A Malacca–Singapore Model for Resolving Hormuz

UPSC Syllabus: Gs Paper 2- International relations

Introduction

The Strait of Hormuz is a vital maritime chokepoint where regional tensions can disrupt international navigation and affect wider security. The Malacca–Singapore Straits provide a useful precedent of cooperation among littoral states, supported by international users and maritime institutions. Their experience shows how territorial interests can coexist with safe and continuous navigation. However, applying this model to Hormuz is difficult because of differences in maritime disputes, legal positions, regional security structures and the role of major powers.

Evolution of the Malacca–Singapore Cooperative Maritime Model

1. Strategic geography: The 800-km Malacca Strait connects the Andaman Sea with the Singapore Strait, which extends about 105 km towards the South China Sea.
2. Territorial assertion: Indonesia declared surrounding and connecting waters as its territory in 1957, mainly to strengthen the security of its dispersed islands.
3. Joint territorial approach: Indonesia and Malaysia adopted 12-nautical-mile territorial seas, causing their maritime zones to meet because the Straits are narrower than 24 nautical miles.
4. Initial passage regime: The territorial arrangement initially provided foreign vessels only innocent passage, which could be suspended by the coastal states on security grounds.
5. Three-state coordination: In 1971, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore proposed a coordinating body, while Singapore strongly supported cooperation to maintain safe navigation.
6. International support: Japan supported the three states through the Malacca Strait Council, while the United States and Soviet Union supported continued international transit through the Straits.
7. UNCLOS transition: The introduction of transit passage allowed continuous and expeditious movement through qualifying straits, including passage by warships.
8. 2007 Cooperative Mechanism: The three states established a permanent mechanism with user states and industry to support navigation aids, hydrographic surveys and maritime safety projects.

Relevance of the Model to Hormuz

1. Similar territorial setting: Both waterways contain sections where the territorial waters of neighbouring littoral states intersect, creating a need for coordinated maritime management.
2. Shared navigation responsibility: The Malacca experience shows that coastal states can retain territorial responsibilities while cooperating with international users to ensure safe navigation.
3. International participation: Major maritime users can support maritime safety without seeking direct control over the waterway or establishing permanent naval alliances.
4. Voluntary funding: The Malacca model uses voluntary contributions from states, industry and organisations for navigation and safety rather than compulsory tolls.
5. Navigation technology: Real-time navigational data, hydrographic surveys and related technology can improve the safety and efficiency of vessel movement.
6. Joint security measures: Joint patrols established in 2004 demonstrate how littoral states can coordinate against maritime threats affecting navigation.
7. Shared responsibility: The model treats safe navigation as both a regional and international responsibility, involving coastal states, users and industry.

Why the Model Is Difficult to Replicate in Hormuz

1. Unresolved maritime disputes: Malaysia and Indonesia resolved their maritime boundary disputes in 2023, while Hormuz remains affected by Iran’s territorial claims involving the three Emirati islands.
2. Different legal position: The Malacca states operate within the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) framework, while Iran has signed but not ratified the Convention.
3. Warship passage dispute: Iran’s 1993 law requires foreign warships to obtain its authorisation before passing through the Strait, creating a major difference from the Malacca transit framework.
4. Power asymmetry: Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore managed their differences without allowing the larger state to dominate the cooperative arrangement, while Iran has greater strategic weight in Hormuz.
5. Lack of common regional framework: The Malacca states are all members of ASEAN, which provides a regional platform for coordination, while the Gulf lacks a comparable framework accepted by both Iran and the GCC.
6. Competing security visions: The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Iran follow different approaches to regional security, especially regarding the presence of foreign powers.
7. Different nature of threats: Malacca cooperation developed mainly around piracy, navigation and environmental safety, whereas Hormuz is closely linked to state-level geopolitical tensions involving Iran.
8. Major-power disagreement: Even if regional states reach an arrangement, implementation may remain difficult because the United States has not accepted the reported Hormuz framework.

Prospects for a Hormuz Mechanism

1. Emerging Iran–Oman framework: Iran and Oman have reportedly agreed on a framework for reopening the Strait, although the Strait has not yet reopened.
2. Proposed funding mechanism: The reported Omani proposal envisages voluntary user fees for navigation services, environmental protection and search-and-rescue operations.
3. Reduced unilateral control: The proposed arrangement could provide for joint regional management, rather than leaving the Strait solely under Iranian control.
4. Wider strategic significance: A permanent mechanism could affect the security architecture of the Gulf, given the Strait’s importance to both regional and global maritime security.

Way Forward

1. Resolve maritime differences: Regional states need greater progress on maritime boundaries and territorial disputes before a stable cooperative framework can emerge.
2. Build regional consensus: Iran, Oman and other Gulf states need agreement on the basic principles governing maritime navigation and security.
3. Create clear mechanisms: Broad principles should be translated into specific rules, responsibilities and implementation procedures.
4. Secure international acceptance: Major international users, particularly the United States, need to be accommodated because Hormuz connects regional security with global maritime interests.
5. Institutionalise cooperation: A permanent mechanism should provide continuity beyond individual negotiations and temporary responses to crises.

Conclusion

The Malacca–Singapore experience offers useful institutional lessons, but not a ready-made solution for Hormuz. Its framework emerged from specific legal and regional conditions that differ from the Gulf. A workable Hormuz mechanism therefore requires regional consensus, clear navigation rules, concrete commitments and international acceptance. Such cooperation could improve maritime safety while strengthening the wider security architecture of the Gulf.

Question for practice:

Discuss the relevance and challenges of applying the Malacca–Singapore model to ensure safe and cooperative navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.

Source: The Hindu