India China border talks need decisive political push now

Source: The post India China border talks need decisive political push now has been created, based on the article “India-China: the need for a border settlement” published in “The Hindu” on 9 September 2025. India China border talks need decisive political push now.

UPSC Syllabus Topic: GS Paper 2 – India and its Neighborhood- Relations

Context: The article traces India-China boundary negotiations from Vajpayee’s 1979 China visit to the 24th Special Representatives (SR) talks in August 2025. It explains the 2005 “Political Parameters” agreement, subsequent setbacks over Tawang, periods of crisis and calm, and why a final political push still eludes both sides.

For detailed information on India-China Relations – Significance & Challenges read this article here

How did Vajpayee set the stage?

1. 1979 outreach after the 1962 rupture: Vajpayee’s China visit restarted high-level contact after the 1962 war. Deng Xiaoping hinted at a border deal, but India was not ready then.
2. From 1998 shock to dialogue resumption: After India’s nuclear tests in 1998, ties hit a nadir and China backed UNSC Resolution 1172. Yet by April 1999, the Joint Working Group met again after a 20-month gap.
3. 2003 political push and the SR mechanism: Vajpayee proposed a political impulse to boundary talks in Beijing in 2003. India named NSA Brajesh Mishra as SR; China appointed Dai Bingguo.
4. Momentum lost after 2004: Vajpayee wanted a quick settlement but lost the 2004 election. The SR process continued but without his prime-ministerial backing.

What did the 2005 India–China “Political Parameters and Guiding Principles” agreement change?

1. Boundary settlement as strategic objective: The preamble frontloaded the boundary as a strategic priority. Both sides agreed an early settlement served their basic interests.
2. Political lens and mutual security: Article II sought a settlement from the broader political perspective of ties. Article IV required due regard to each other’s strategic and reasonable interests within mutual and equal security.
3. Natural features and settled populations: Article VI favoured well-defined natural geographical features for alignment. Article VII required safeguarding the due interests of settled border populations.
4. Common-sense reading and implied trade-offs: A practical reading pointed to an “as is where is” approach. China’s strategic focus was Aksai Chin, while India’s settled populations centred on Arunachal Pradesh.

Where did talks falter and evolve?

1. 2007 recoil on Article VII and Tawang: In Berlin, Yang Jiechi said mere population presence would not affect Chinese claims. This restated Beijing’s claim over Tawang.
2. Framework progress but a sticking point: By Dai’s tenure end, an 18-point consensus on a resolution framework was recorded. Shivshankar Menon later said the framework was done, but China still sought Tawang.
3. Revealed understandings during Doklam: The 2017 crisis disclosed agreement on the Sikkim-Tibet alignment along the watershed. Both sides also agreed to consult third countries on trijunctions.

What changed by 2024–25?

1. A decade of swings and a long hiatus: There were incidents at Chumar in 2014, the 2017 Doklam crisis, and a 2018–2019 détente. The 2020 crisis followed, and the SRs did not meet formally between 2019 and 2024.
2. Leaders reopen the channel, 24th SR round: Talks resumed after a Modi–Xi meeting at BRICS in Kazan. On August 19, 2025, SRs reaffirmed pursuit of a “reasonable and mutually acceptable framework” based on the 2005 agreement.
3. Early harvest and better border management: They set up a special expert group to settle the Sikkim-Tibet boundary first. They also tasked new border management methods to replace the systems that failed in 2020.

What still blocks a settlement?

1. Costs of deployments and failed de-escalation: Both sides maintain heavy deployments along the LAC at high cost. The 1996 effort to build down forces did not achieve its purpose.
2. Agreement basics exist, execution lags: The essentials to align the boundary already exist from prior understandings. What is missing is the political go-ahead to implement them on the ground.
3. Needed a shared political decision: A settlement requires leaders to accept that an unsettled border yields no gains. It risks larger losses compared to normalising the boundary through agreement.

Question for practice:

Examine why, despite the 2005 Political Parameters agreement, India and China have not reached a final border settlement.