A Turning Point for Nuclear Deterrence

UPSC Syllabus: Gs Paper 2- International Relations

Introduction

Europe’s security debate has reached a critical stage due to a breakdown of trust in the U.S. as a nuclear guarantor. Tensions over Greenland and the possible expiry of the last arms control treaty with Russia have exposed deep cracks in the transatlantic alliance. At the same time, renewed nuclear modernisation and strategic rivalry have forced Europe to reconsider its defence architecture and reassess the role of nuclear deterrence in ensuring its security.

NATO’s Crisis and the Erosion of Alliance Trust

1. NATO’s original security role: North Atlantic Treaty Organization was created in 1949 as a defensive nuclear alliance against the Soviet Union. The U.S. acted as the primary guarantor of security for Western Europe.
2. Breakdown of alliance trust: U.S. pressure over Greenland, a Danish territory under NATO jurisdiction, showed the alliance turning against itself. Bullying and economic coercion damaged trust, which is essential for a nuclear alliance to function.
3. Impact on European security thinking: Without trust in the U.S., NATO’s nuclear guarantee loses credibility. Europe must now rethink its security structure, which will directly shape future nuclear deterrence debates.
4. Risk of outdated nuclear thinking: If Europe relies only on nuclear deterrence, it may repeat Cold War ideas shaped by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which divided the world into nuclear haves and have-nots.

Evolving Nuclear Deterrence From Arms Control to Rearmament

1. Changing global threat landscape: Since the NPT limited horizontal proliferation, major threats have shifted to terrorism, extremism, climate change, inequality, economic stress, and regional rivalries. Nuclear weapons cannot address these challenges.
2. Persistence of nuclear centrality: Despite this shift, nuclear weapons continue to be treated as the ultimate security guarantee. Deterrence thinking has remained largely unchanged and rigid.
3. Certainty versus uncertainty in deterrence: Early nuclear debates focused on whether deterrence rested on uncertainty or certainty. India and Pakistan relied on uncertainty between the 1980s and 1998, while Israel continues to rely on nuclear opacity.
4. Stockpiles and proof of resolve: Other nuclear powers pursued certainty through growing arsenals. Testing demonstrated intent, while the number of weapons signalled resolve.
5. Strengthening of the nuclear taboo: Even as stockpiles expanded, a strong taboo against nuclear use emerged. No nuclear weapon has been used since 1945, despite repeated threats and the development of tactical nuclear weapons.
6. Role of arms control agreements: Arms control between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and later Russia helped prevent nuclear use. However, core deterrence thinking did not evolve.
7. Return of nuclear expansion: China, Russia, and the U.S. are modernising their arsenals. China has added around 100 warheads per year since 2023, reaching about 600.
8. Reversal of reductions by the U.K.: The U.K. reversed its 2006 reduction decision in 2015 and now maintains about 225 nuclear warheads.
9. End of treaty-based restraint: The last remaining arms control treaty, New START, expires on February 5. If the U.S. and Russia expand beyond 5,459 and 5,277 warheads, it will clearly signal a return to Cold War-style deterrence.

Ukraine War and the Limits of Nuclear Coercion

1. Nuclear threats without nuclear use: Russia issued nuclear threats before invading Ukraine and again in October 2022. These threats did not lead to nuclear escalation.
2. Deterrence through conventional certainty: Deterrence worked through the certainty of a strong response, while the nuclear element remained deliberately unclear.
3. Ukraine’s non-nuclear resistance: Ukraine, a non-nuclear state, has resisted a nuclear-armed neighbour. Despite support and territorial losses, it has not been defeated.
4. Challenge to nuclear dominance theory: The conflict shows that nuclear weapons do not guarantee success. Nuclear possession alone does not decide outcomes.
5. Europe’s emerging security options: Earlier debates focused on relying even more closely on the U.S., but this approach now appears inadequate. Europe is exploring alternatives that reduce dependence on U.S. guarantees.
6. New cooperative arrangements: European states have formed the Coalition of the Willing to support Ukraine’s security. Ukraine’s experience now informs future European defence thinking.

Conclusion

Europe stands at a decisive moment in shaping its security future. It can pursue a replacement nuclear arrangement or build a defence model where nuclear weapons play a limited role. This choice will determine whether nuclear deterrence thinking adapts to post-Cold War realities or remains locked in outdated assumptions.

Question for practice:

Examine how the erosion of trust within NATO and the changing dynamics of nuclear deterrence are reshaping Europe’s security choices in the post–Cold War era.

Source: The Hindu