a responsible nuclear power committed to global non-proliferation norms.
      2. Ensuring the reliability of its deterrent in an evolving threat environment.
   2. Resuming tests could erode India’s international standing, invite sanctions, and undermine its claim to responsible leadership.
   3. Yet, continuing restraint without assurance of credibility risks deterrence obsolescence.
4. Testing within India’s Ethical and Strategic Framework
   1. Any future decision must align with India’s principles of credible minimum deterrence and NFU.
   2. Testing, if ever necessary, should aim at deterrence credibility, not power projection or showmanship.
   3. The focus must remain on preparedness, not provocation and on assurance, not aggression.
5. The Need for Open and Informed National Debate
   1. Decisions of such magnitude require transparent, informed discussion among scientists, policymakers, and citizens.
   2. India’s nuclear decisions should emerge from consensus, not reaction, grounded in national security, science, and moral responsibility.

Way Forward

1. Reaffirm Responsible Nuclear Posture: Continue to uphold restraint as a strategic strength while enhancing technological reliability through advanced simulations and subcritical experiments.
2. Invest in Indigenous Capability: Strengthen modelling and validation capacities to reduce dependence on physical testing.
3. Reassess Security Environment: Conduct periodic strategic reviews considering developments in China, Russia, and the U.S.
4. Diplomatic Engagement: Lead efforts to revive global dialogue on the CTBT and arms control, positioning India as a stabilising power.
5. Maintain Moral Leadership: Balance deterrence credibility with India’s long-standing advocacy for disarmament and peaceful coexistence.

Conclusion: The longevity of nuclear restraint is not guaranteed—it has a half-life shaped by global politics, technological change, and strategic mistrust. As the world edges toward renewed nuclear competition, India must act prudently: reaffirming its moral authority while remaining strategically prepared. The future of restraint will depend not merely on treaties but on the conviction and credibility of responsible powers like India.

Question: With the global consensus on nuclear restraint showing signs of erosion, critically examine the challenges to the existing nuclear order. In this context, discuss how India should recalibrate its nuclear policy to balance deterrence credibility with responsible restraint.