India Needs a Comprehensive Doctrine on Space Security

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UPSC Syllabus: Gs Paper 3- Security

Introduction

Space has evolved from a specialised field of scientific exploration into an essential part of national security, economic activity and everyday life. Satellites support communications, navigation, weather forecasting, disaster management, agriculture, banking and military operations. India’s growing dependence on space-based services makes their protection essential for national resilience, strategic autonomy and uninterrupted functioning of critical infrastructure. Therefore, India needs a comprehensive space-security doctrine that addresses emerging threats, institutional gaps and military preparedness.

Changing Nature of Space Security Threats

  1. Impact on Essential Services: Disruption of space-based services can affect communications, navigation, weather forecasting, banking, logistics and disaster management. Military operations and critical infrastructure also depend on the continuity of these services.
  2. Shift from Destruction to Disruption: Space competition is expanding beyond physically destroying satellites towards disrupting their services. Modern interference can temporarily disable essential capabilities without causing physical damage to spacecraft.
  3. Emerging Forms of Interference: Jamming and spoofing can interfere with satellite communications and navigation, while cyberattacks can target satellite networks and ground stations. Electronic warfare can also weaken signals and reduce the reliability of space-enabled services.
  4. Vulnerability of Interconnected Systems: Space security extends beyond individual satellites to the wider networks connecting orbital assets with users on Earth. Disruption in one component can affect connected civilian infrastructure, military operations and economic activities.
  5. Complex Attribution and Response: Non-physical interference makes it difficult to identify responsible actors and determine appropriate responses. Temporary disruptions can have serious consequences, while uncertain attribution increases the possibility of accidental escalation during crises.

India’s Existing Space Security Framework

  1. Indian Space Policy 2023: The policy provides an overarching framework for India’s space activities. It provides the broad policy foundation within which India’s space activities are organised.
  2. Mission Shakti (2019): India’s anti-satellite demonstration established its ability to destroy an orbital target. However, this technological achievement does not independently provide a comprehensive doctrine for sustained space operations.
  3. Project NETRA: India’s space surveillance capabilities strengthen its ability to observe activities in orbit. However, observation capabilities alone cannot ensure strategic superiority or provide complete protection against emerging threats.
  4. Indian Space Situational Awareness Report 2025 (ISSAR-2025): The report documents India’s efforts in space situational awareness, collision avoidance and space-debris mitigation. These capabilities can support better assessment of activities around Indian space assets.

Key Challenges in India’s Space Security Architecture

  1. Institutional Fragmentation: India’s space organisations and military institutions operate under different administrative responsibilities. This separation can restrict coordination and prevent the integration of space capabilities into national security planning.
  2. Kármán Line-Based Institutional Division: The Kármán Line, located approximately 100 km above Earth’s surface, is a conventionally recognised boundary between Earth’s atmosphere and outer space. It was not designed as a military boundary, but treating it as an institutional dividing line can restrict coordination between atmospheric and space operations.
  3. Separation of Military and Civilian Responsibilities: The Indian Air Force controls conventional military assets below the Kármán Line, while civilian-administered organisations manage space activities above it. This division can limit the integration of military requirements with India’s scientific and technological capabilities.
  4. Absence of a Comprehensive Operational Doctrine: Mission Shakti demonstrated anti-satellite capability, while Project NETRA strengthened space observation. However, India still needs a sustained operational doctrine covering protection, manoeuvring, logistics, defence and recovery.
  5. Limited Integration of Atmospheric and Space Operations: Detection, telecommunications and intelligence activities depend on interconnected ground, atmospheric and orbital systems. Managing these capabilities under separate authorities can weaken coordination and military effectiveness.
  6. Inadequate Focus on Commercial and Cislunar Capabilities: Private operators increasingly support essential civilian and economic services, creating wider security responsibilities. India’s existing focus also needs to extend beyond near-space towards orbital logistics and cislunar operations.

Global Practices and Lessons for India

  1. United States – Establishment of Space Force: The United States established the Space Force as a separate military service within the Department of the Air Force. This recognises space as an important operational domain for future military conflicts.
  2. China – Military Restructuring: In April 2024, China established the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Aerospace Force, Cyberspace Force and Information Support Force as distinct military arms. This strengthened its organisational focus on space, cyber and information-related operations.
  3. Russia – Integrated Aerospace Forces: Russia’s Aerospace Forces bring atmospheric and space operations under an integrated military structure. This approach recognises their interconnected nature and reduces institutional separation between operational domains.
  4. India’s Naval Transformation as a Strategic Lesson: India’s Navy developed an integrated understanding of maritime operations, covering surface and underwater activities. A similar approach can help India integrate atmospheric, space and cislunar operations into one strategic domain.

Way Forward

  1. Establish an Integrated Space Command: India should establish a robust space command to coordinate military space operations and strategic responsibilities. Military doctrine should recognise atmospheric, space and cislunar operations as interconnected parts of one strategic domain.
  2. Establish Clear Security Thresholds: India needs clear standards to distinguish accidental interference from deliberate attacks and assess different forms of disruption. Attribution standards and response principles should guide decisions while reducing the risk of escalation.
  3. Strengthen Space-Domain Awareness: India should improve its ability to monitor activities around national space assets and identify unusual behaviour. Better awareness can strengthen threat assessment and provide a stronger basis for attributing hostile interference.
  4. Build Resilience and Recovery Capabilities: Multiple systems, redundancy and operational flexibility should maintain essential services when individual components face disruption. India must also develop reconstitution and recovery capabilities to restore critical functions rapidly.
  5. Integrate Government and Private Stakeholders: The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe), armed forces and commercial operators should work under an integrated strategic framework. Regular information sharing and vulnerability assessment can improve protection of interconnected space infrastructure.
  6. Develop Comprehensive Space Capabilities: India should strengthen specialised space education and develop critical orbital infrastructure. Its capabilities should cover deploying assets towards cislunar regions, orbital manoeuvring, hostile operations, logistical support, defence and safe personnel recovery.

Conclusion

India needs a space-security doctrine linking military planning, civilian infrastructure and commercial operators. It should define thresholds for hostile interference, strengthen awareness and resilience, and enable rapid recovery. Better institutional coordination must support deterrence without turning space into another arena of conflict, while preserving essential services and the peaceful use of outer space.

Question for practice:

Discuss the need for a comprehensive space-security doctrine in India in the context of emerging threats, institutional challenges and changing global space dynamics.

Source: The Hindu; Firstpost

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