India- China boundary conflict

Source– The post is based on the article “What Yangtse Means” published in The Times of India and “Tawang incident should drive home the urgency of army modernisation, reconsideration of ill-conceived Agnipath” published in The Indian Express on 15th December 2022.

Syllabus: GS2- India and neighbourhood relations

Relevance– India and Chinese relationship

News– The article explains the issue of frequent border conflicts between India and China.

Recently, there was a serious clash between Indian and Chinese troops at Yangtse near Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh.

What are the probable reasons for the increasing confrontation on LAC?

Lack of clarification on LAC– LAC has not been jointly delineated or demarcated by India and China. In some parts of this mountainous geography, each side’s perception of the LAC is different from the other’s.

There are pockets where these conceptions overlap. Yangtse is one such pocket where Indian and Chinese perceptions of the LAC differ.

Buffer zones– Another reason is creation of buffer zones. The area in between is currently not patrolled by either side at least until the two sides agree to a methodology for such patrols.

Expansion of territory– It indicates a pre-planned operation to exploit a window of opportunity. The intent seems to have been to seize the post in an area claimed by the Chinese. The LAC would have been permanently altered.

The Tawang incident was not the outcome of a local initiative. This operation could have only been conceived at the highest levels in China.

What are the larger strategic dimensions of Chinese strategy?

Political dimension– The LAC is a political issue in China. Politically, even a small victory over the Indian Army through salami slicing, could have diverted attention from China’s internal economic and social turmoil.

Geopolitics– This incident must also be viewed against a larger canvas. It may be  the political messaging of retaliation against the recent Indo-US military exercises.

It could also have been designed to force a postponement of the IAF exercises to be conducted in the east shortly. Such activities could enable the Chinese to increase its presence in the Indian Ocean Region by diverting India’s attention.

Strategic prioritisation– The apparent priority for China is annexing Taiwan. However, annexing Taiwan militarily requires extensive training and resources. It is also a major political risk. The chances of immediate military action against Taiwan are low.

In contrast, military action along the LAC with India can be undertaken at a time and place of China’s choice, with fewer resources and calibrated for maximum effect. The political risks are low. Therefore, India is the greater priority for China from a military perspective.

Why have such incidents of physical contact between troops of each side become more frequent?

China has improved the infrastructure on its side to such an extent that the PLA is able to move its troops to the very limits of its claimed territory at quick speeds.

The PLA has been instructed by its leadership to protect every inch of Chinese territory in a proactive manner.

China and its military troops are not merely more assertive, they are also more aggressive.

infrastructure on the Indian side has also improved greatly and the Indian army too is able to move troops and equipment to the border faster than ever before.

But the terrain on the Indian side is higher mountains where both road building as well as transporting men and material are very difficult.

The Chinese side has the Tibetan plateau where both infrastructure development as well as transportation is far less difficult.

Why is China not willing for demarcation of LAC?

There is fear on the Chinese side that once there is a common idea of where the LAC lies, this line would then become the de-facto boundary between the two countries. It may be unacceptable to them.

They desire to achieve such a result unilaterally, through use of force. This is exactly what they attempted in eastern Ladakh.

What is the level of India’s defence preparedness for Chinese aggression?

Our jointness and theatrisation initiatives seem to be lagging despite the new CDS. Our modernisation programmes appear episodic.

The strategic partnership plan to produce submarines has hit a roadblock. The requirement of a lightweight tank for high altitudes is still on paper. There seems to be no comprehensive plan for firepower enhancement.

The difference between the PLA and Indian troops is evident in this incident.

What is the way forward for India?

India needs to rethink national security and focus holistically on the clear and present threat of China.

It needs to rethink the ill-planned Agnipath scheme on an emergency basis.