Revisiting India’s nuclear doctrine without revising it

Source: The post “Revisiting India’s nuclear doctrine without revising it” has been created based on “Revisiting India’s nuclear doctrine without revising it” published in “The Hindu” on 26th September 2026.

UPSC Syllabus: GS-2- International Relations

Context: India’s nuclear doctrine, operationalised in 2003, is based on credible minimum deterrence, No First Use (NFU), and massive retaliation. Although the core principles have remained largely unchanged, India’s security environment has undergone significant strategic, technological and geopolitical changes.

Key features of India’s nuclear doctrine

1. India follows a policy of credible minimum nuclear deterrence.
2. It maintains a No First Use (NFU) posture, while retaining the option of nuclear retaliation following a major biological or chemical attack.
3. The doctrine emphasises massive retaliation in response to a nuclear attack.
4. Its implementation has been supported by survivable second-strike capability.
5. The doctrine has contributed to continuity, predictability and strategic stability for more than two decades.

Reason behind the change in strategic environment

1. China and Pakistan have moved closer strategically, creating a more complex security environment for India.
   1. China has expanded and modernised its nuclear forces and strengthened military infrastructure along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
   2. Pakistan has diversified its nuclear capabilities, including the development of tactical nuclear weapons, partly intended to offset India’s conventional advantages.
2. Emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities, space-based surveillance, hypersonic weapons and ballistic-missile defence are shortening decision-making timelines.
   1. These technologies have increased the vulnerability of command-and-control networks and complicated assumptions about assured retaliation.
3. The Indo-Pacific has become an area of great-power competition, while the international system is becoming more multipolar and geopolitical competition is widening.

Need for review without revising the doctrine

1. India’s existing doctrine has provided continuity, predictability and strategic stability for more than two decades.
2. A review does not necessarily mean changing the core principles of credible minimum deterrence, NFU and massive retaliation.
3. India needs to examine whether its nuclear capabilities are sufficiently survivable and credible in the changing technological environment.
4. Greater attention is required to second-strike capabilities, so that India retains the ability to retaliate even after an adversary’s first strike.
5. India needs to strengthen command, control and communication systems to ensure reliable decision-making during a crisis.
6. Early-warning systems and surveillance capabilities need to be strengthened to cope with shorter decision-making timelines.
7. India also needs greater cyber resilience because cyber vulnerabilities could affect nuclear command-and-control systems.
8. The continuing relevance of existing concepts should be examined in the context of China’s expanding nuclear capabilities and Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons.
9. The issue of massive retaliation also deserves scrutiny because Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons could create situations in which India would face difficult response options.
10. At the same time, changing the doctrine itself could create greater uncertainty and instability, whereas strengthening supporting capabilities can improve deterrence without altering declared policy.

Way Forward

1. India should modernise its nuclear delivery systems and strengthen their survivability.
2. India should improve command-and-control, early warning, surveillance and cyber-resilience capabilities.
3. Regular doctrinal reviews should examine the changing technological, strategic and geopolitical environment.
4. Nuclear policy should remain aligned with India’s broader diplomatic objectives and strategic autonomy.
5. India should maintain a balance between restraint and credible deterrence, ensuring that its declared policy is backed by adequate capabilities.

Conclusion: India’s nuclear doctrine is a policy instrument, not an immutable doctrine. Therefore, regular review of its assumptions and supporting capabilities is necessary. Reviewing the doctrine is not the same as revising it; India can strengthen credible deterrence and strategic stability while retaining the core principles of its existing nuclear policy.

Question: India’s nuclear doctrine has remained largely unchanged for over two decades despite significant changes in the strategic environment. Discuss why India needs to review its nuclear capabilities without necessarily revising its core nuclear doctrine.

Source: The Hindu