Judicial Accountability in India – Explained, pointwise

Judiciary forms one of the three pillars of a democracy & derives its authority from the Constitution. However, incidences like a large amount of cash found at the official residence of Justice Yashwant Verma of Delhi High Court after a fire incidence has sparked concern about judicial accountability & independence. In another incidence, Supreme Court dropped its inquiry into the alleged hate speech by Justice Shekhar Yadav of Allahabad HC following the intervention by Rajya Sabha. Such incidences raises the question that: Who judges the judge?

What is the meaning of Judicial Accountability?

• Judicial accountability refers to the set of mechanisms and obligations that ensure judges and courts are responsible—both personally and institutionally—for their actions, decisions, and conduct, especially when these are contrary to constitutional or legal standards. It is a cornerstone of a fair and just legal system, aiming to balance the independence of the judiciary with the need for transparency, integrity, and public trust.
• The Judiciary in India is not subjected to the same level of accountability as the Executive or the Legislative wings of the Government. The reason is that the principles of Judicial Independence and Accountability are sometimes regarded as fundamentally opposed to one another. Judicial independence is considered ‘an essential pillar of liberty and the rule of law’. So if Judiciary is made accountable to the Legislature or the Executive it will impact its independence. So special provisions have been provided to ensure judicial accountability.

What is the current framework of Judicial Accountability in India?

• The Constitution of India provides for the removal of the judges of the Supreme Court of India and the High Courts for misbehavior and incapacity by means of impeachment. The provisions of impeachment have been provided in the Article 124(4) (SC Judge) and Article 217(1)(b) (HC Judge) of the Constitution. To date, only one impeachment proceeding was initiated against a Supreme Court judge but the procedure failed. Similarly, no High Court Judge has been impeached so far.
• Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 was passed to regulate the investigation procedure and to find proof showing incapacity and misbehavior on the part of the judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts.
• Article 235 of the Constitution provides for the ‘control’ of the High Court over the subordinate judiciary. It provides an effective mechanism to enforce accountability of the lower judiciary.
• Restatement of Values of Judicial Life (1997): The Supreme Court of India adopted a Charter called the Restatement of Values of Judicial Life in 1997. It is the restatement of the pre-existing and universally accepted norms, guidelines and conventions observed by Judges. All the High Courts of the country have also adopted the same. The Charter contains guidelines for general behaviour of the Judges. However, it is not an instrument of judicial accountability in strictest terms.
• In-House Procedure (1999): A resolution of the Supreme Court in December 1999 declared that an ‘in-house procedure’ would be adopted to take action against judges who act against accepted values of judicial life. In case of a complaint against a judge, the procedure allows the Chief Justice of that Court to set up an inquiry with a 3-judge committee. If the allegations are serious, the committee may recommend initiating proceedings for removal.

• Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill (2010, Lapsed): Sought to establish an external oversight body (National Judicial Oversight Committee) for complaints and investigations. Passed in the Lok Sabha but lapsed in the Rajya Sabha, so not enacted.   

What is the need to enhance Judicial Accountability?

1. It will induce the judges to improve efficiency and deliver quality judgements thereby ensuring justice in the society. There have been several ‘shocking‘ judgments in recent times e.g., a Bombay High Court Judge ruled that groping a child without ‘skin-to-skin contact with sexual intent’ does not amount to the offence under the POCSO Act.

2. It will help in ensuring an impartial functioning that would augment public trust in the institution of judiciary. For instance, a major controversy erupted when a sitting Chief Justice of India was accused of sexual harassment. The CJI, instead of ordering external enquiry, set up an Internal Committee to look into the matter. The CJI himself appointed the Judges, raising concerns of conflict of interest. The Committee absolved him, while the complainant was not allowed to be represented by a lawyer.

3. Backlog of cases: In the absence of any accountability, the pendency of cases has reached unprecedented levels (> 4 Crore cases in lower courts). Since, Judges are not accountable to the people or to any other organs of the State, no concrete action has been undertaken to address this pendency. Judicial Accountability might have provided an element of external pressure on the Judiciary to reduce pendency.

5. Inadequate existing mechanisms: The current framework, including the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 and the in-house procedures, is cumbersome, opaque, and rarely results in meaningful action; no Supreme Court or High Court judge has ever been impeached for corruption despite several serious allegations. There are several shortcomings in the in-house procedure. There is no statutory basis for the procedure. No judge (who faced such committee) has agreed to resign because there was an adverse report by the committee. In some cases, allegations requiring further investigation were dismissed by such committees. No FIR against a sitting judge can be registered without the permission of the Chief Justice of India & in the absence of an FIR, no evidence can be seized for e.g. in the case of burnt notes found from the residence of a sitting judge.

6. Balancing Judicial Independence and Accountability: While judicial independence is vital to prevent undue influence from the executive or legislature, excessive autonomy without robust accountability leads to opacity and potential misuse of power. Judicial independence should not become a shield against legitimate scrutiny; rather, a balanced approach is needed to ensure both impartial justice and answerability.

7. Preventing Corruption and Misconduct: The absence of effective accountability mechanisms increases the risk of corruption, arbitrariness, and abuse of power within the judiciary. Recent allegations and the rarity of successful prosecutions or impeachments highlight the system’s inability to deter or address judicial corruption.

8. The scope of information which the courts are willing to share under RTI is not too wide. For instance, the Bombay High Court ruled that its ‘file notings’ on administrative matters are not required to be disclosed under the RTI Act. The reluctance of Judiciary to subject itself to greater transparency became evident when a former CJI remarked that the “institution of Judiciary can’t be destroyed in the name of transparency“.

9. Unlike the executive, the judiciary is not under any legal obligation to prepare annual reports or table them before Parliament or the State Legislature. Only the High Courts of Madras, Himachal Pradesh and Tripura had published an annual report in the last few years.

10. There exists no provision in the Indian Constitution which directs in reviewing the Supreme Court’s decision. Except for the Supreme Court itself, there exists no other body or council to have a check on the decisions passed by the Apex Court.

What are the challenges in enhancing Judicial Accountability?

1. Cumbersome and Ineffective Impeachment Process: The only formal mechanism to remove judges of the higher judiciary is impeachment, which requires a two-thirds majority in Parliament and is limited to cases of “proved misbehaviour or incapacity.” This high threshold makes it almost impossible to achieve consensus, especially in a politically charged environment. As a result, no judge has been successfully impeached since 1993 despite several allegations, highlighting the ineffectiveness of the process.

2. Judicial Independence vs. Accountability: While judicial independence is crucial, excessive autonomy has led to a lack of external scrutiny and fostered a culture of impunity. The judiciary often uses independence as a shield against accountability, undermining public trust in the system.

3. Lack of Transparency in Appointments and Discipline: The collegium system for judicial appointments is opaque and lacks public or parliamentary oversight, leading to concerns about nepotism and lack of diversity. Internal disciplinary mechanisms, such as the in-house procedure, are secretive and outcomes are rarely made public, reducing confidence in the system.

4. Immunity and Evasion of Accountability: Judges enjoy significant immunity and can resign before formal proceedings are completed, often retaining post-retirement benefits even after accusations of misconduct. This allows judges to evade accountability, as seen in cases like Justice Soumitra Sen and Justice P.D. Dinakaran.

5. Absence of Independent Oversight: There is no independent external body to investigate and act on complaints against judges. All oversight is either internal or Parliament-driven, limiting real-time accountability.

What can be the way forward to enhance Judicial Accountability?

1. National Judicial Oversight Committee: Set up a statutory, independent body comprising retired judges, legal experts, and eminent persons from outside the judiciary. This committee should have the authority to investigate complaints of judicial misconduct, ensuring impartiality and transparency without political interference.

2. Reform the Impeachment and Inquiry Process:  Make the impeachment process more transparent, time-bound, and accessible. Introduce clear timelines for investigations and public disclosure of proceedings to prevent delays and political obstruction.

3. Mandate Public Disclosure of Judicial Assets: Make it legally mandatory for all judges (Supreme Court, High Court, and District Courts) to publicly declare their assets and liabilities, including those of their spouses and dependent family members, on an annual basis. This should be a statutory requirement, not merely a resolution or voluntary measure.

4. e-Courts and Case Management: Expand digital platforms (like the National Judicial Data Grid) for real-time monitoring of caseloads, pendency, and disposal rates, making judicial performance data publicly accessible.

5. Implementation of RTI in Judiciary: Fully implement the Right to Information (RTI) Act in the judiciary, addressing concerns about delayed responses or denial of information, especially regarding administrative matters and judicial appointments (as upheld by the Supreme Court itself).

6. Annual Report: Parliament can enact a law that mandates Judiciary to publish an annual report. This law should clearly outline the expected content of the report and establish a clear timeline for its publication.

7. Review of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971: While necessary to protect the dignity of the courts, the “scandalizing the court” provision of the Contempt of Courts Act is often criticized for its broadness and potential to stifle legitimate criticism. A review to narrow its scope, bringing it in line with global best practices (e.g., in the UK where it has been abolished), could allow for more robust public discourse and constructive criticism of the judiciary without undermining its authority.

8. Performance Review System: Introduce a system for periodic, anonymous, and aggregate performance review of judges, focusing on the quality of judgments, adherence to ethical standards, disposal rates, and judicial temperament. The results, in aggregate, could be made public to promote efficiency and accountability. Individual performance data should be used for internal improvement, not for public shaming.

9. Judiciary under Lokpal: Judiciary can also be brought under the scope of Lokpal to enhance accountability as seen in countries like Sweden where judiciary comes under the scope of the ombudsman.

10. Recommendation by Law Commission: Law Commission in its 195th Report recommended Judicial (Inquiry) Bill 2005, establishing National Judicial Council consisting of 5 judges with CJI as the Chairman. The Commission noted that such a practice of enquiry is in line with various international principles like Siracusa Principles (1981) & the Latimer Guidelines for the Commonwealth (1998).

Conclusion:
The judiciary, like any other institution, must be held accountable. But the accountability must be enforced within a constitutionally protected framework that ensures independence from political pressures. The rule of law demands not just that justice be done – but that it must be done through proper channels, and equally for all.