India’s travails in negotiating a friendless world

UPSC Syllabus Topic: GS Paper 2 –International relation.

Introduction

India faces a harsher global landscape and shrinking diplomatic space. Multilateralism has weakened, flexibility is lacking, and a trust deficit is growing. India was absent or marginal in key events abroad and hesitant or helpless during churn in its neighbourhood. The earlier “sweet spot” of being courted by major powers has eroded. The result is a tougher, more transactional world in which India must reset aims toward core security and economic interests. India’s travails in negotiating a friendless world.

Arguments for a decline in India’s geopolitical relevance

1. Marginalisation in key theatres: India was absent from the Gaza peace process. The settlement was shaped by the United States with Türkiye, Egypt, Qatar, and others. India then sent very low-level representation to the reconciliation event, signalling reduced influence in West Asia.
2. Weak presence amid neighbourhood upheavals: India looked like a bystander in Nepal’s Gen Z revolution. This happened despite proximity and stakes. Bangladesh and Nepal now appear more hostile, and Sri Lanka’s surface calm still leaves room for external meddling.
3. Adverse strategic alignments in West Asia: Türkiye sided with Pakistan during the India–Pakistan conflict and gained visibility in West Asia. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement, reinforcing the perception that India is an outlier in a region where it earlier had comfort.
4. Erosion across South Asia: China became the top trading partner for Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. Maldives expelled Indian military personnel. Chinese projects moved faster than Indian ones in Nepal and Sri Lanka, pulling neighbours closer to Beijing. Backing Sheikh Hasina despite rights concerns hurt India’s credibility in Bangladesh.
5. From sweet spot to reduced leverage: India earlier enjoyed a sweet spot. The U.S. courted India, China watched India’s choices, and Russia stayed engaged. Global crises and India’s firm autonomy on Russia reduced patience in Washington and made ties more transactional. The Russia–Ukraine war exposed over-expectations about India’s leverage with Russia and its moral sway.
6. China’s pressure and reach
   Since 2020, moves at the LAC changed facts on the ground; external partners could not reverse them. Beijing shifted to hard leverage and a hierarchical stance. It expanded influence to India’s east through businesses, universities, research centres, and cyberspace. As U.S. influence wanes in parts of Asia, a China-led order is emerging in East and Southeast Asia, further shrinking India’s leverage.
7. Risky drift and north-west volatility
   

• After the Tianjin meeting in August 2025, relations briefly warmed. This encouraged some in India to treat the June 2020 Galwan clash as a “mere blip” and push for normalisation, even though little changed on the ground and talks lacked candour.
• India’s influence in the Afghanistan–Pakistan region has weakened. It now watches events unfold rather than shaping them. India seems content with Taliban attacks on Pakistan, instead of actively using its own diplomatic or strategic tools.

Arguments against a decline in India’s geopolitical relevance

1. Growing economic weight: India’s economy is expanding. It now ranks among the top five. Rising heft sustains relevance.
2. Proven balancing record: India works with the Quad and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. It deepens ties with the United States while keeping links with Russia. Multi-alignment still gives options.
3. Energy and sanction navigation: India continued buying Russian oil after the Ukraine war. It protected energy security without a major diplomatic rupture. Room for manoeuvre remains.
4. Technology and forum gains: The iCET initiative opened doors in advanced tech. Hosting the G20 strengthened convening power. These platforms preserve India’s visibility and voice.
5. Ongoing engagement with China: Diplomacy with China is ongoing. While fragile and risk-laden, channels exist. Caution is advised, but total breakdown is not preordained.

What should be done

1. Reset to cooperative neighbourhood diplomacy:

• Abandon interventionist reflexes. Treat neighbours as equal partners with their own priorities. Build mutual respectand sovereignty-sensitive engagement.
• People-to-people links and cultural diplomacy must counter alienation in Sri Lanka, Nepal, Maldives, and Bangladesh. Re-invest in soft power through education, exchanges, and shared heritage.

2. Prioritise economic interdependence over political control

• Shift from aid-as-leverage to growth-as-glue. Deepen trade, investment, supply-chain linkages, regional energy cooperation, and joint infrastructure.
• Provide predictable, timely financing to compete with fast Chinese disbursements. Delivery speed and scale must become core metrics.
• Reduce micromanagement, avoid implicit loyalty demands, and focus on tangible benefits.

3. Re-energise regional institutions

• Reform SAARC to make it functional: simplify procedures, curb unanimity-style blocks, and start joint programmes on climate, health, and security.
• In parallel, use BIMSTEC and BRICS to give South Asia a stronger voice and diversify engagement across multiple platforms.

4. Calibrate great-power ties with realism

• With the sweet spot gone, do not bank on positional bargaining between Washington and Beijing.
• Stabilise ties with both on specific levers: technology, market access, targeted security cooperation, and crisis management.
• Make capacity-building at home the core goal—strong industry, defence, and technology—not optics or headline diplomacy.

5. Hard-power revival and border prudence

• Accelerate defence-industrial reform and joint ventures to close capability gaps. Maintain border vigilance and avoid complacency on the LAC.
• In engagement with China, use candid exchanges and aim for real progress, not cosmetic patch-ups, which are risky.
• In the north-west, limit Pakistan’s harmful capacity while keeping war a last resort.

Conclusion

India’s diplomatic room has narrowed. The earlier sweet spot created by U.S.–China rivalry and optimistic bets has expired. China’s pressure, U.S. transactionalism, regional pushback, and capability gaps expose vulnerabilities. Yet decline is not destiny. If India pivots to realism, prioritises core security and economic interests, treats neighbours as partners, delivers projects fast, reforms SAARC, and rebuilds hard power, it can stabilise influence and recover agency in a tougher, more multipolar neighbourhood. Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty.

Question for practice:

Examine the factors that have reduced India’s geopolitical leverage in recent years and the steps it should take to regain influence.

Source: The Hindu, The print , IAPSS