UPSC Syllabus Topic: GS Paper 2 -International relation.
Introduction
Israel sought to ride a favourable regional moment. The October 7 shock opened a war that spread beyond Gaza. Israel achieved notable battlefield effects. Yet the core conflict returned to centre stage, and regional politics shifted in unexpected ways. Israel’s tactical advances did not deliver lasting security or a clear end. Israel’s tactical gains in a strategic labyrinth.
Background (Pre–Oct 7)
- Regional fault-lines:
- Hamas controlled Gaza, while Fatah ran the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. This internal division kept the Palestinian cause weak and pushed the issue to the margins.
- Iran, despite economic troubles, projected power through its “axis of resistance.” Most Gulf monarchies viewed Iran as a security threat and deepened security cooperation with Israel. These opposing alignments set the stage for competing blocs in West Asia.
- U.S. blueprint and normalisation track
- The United States aimed to knit Arab states and Israel into a joint front against Iran. The Abraham Accords (2020) advanced this plan, and by 2023 Saudi–Israel normalisation was moving ahead.
- Two U.S-backed initiatives involving India—I2U2 (India, Israel, the U.S., UAE) and IMEEC—were meant to embed Israel in regional and global supply chains by strengthening connectivity and shared interests..
- A “new Middle East” in the making
- Washington’s plan placed Israel at the heart of regional integration. Momentum suggested a U.S.-led order with Israel central to security and connectivity.
- This architecture depended on suppressing the Palestine question and containing Iran’s network.
October 7 Shock & Regional Escalation
- Immediate response: On October 7, 2023, Hamas attacked Israel, killing about 1,200 people. The assault shattered Israel’s sense of security and showed that, without addressing Palestine, peace would remain elusive. Israel launched an all-out war, first in Gaza, then widening to the region.
- War beyond Gaza: Israeli operations extended across multiple theatres. Since October 7, Israel bombed at least five countries besides Palestinian territories: Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Iran, and Qatar. The conflict spilled over, entangling regional actors and U.S. security arrangements.
Israel’s Aims and Its Gain
- Declared objectives: Israel announced two immediate goals: destroy Hamas and free 251 hostages. These aims framed the military campaign in Gaza and beyond.
- Broader strategic project: Israel’s conduct pointed to wider ambitions. It sought to crush Palestinian resistance, dismantle Iran’s axis, and shape a unipolar West Asia with Israel—backed by the U.S.—as the central security actor, while pushing the Palestine question back to the margins.
- Battlefield gains: Hamas’s militant and administrative infrastructure was severely damaged. Israeli forces controlled much of Gaza. Under the U.S. President’s 20-point plan scenario, even after initial withdrawals, Israel would retain parts of Rafah, much of Khan Yunus, and a northern buffer zone.
- Pressure on Iran’s network: Hezbollah was weakened by repeated Israeli strikes. In Syria, the collapse of Bashar al-Assad and the rise of Abu Mohammed al-Golani were presented as a tactical victory for Israel. This weakened the Iran–Hezbollah link and enabled Israel to take more Syrian territory.
- Direct strikes on Iran: In June 2025, Israel struck Iran to target its nuclear programme and degrade military capabilities. These attacks signalled an effort to push back Iran’s regional power while fighting Hamas.
Geopolitical Pushback in West Asia
- Insurgency, not defeat: Despite losses, Hamas was not destroyed. It reinvented itself as an insurgency, rooted in Palestinian nationalism, making eradication far harder.
- Palestine back at the centre: The Palestine question returned to the geopolitical core. Even close partners moved to recognise Palestinian statehood, and global public opinion turned against Israel.
- Iran’s durability:
- Israel weakened elements of Iran’s non-state network, but Hezbollah remained a formidable political and social force.
- Iran absorbed 12 days of Israeli bombing (June 13–25, 2025) and fired back with long-range missiles.
- Gulf security shock: The September strike on Qatar failed to kill top Hamas leaders. It shook U.S. security guarantees in the Gulf, unsettling regional calculations without achieving decisive results.
- Saudi normalisation stalls: Saudi Arabia no longer sees normalising ties with Israel as a strategic asset. It is now viewed as a liability in the kingdom. This change blocks the earlier diplomatic track.
- Impact on IMEEC and I2U2: Without Saudi normalisation, IMEEC is unlikely to take off. The I2U2 remains paralysed, with the UAE drawing a red line on any Israeli move to annex the West Bank. The regional integration plan loses momentum.
- Security diversification in the Gulf
- Saudi Arabia signed a mutual defence agreement with Pakistan. This marks a shift in Riyadh’s security choices as earlier tracks with Israel stalled.
- Qatar received a NATO-style security assurance from the U.S. President. An executive order states that future attacks against Qatar would be seen as a “threat to the peace and security of the U.S.
- Growing isolation and reliance on U.S: Israel faces international isolation. It leans more on U.S. political, economic, and military cover to manage the fallout of the war and the diplomatic pushback.
Conclusion
Israel set out to reshape West Asia. The region is indeed being remade, but not to Israel’s design. Palestine is back at the centre, Iran’s regime and nuclear programme still stand, and Arab states increasingly see Israel as a threat rather than a provider of security. As the war dragged on without an end plan, Israel’s isolation grew, and the U.S. publicly drew a boundary—“stop bombing Gaza immediately”— signalling the U.S now sets the ceiling on further moves.
Question for practice:
Examine why Israel’s post–October 7 tactical gains did not produce a clear end-state.
Source: The Hindu
